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GAINS OF GERMANY (AND HER ALLIES) THROUGH THE OCCUPATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY

~~Report No. 17~~

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Research and Analysis Branch
East European Section

GAINS OF GERMANY (AND HER ALLIES) THROUGH THE OCCUPATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY

Report No. 17

March 14, 1942

(9634)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 1

I. AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF THE OCCUPIED AREA BEFORE THE INVASION. . 14

II. TRANSPORT IN THE OCCUPIED REGIONS OF RUSSIA BEFORE THE INVASION 71

III. RUSSIAN EVACUATION, DESTRUCTION, AND GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF THE OCCUPIED AREA 80

(9634)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. General Conclusion 1
B. This Picture a Partial One 2
C. Stocks Seized by the Invaders: Summary 3
D. Productive Capacity of the Occupied Area: Summary. 4
E. Can the Captured Potential be Realized?. . . . 7
F. The Human Factor 8
G. Collectivism vs. Individualism in Agriculture. 10
H. Difficulties in Industry 11
I. Eating and Working 12
J. The National Minorities and the German Empire 12
K. German Gains, Russian Losses, and the Coming Campaign. 13

(9634)

GAINS OF GERMANY (AND HER ALLIES) THROUGH THE OCCUPATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY

Summary and Introduction

A. GENERAL CONCLUSION

The occupation of Soviet Territory has brought economic gains of some current value and large potential importance to Germany, but it seems improbable that the potential gains can be utilized in time to affect seriously the outcome of the critical campaign of the summer of 1942. On the other hand, the heavy economic losses of Russia are actual, immediate, and vitally important in their bearing on the coming summer war. This is the tentative conclusion of the present study of Axis gains, and of our earlier study of Soviet losses, in the Russo-German war.

Some of the factors that enter into this conclusion have been measured with a fair degree of statistical accuracy; others, just as real, can be defined by nothing more precise than an "informed guess." But a commander in the field cannot omit the enemy's air-force from his calculations, simply because he does not know its strength. If precise knowledge does not lead him all the way to a conclusion upon which action can be based, he must fill the gap with half-evidence and half-inference, and somehow get to the other side. It is only under the extreme pressure of a situation somewhat resembling this that our very tentative conclusion has been produced.

B. THIS PICTURE A PARTIAL ONE.

Hitler had two major objectives in invading Russia:

One was to break the Russian military power and to free his own forces of the burden of guarding the eastern frontier;

The other was the conquest and exploitation of Soviet economic resources.

The present study attempts to determine the extent to which the Germans have been successful in attaining their second objective. Since this report speaks only of the gains of Germany and her allies, and not at all of their military and economic losses in the Russian campaign, it is not a balance-sheet that is presented here, but simply a picture of the credit account of the Axis in the great Russian war.1/ Any comprehensive view of the net results of the Russian campaign would of course include not only the losses and gains of the Axis, but the losses and gains of the United Nations also (and particularly those of Russia).2/ Thus, at the time when many of the industrial plants of Russia were being destroyed, the war industries of the United States were expanding rapidly; but under the circumstances, it is of course thoroughly unsound to regard

---

1/ The losses incurred by Germany in the Eastern campaign were discussed in a report of C.O.I. dated December 10, 1941, "The German Military and Economic Position, December, 1941."

2/ For earlier discussions of Russian economic losses, see two reports of C.O.I.: "Losses of Russian Industrial Production Resulting from the Eastward Movement of the War Front," September 19, 1941; "Lines of Communication between the United States and the Russo-German War Zone," October 16, 1941 (Part II, "The War Losses of Russian Industry").

the total increase in American output as a net gain for the United Nations.

It ought to be emphasized, then, that the present report deals with only a fragment of the total picture--not with both the gains and the losses of both parties in the struggle, but with only one half of the balance sheet of one of the parties; that is, with the gains of the Axis. These gains are of two kinds:

First, stocks of goods and

second, productive capacity.

C. STOCKS SEIZED BY THE INVADERS: SUMMARY

The complete absence of statistical information as to the stocks of goods on hand at the opening of the campaign, in the area subsequently occupied by the enemy, would be enough in itself to make futile any attempt to estimate, even approximately, the quantities of goods captured by the invaders. But still other unmeasured quantities enter the equation: the evacuation of stocks by the Russians; the deliberate destruction resulting from their "scorched earth" policy; and the destruction incidental to the movement of both armies and to their actual combat. That the peacetime stocks in the war area were greatly reduced before they fell into the hands of the enemy, there is no question; yet the enemy undoubtedly captured stores of considerable importance. Besides military supplies and equipment, the booty must have included a great deal of wealth that was difficult or impossible for the Russians to remove or destroy, such as unripe grain and root crops in the fields (especially in the western part of the occupied area), piles of ore, bulky semi-finished metal products, and scrap metal produced by the destruction of industrial plants and on the battlefield. The Germans also captured some consumers' goods; but the goods that were most likely to escape removal or ruin by the Russians, and to fall into the hands of the enemy, were precisely those raw and semi-finished materials that required much further handling by the half-destroyed railroads and industrial plants of the war zone, or the factories of the Axis countries.

D. PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THE OCCUPIED AREA: SUMMARY

In the way of productive potential, the invaders acquired the peace-time capacity of the occupied zone, minus the reductions that have resulted from the war itself, through Russian evacuation and wrecking, combat destruction, and so on. The statistical information on the pre-war capacity of the area is far from satisfactory, and the evidence respecting the conditions created by the war is compounded of hundreds of scraps -- incomplete and often inconclusive; but stripped of the many reservations and qualifications that appear in the text of the report, the main results of the study appear in Columns VI and VII of the attached table. The latest available localized statistics were used in computing peace-time production; but after the data of these statistics, Soviet production increased in agriculture, and especially in industry. On the other hand, the occupied zone has continued to shrink since February 16, and further deductions would be in order if the table were brought up to date.

The extent to which the enemy can utilize the remaining productive capacity of the occupied zone is influenced by a great many factors: the defects of the transport system; the heavy strain

(9634)

of continued military activity; the limited supply of fuel; the shortage of skilled labor and of technicians, and the disappearance of the administrators of the Soviet economic system; the difficulty of maintaining a collectivist economy without the support of the collectivists; the opposite difficulty of breaking the collective farms into petty units; the general hostility of the population.

In agriculture, the shortage of tractors and of gasoline will seriously effect the captured Soviet territory east of the frontier of 1939; the less mechanized culture of the western area annexed in 1939-40 will be greatly handicapped by the shortage of horses. As a result of all the factors that have been mentioned, the seeded acreage may very well fall one-third below that of recent years and the normal surplus of the occupied area (5-6,000,000 met. tons of rye and wheat) may not be produced in 1942. In the occupied zone, only the Baltic states had a significant surplus of meat or dairy products in normal times, and it is probable that this surplus no longer exists. Yet hunger in the conquered territory need not prevent enforced export for the benefit of the conquerors.

The floundering of the Germans between collectivism and individualism in Russia agriculture suggests that here the restoration of production will be even more difficult than in industry.

The Germans will probably draw oil exports of some value from Eastern Galicia; the electric power stations of Russia have apparently been pretty generally wrecked and will be difficult to restore, but coal production has been less seriously affected. Metal mining and metallurgy have suffered considerable damage,

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

PRODUCT

OF SOVIET TERRITORY OCC

	Peace-Time Productive Equipment and Capacity (See			
	Original Soviet Territory between pre-1939 Frontier and Military Front of December 5, 1941 (Approximate Maximum Depth of Invasion)	Territory Annexed by the Soviets in 1939-40	Total Peace-Time Capacity of Occupied Zone at its Maximum Extent	De De (
(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	
1. **Population**				
Urban	19,000,000	23,000,000	80,000,000	
Rural 2/	38,000,000 2/			
2. **Agriculture**				
Sown Area; Harvest 2/	41,000,000 hectares 2/	15,000,000 h.	56,000,000	Possi Flax, affec and
Livestock				
Cattle 2/	13,900,000	8,900,000	22,800,000	Possi
Horses 2/	5,500,000 2/	3,600,000	9,100,000	Possi
Farm Machinery				
Tractors 2/	130,000 2/	No data; less used than in original Soviet territory	130,000 plus	Possi
Trucks (on Farms) 2/	63,000 2/	Same	63,000 plus	Possi
3. **Industry**	Approx. Annual Output per Latest Statistics 3/			
Fuel and Power 3/				
Electric Power	Possibly 2,900,000 kilowatts	Small	2,900,000 kilowatts	Limit
Coal	25,000,000 met. tons	Not significant	25,000,000 met. tons	More
Oil	Small new field in Ukraina	Possibly 450,000 met. tons. (chiefly in E. Galicia)	Possibly 500,000 met. tons	None.
Mining and Metallurgy 3/				
Manganese Ore	1,000,000 met. tons	None	1,000,000 met. tons	None.
Iron Ore	17,600,000 met. tons	None	17,600,000 met. tons	
Pig Iron	4,300,000 met. tons plus	Not significant	4,300,000 met. tons plus	
Steel Ingots	4,200,000 met. tons plus	Probably none	4,200,000 met. tons plus	
Rolled Steel	2,097,000 met. tons plus	Probably none	2,097,000 met. tons plus	
Aluminum	45,000 met. tons	Probably none	45,000 met. tons	
Machine-Building and 3/ Metal-Fabricating	6,323,000,000 roubles	Minor	6,323,000,000 roubles plus	Redu
4. **Transportation**				
Railways	25,000 km	12,500 km	37,500 km	Pos

UCTIVE CAPACITY
OCCUPIED BY GERMANY AND HER ALLIES
e Footnote 1) Peace-Time Productive Equipment and Capacity

Deductions for Shrinkage of Occupied Zone between Dec.5,1941 and Feb.16,1942 (Very Rough Estimates) (V)	Total Peace-Time Capacity for Occupied Zone as of Feb. 16, 1942 (Very Rough Estimates) (VI)	War-Time Reductions of Productive Capacity of Occupied Zone through Evacuation, Destruction, Labor Shortage, etc. (Very Rough Generalizations) (VII)
7,000,000	73,000,000..........	Urban reduction much heavier than rural; general population may have been reduced by 10-20%.
ssibly 5,000,000 h. 2/ ax, potatoes, rye and fodder more fected than wheat, sugar-beets l sunflower seeds.	Possibly 51,000,000 h.........	Acreage of 1942 may be 1/3 or more below that of normal recent years.
ssibly 1,800,000 2/........	Possibly 21,000,000...........	Large evacuations by Russians during retreat; many of remaining cattle probably starving since occupation.
ssibly 800,000 2/........	Possibly 8,300,000...........	Heavy mobilization for Russian army; large evacuation by Russians during retreat; probably much starvation since occupation.
ssibly 15,000 2/........	Possibly 115,000 plus	Heavy mobilization and evacuation by Russians.
ssibly 5,000 2/........	Possibly 58,000 plus	
nited........................	Less than 2,900,000 kilowatts	Reduction apparently very heavy.
e than 7,000,000 met. tons..	Less than 18,000,000 met. tons	Reduction apparently considerable.
ne........................	Possibly 500,000 met. tons	Reduction apparently moderate.
e........................	.... 1,000,000 met. tons	Reduction apparently considerable.
1,500,000 met. tons.	16,100,000 met. tons	" " "
800,000 met. tons.	3,500,000 met. tons plus	" " "
800,000 met. tons.	3,400,000 met. tons plus	" " "
200,000 met. tons.	1,900,000 met. tons plus	Reduction apparently considerable.
13,000 met. tons.	32,000 met. tons	Reduction apparently heavy.
eduction considerable......	Considerableless than 6,000,000,000 roubles.	Reduction apparently very heavy.
ossibly 3,500 km........	Possibly 34,000 km.	Reduction probably heavier than in any other branch of Russian economy except perhaps armament factories.

FOOTNOTES TO TABLE (on page 6):

1. The data in this Table should be used only in connection with the numerous reservations and qualifications stated in the Summary and in Parts I, II, and III of the body of this monograph.

2. The estimates for the parts of the divided districts that lie within the occupied zone are based on the assumption (not entirely valid, of course), that in peacetime the totals of rural population, sown area, livestock and farm machinery for each district were uniformly distributed throughout that district. There are no statistics available for sub-divisions of districts.

3. The national trend of industrial production was generally markedly upward after the date of the latest available localized statistics, employed in this column.

while both evacuation and destruction by the Russians have been very heavy in the machine-building and metal-fabricating industries; here skill and organization are extremely important, and the full recovery of production is hardly to be expected for a long time to come.

Railway transportation probably suffered more heavily than any other major branch of Russian economy, and under the maximum pressure of military necessity this industry has probably had the maximum degree of recovery.

E. CAN THE CAPTURED POTENTIAL BE REALIZED?

Even in this brief summary, some of the factors mentioned above are deserving of a fuller treatment than they have already received, and one new debit item ought at least to be mentioned.

This last is the shutting off of Germany's peace-time imports from Russia and of transit goods that formerly were shipped to Germany by way of Russia - items of some consequence to Germany, especially after the establishment of the Allied sea-blockade.

Another item, no more than mentioned above, is the continuance of a considerable military activity on the Russo-German front throughout the current winter, with the consequent diversion of German man-power, directive energy, materials, and transport-facilities from the task of repairing and reconditioning the captured apparatus of production. This diversion is a very important result of the winter campaign of the Russian army, but one that is rarely mentioned. This campaign has deprived the invaders of some of the resources that they controlled at the beginning of December, but perhaps an even more important fact is that it has hampered them radically in their enjoyment of the rest.

The question of how to restore and utilize effectively the productive capacity that they have conquered, is one that must be causing the Germans and their allies endless trouble. It seems probable that the bottleneck in their whole economic-military system in the occupied territory is transportation. Among all the major factors in Russian economy, the under-developed railway system is probably the one that was most damaged (chiefly through the evacuation of rolling stock and the destruction of tracks and bridges by the Russians), and the one that has since profited most through reconstruction by the Germans. A captured steel mill in Belgium or Bohemia can do the work of a steel mill that has been captured in the Donets Basin; but if military operations are to be carried on and economic resources are to be exploited in the occupied zone of Russia, the transport system must function right there on the spot. The acuteness of the transport crisis is suggested by the fact that at least for a time the Germans moved considerable quantities of men and material to the front by air.

F. THE HUMAN FACTOR.

The problem of exploiting the conquest for the benefit of the conquerors is in considerable part a problem in human relations. National patriotism and the revolutionery spirit are the chief moral forces of opposition to the conquerors, and in a rough way these two motives increase in strength as one rises toward the top of Soviet Russian society: in the part of the population that is still out of sympathy with Communism, Russian patriotism is generally strongest in the upper levels, while in the revolutionary sector, Communism becomes more and more powerful, in general, as one climbs the scale of Soviet organization from unskilled agricultural and industrial workers at the bottom up through skilled labor and the technical group (now largely selected and trained under the Soviets) to the upper levels of the hierarchy that directs the economic and political life of the country--directs it by a combination of persuasion and policing, leadership and force.

There is every reason to believe that the proportion of disappearance from the occupied territory increases in approximately this same way, as one rises in the scale of Russian society through the levels of skilled labor, technical skill, and administrative authority; and apparently the Germans have improved upon this process of skimming off the upper strata by executing some of the local leaders whom they found still on captured territory.

This is no place for a general dissertation of Soviet society and the Soviet state; but there is no doubt that a wholesale evacuation and decimation of leadership and police power must have its maximum effect when applied to the most highly centralized society in the world. The problem of replacing this lost skill, leadership, and force, is by all odds the most difficult that the Germans have faced in any of the countries that they have thus far over-run.

In Soviet society, there are two elements of some consequence to which the Germans might perhaps appeal for cooperation in the construction of the "New Order": those peasants who would still prefer individual farming to the collective system, and those members of the national minorities who hope for separation from the Soviet Union. Very little is known abroad of the strength of these two tendencies; but now that the Germans are in a position to sample the temper of many millions of Soviet citizens, they should be better able than anyone else to judge the power of peasant individualism and nationalist separatism. Up to date, the Germans have fumbled badly in the handling of both.

G. COLLECTIVISM VS. INDIVIDUALISM IN AGRICULTURE.

It is well known that the Nazis have long preached the virtues of individual peasant property and small-scale cultivation (however inconsistent this may be with their belief in large-scale plants and centralized control for industry). Yet they have acknowledged that any attempt to break up the agricultural collectives in Russia must result in a heavy decline in output, at least during a long period of transition; the collectives are organized and mechanically equipped for large-scale operations (though it may be no easy matter to find gasoline for their tractors), and the Nazis must know that any attempt to partition the common land and the common inventory (largely unpartitionable) would result in vast confusion, and in outright civil war between collectivist and anti-collectivist peasants in thousands of villages. In this situation, the Nazis have been in the peculiar position of trying to maintain and operate a collective system of agriculture which they have condemned, with the help of certain anti-collectivist peasants whose desires

(9634)

they have been afraid fully to satisfy, and certainly without the sympathy of the collectivist wing of the peasantry. In other words the Nazi agricultural system in Russia has been hanging in the air; it has made no all-out appeal to any element of the population.

At this writing, vague and somewhat confusing reports are coming in of a decree that apparently provides for the abolition of the agricultural collectives, after the war; for the present, this law seems to maintain the joint cultivation of the bulk of the land, but directs the allotment of a part of the soil in small supplementary private holdings to peasants who will still continue to work chiefly on the collective farms.[1]

Details are lacking, but apparently the Germans are afraid either to maintain the collective system in full vigor or to abolish it outright. It would seem that they are faced with a period of confusion and even of considerable local violence, and there is a poor prospect of a substantial restoration of agricultural production in 1942.

H. DIFFICULTIES IN INDUSTRY.

In industry, the problem is somewhat less complex; there is no question here of attempting to break up the large-scale plants into units that correspond in scale to individual peasant farms. On the other hand, the revolutionary spirit is stronger in the industrial system than it is in agriculture; the losses in the middle and higher levels of the personnel must have been much heavier, and the evacuation and destruction of equipment more extensive. To put Soviet industry into full operation will be a long and very difficult task.

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[1] Cables from Johnson, Stockholm, February 28, 1942, Nos. A380, 388; dispatch from Berne, New York Times, February 28, 1942, (from a German broadcast recorded by the United Press).

(9634)

I. EATING AND WORKING.

One consideration that affects all branches of economy in the occupied territory is the question as to how much squeeze may be applied, without producing diminishing returns. How much can the invaders take out of the country without reducing dis-proportionately its capacity to produce? Soviet citizens are already familiar with the doctrine that he who does not work shall not eat; but a still more fundamental law is that he who does not eat cannot work. There is no reason to believe that it has been or will be the policy of the Germans to satisfy the normal needs of the inhabitants and to take only the surplus that then remains; but even the Germans must give some thought to the effect of their exactions upon the productivity of labor and the temper and managability of the local population.

J. THE NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

In their treatment of nationalist separatism, the Nazis have done almost nothing to win popular support; on the contrary, their policy is flatly and openly imperalistic. Little has been said about "liberating" the non-Russian nationalities, and no national state has been set up to give any sort of identity and autonomy to any minority in the occupied zone. Slovakia was created out of Czechoslovakia, and Croatia out of Yugoslavia--but there is no "autonomous" Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia, Ukraina, on the present Nazi map of Eastern Europe. Apparently the peoples of the conquered territory are to be so completely subjected to the conquerors that even the pretense of autonomous partnership in the New Order is considered inconsistent and superfluous.

K. GERMAN GAINS, RUSSIAN LOSSES, AND THE COMING CAMPAIGN.

The gains that the occupation has brought to the enemy belong largely to the future. The German press abounds in articles on the wealth of the Ukraine, but aside from claims to the capture of military supplies and limited amounts of other goods, the benefits to be realized are almost always assigned by the Germans themselves to some future date. With this German estimate of the results thus far accomplished by the conquest, the evidence presented in this report substantially agrees.

On the other hand, the economic losses that the Russians have suffered are immediate and critical; and almost certainly it is here that one must look for the major economic effect of the recent past upon the early future of the Russo-German war.

-Geroid T. Robinson

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PART I

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF THE OCCUPIED AREA BEFORE THE INVASION

March 14, 1942

(9634)

PART I

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF THE OCCUPIED AREA BEFORE THE INVASION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
A. Summary 14
  1. Recent Shrinkage of the Occupied Area
  2. The Occupied Area between the Pre-War Frontier and the Military Front of December 5, 1941
  3. The Soviet Annexations of 1939-40
  4. The Shrinkage of the Occupied Area, up to February 16, 1942
B. General Remarks 28
C. Sources of Information 30
D. Population 31
E. Agriculture 33
  1. Sown Area
  2. Crop Yields and Estimated Harvest
  3. Domestic Consumption and Surplus of Bread-Grains
  4. Livestock
  5. Agricultural Machinery
F. Industry 46
  1. Fuel and Power
    a. Coal
    b. Oil
    c. Peat
    d. Electric Power
  2. Iron Ore, Manganese Ore and Ferrous Metallurgy
    a. Iron Ore
    b. Manganese Ore
    c. Pig Iron
    d. Steel
  3. Non-Ferrous Metallurgy
    a. Nickel
    b. Aluminum
    c. Lead and Zinc
    d. Copper
  4. Machine-Building and Metal-Fabricating Industry
  5. Lumber

(9634)

PART I

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF THE OCCUPIED AREA BEFORE THE INVASION

A. SUMMARY

This part of the report attempts to answer a single question: When the present Russo-German war began, what resources--human, agricultural, and industrial--were to be found within the part of the Soviet Union that has since been over-run by the Germans and their allies?

1. Recent Shrinkage of the Occupied Area.

The completion of Part I of the present study was seriously delayed by the lack of localized statistics that could be fitted to the eastern boundary of the occupied area--that is, to the military front--and by a prolonged attempt to construct estimates that would to some extent replace these missing data; also, other demands upon the Section required the work to be many times postponed. As a result of these delays, the extent of the occupied area was very considerably reduced, between the date of the beginning of the work and the date of its completion, by the westward advance of the Russian armies.

Except for Section 4 below ("The Shrinkage of the Occupied Area, up to February 16, 1942"), Part I of the study deals with the occupied zone as bounded on the east by the military front of December 5, 1941, when the work was begun. All the detailed estimates, unavoidably based on out-of-date figures, are for this area, and

Section 4 supplies only incomplete and extremely rough corrections designed to make the results correspond somewhat more closely with the limits of the occupied zone as reduced after December 5. Greater precision in these corrections would of course be desirable, and could be produced with a further expenditure of time and effort; but a close definition of the peace-time productivity of the occupied area seems to diminish in importance, when it is remembered that this peace-time capacity has been cut down, during the course of the war, by a number of general factors that can be measured only within the limits of an "informed guess." These general factors are the evacuation and destruction incident to the war itself (See Part III, "Russian Evacuation, Destruction, and German Exploitation of the Occupied Area."). Also it is to be remembered that the shrinkage of the occupied area has continued since the date of the latest situation map used in this report--that of February 16, 1942.

2. The Occupied Area between the Pre-War Frontier and the Military Front of December 5, 1941.

The eastern boundary of this area is the military front of December 5, 1941, as shown in the M.I.D. situation map of that date. (At this stage of the campaign, the Russian forces had already re-occupied Rostov, while the Germans were still pushing their advance on Moscow.) The line of December 5 may be taken as marking in a very rough way the maximum limits attained, up to the present time, by the occupied zone. Unfortunately, the boundaries of the statistical areas used in measuring Russian resources can be fitted to this military front only very loosely.

Because of the pressure of time and the inadequate and scattered character of the material, no attempt is made to include in the body of this survey of peace-time productivity, the territory acquired by the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940 (eastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, eastern Finland, Bukovina and Bessarabia); instead, the pre-Pact frontier is accepted, for the purposes of this study, as the western boundary of the occupied area. To compensate, in a small measure, for this omission from the body of the survey, a brief sketch of the resources of the territories annexed by the Soviet power in 1939-40, and now entirely occupied by the invaders, is given in Section 3 below ("The Soviet Annexations of 1939-40").

As to the date of the coverage in the body of the report, further reservations must be made: The statistics employed are the latest localized data that could be discovered; but in most cases, unfortunately, the picture that these figures present is of a considerably earlier date than that of the opening of the Russo-German campaign.

For two reasons, therefore, the figures given just below (as well as those in the main body of the text) are short of the total peace-time capacity of the area occupied by Germany and her allies (as of December 5, 1941): first, the territory annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-40 is not included; and second, Soviet agriculture, and especially Soviet industry, substantially increased their output after the date of most of the localized statistics employed in the survey.

Population. On the basis of the census of 1939, the aggregate human resources of the occupied territory are estimated at somewhat less than 57,000,000 people.

Agriculture. The total sown area is estimated at about 40,508,000 hectares. On the basis of the latest available data pertaining to crop yields, the harvest of the principal agricultural commodities in a normal recent year is estimated as follows:

All Grains	31,258,000	metric	tons,	approximately
Winter Rye	7,046,000	"	"	"
Winter Wheat	9,972,000	"	"	"
Spring Wheat	1,461,000	"	"	"
Sugar-beets	15,165,000	"	"	"
Sunflower Seeds	721,000	"	"	"
Flax	289,000	"	"	"
Potatoes	28,261,000	"	"	"

On the basis of our own estimates of population and an average per capita domestic consumption of bread-grains (rye and wheat only) of 226 kilograms per year in the period between 1933 and 1935, the deficit of bread-grains (rye and wheat only) in Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin and Moscow Districts, the Karelian Republic and White Russia is estimated at 1,559,000 metric tons; on the same basis the surplus of bread-grains (rye and wheat only) in Tula, Orel and Kursk Districts, the Crimean Republic and the Ukraine is estimated at 7,072,000 metric tons. (The figure of 226 kg. is employed on the ground that it is the latest, and probably the most nearly consistent with the crop data in this report, that could be found). Deficit and surplus are for a normal pre-war year.

The latest figures, relating to 1938, indicate the presence in the occupied territory of approximately the following quantities of livestock and agricultural machinery:

Livestock	
Horses	5,512,000
Cattle	13,883,000
Hogs	13,946,000
Sheep and Goats	9,497,000

Machinery	
Tractors	129,590
Combines	36,400
Trucks (on farms)	63,230

Industry. The output of coal in 1938 in the occupied territory is estimated at about 25.0 million metric tons.

Except for a small new field near Kiev, no oil is produced between the western pre-war frontier and the military front. (For oil in Polish Eastern Galicia, annexed in 1939, see Section 3 just below; also Part III, page 28, note 2.)

On the basis of figures for 1935 and 1938, the output of peat is estimated at 10.5 million metric tons.

On the basis of regional statistics relating to 1935, it is estimated that the aggregate capacity of the electric power stations in the occupied parts of the Russian Federative Republic and the Ukraine was between 1,885 and 2,485 thousand kilowatts; according to data of 1937 the aggregate capacity of the electric stations in the occupied parts of the Russian Federative Republic and the Ukraine and in the completely occupied White Russian Republic is estimated at between 2,217 and 2,872 thousand kilowatts.

The estimated output of iron ore in the occupied territory in 1938 was 17.6 million metric tons; in 1940, somewhat more than 19.7 million metric tons. The output of manganese ore in the occupied territory in 1937 (latest regional Soviet figures available) was 957 thousand metric tons; in 1940 (according to an American estimate) it was 1,000 thousand metric tons.

On the basis of statistics of 1935 and 1937, the production of pig iron is estimated at substantially more than 3.5 million metric tons in the occupied part of the Ukraine and somewhat less than .8 million metric tons in the occupied part of the Russian Federative Republic. On the same basis the production of steel ingots in the occupied zone is estimated at substantially more than 4.2 million metric tons. The American Embassy at Kuibyshev has estimated it in terms of the production of 1940, at between 5.5 and 10.0 million metric tons. No estimate of rolled steel production is possible for any year later than 1935; in that year the output in the occupied part of the Soviet Union is estimated at substantially more than 2.1 million metric tons.

There are no nickel deposits in the occupied territory. The estimated output of aluminum (primary metal) in 1940 was 45,000 metric tons, and a zinc distillation plant with annual capacity of 12,000 metric tons was located in the territory now under German occupation. Copper production was unaffected by the invasion.

According to regional data of 1934, the aggregate value of the output of the machine-building and metal-fabricating industry was 4,005 million roubles (based on prices of 1926-27). It is estimated that in terms of the prices of 1926-27, the output of this industry in 1937 had a value of 6,323 million roubles.

As of 1935, the occupied territory had somewhat less than 29,353 thousand hectares covered with timber. The latest regional data pertaining to the production of lumber relate to 1934 and 1935;

these figures reveal an output of about 22.3 million cubic meters of firewood, 29.1 million cubic meters of other wood and 7.5 million cubic meters of sawed lumber.

3. The Soviet Annexations of 1939-40.

The western territories annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-40 (and now included in the area occupied by the enemy) are not covered by any of the statistical data employed in the main body of Part I of this report, or in the summary given in Section 2, just above.[1]

The population of the annexed territories amounted to about 23,000,000. The chief facts respecting agriculture and animal husbandry are given in the table on the following page.

The question of surplus or deficit in food-supply is one of great importance in any appraisal of the value to Germany of the occupied zone. Early in the period of their independence, the Baltic states were far from equal in the degree of their self-sufficiency: Estonia was a considerable importer of foodstuffs; in Latvia, the grain harvest was barely adequate in the most favorable years; and

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[1] Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia were annexed as a whole, while in the case of Poland and Finland the annexations were, of course, only partial. The territories taken from Poland were, in western Belorussiia (White Russia), the voivodships of Bialystok, Wilno, Nowogrudek and Polesie; in western Ukraina, the voivodships of Volyn, Stanislawow, and Tarnopol, and the eastern part of the voivodship of Lwow. *Cf.* the map in: Best, "Die Verwaltung in Poland," *Das Reich in Bereitschaft*, Berlin, 1940. The data for Lwow are included as a whole in the totals given here (Section 3) for the territories annexed by the Soviets; the reason for this is that there is no means available of dividing the data for Lwow along the new frontier that divided that voivodship between the Soviet Union and Germany.

The limited Finnish territories acquired by the Soviet Union are not covered by the data given here (Section 3).

(9634)

SECRET

The Territories Annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-40

Area Population Livestock

Country	Area in Sq. Mi.	Population	Livestock			
			Horses	Cattle	Pigs	Sheep
Estonia	18,353	1,126,413	219,020	660,890	384,580	649,730
Latvia	20,056	1,950,502	400,070	1,224,350	1,360,460	813,500
Lithuania	22,956	2,879,070	549,620	1,164,130	1,186,610	1,241,170
Poland	78,000	13,000,000	1,963,000	5,138,000	3,198,000	2,470,000
Bess. & Buk.	19,550	3,650,000	513,440	670,984	2,312,231	416,459
Total	158,915	22,605,985	3,645,150	8,858,354	8,441,881	5,590,859

Cultivated Area and Agricultural Produce

Country	Cultiv. area (in th. hec.)	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Potatoes
		(In thousands of metric tons)				
Estonia	526	75.2	205.9	81.9	143.6	916.1
Latvia	1,105	171.5	421.4	218.4	405.0	1,782.0
Lithuania	2,711	220.6	606.0	273.9	387.7	2,509.9
Poland	7,621	343.1	229.4	621.9	1,159.7	13,082.8
Bess. & Buk.	3,149	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
Total	15,112	810.4	1,462.7	1,196.1	2,096.0	18,290.8

NOTE: The data for these tables are from The Statesman's Year-Book, 1939, Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland, 1938, and N. Forterk and D. Rostovsky, The Roumanian Year Book, 1931. The figures for the Baltic states are for 1937; those for Poland are averages for 1932-37. See also the first footnote under this Section (Sec. 3).

(9634)

only Lithuania had a sufficient supply of domestic grain.1/ In part as a result of agrarian reforms, the three Baltic states subsequently became more than self-sufficient and began to export grain and especially cattle and dairy products.2/

There are no conclusive data as to self-sufficiency in grain, in the western parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine, but Bessarabia has been not only self-sustaining (corn being the outstanding grain here), but has exported a considerable tonnage.

Undoubtedly the most significant industrial product of the area now under consideration is petroleum. The main deposits are in what was formerly south-eastern Poland, around Drohobyez and Stanislawow (and also near Jaslo, annexed in 1939 by Germany). In 1937, the output of crude oil in Poland was 499,000 tons, and of petroleum products 456,000 tons. The output of natural gas in the same year amounted to 531,000 cubic meters; and the yield of gasoline was 39,000 tons.3/ The Soviet estimate is that about 80% of the Polish productive capacity fell to Russia, as a result of the annexation of 1939. Thus, according to Pravda (October 2, 1939), in the Polish territory acquired by the U.S.S.R. the output of crude oil in 1937 was about 400,000 tons, while the output of petroleum

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1/ Eichols, A.C., "The Baltic States" (U.S. Trade Information Bulletin, No. 569, pp. 13, 24 and 48, respectively).

2/ Albert Pullerits, Estonia, Population, Culture and Economic Life. Tallinn, 1935, p. 82, and Soviet Russia Today, August 1940, p. 11

3/ Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland, 1938, Warsaw, p. 128.

products was about 360,000 tons.1/ Pravda also states that the output of crude oil at Drohobyez fell from 700,000 tons in 1927 to only 380,000 tons in 1938, and that the total Polish output of crude oil dropped from 2,000,000 tons in 1909 to 500,000 tons in 1938.2/ Of the total Polish oil production in 1936, forty per cent was exported to Central Europe.3/

In Estonia there are considerable deposits of oil shale, and crude oil production grew from 10,006 tons in 1930 to 46,877 in 1934. The export of crude oil in 1934 was 13,879 tons; 8340 tons went to Germany.4/

In the area under consideration, potassium salt is the only other extractive product of importance. The deposits are estimated at 450,000,000 tons, and are found almost exclusively in Western (Polish) Ukraine. The output in 1938 was 567,000 tons.5/

No ores are mined in these territories. Peat deposits are present in considerable volume, but no exact figures are available for output.6/

Data on electric power are available only for Poland and

1/ In 1938, the productive capacity of the Drohobycz region was about seven times greater than that of Stanislawow (Przeglad Gospodarczy, 1939, xx, No. 10, p.337.)

2/ December 9, 1939 and October 2, 1939.

3/ J. H. Retinger, All About Poland. Facts, Figures, Documents, London, 1940, p. 128.

4/ Pullerits, op. cit., p. 96.

5/ Retinger, op. cit., p. 129. There is some common salt extracted in Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia: in 1939 the output was 2,000 tons, while in 1913 it was 10,000 (Moscow News, August 2, 1940).

6/ Pullerits, op. cit., p. 96, and The Statesman's Year Book, 1939, p.875.

Estonia. In southern and eastern Poland the capacity of the hydroelectric plants was 56,100 horsepower and the annual output 504 million kilowatt hours; in Estonia the total output of power in 1933 was 26 million kilowatt hours.[1]

Significant data on the lumber industry are not available. The total forest reserves are about 9,000,000 hectares.[2]

4. The Shrinkage of the Occupied Area, up to February 16, 1942.

A comparison of the M.I.D. situation map of December 5, 1941, with the map of February 16, 1942, indicates that the following changes took place between these two dates, as a result of the westward advance of the Russians and the withdrawal of the invading forces (the list of districts does not include all those in the occupied zone, but only those that were affected by the Russian advance):

Name of District	Proportion under Enemy Occupation Dec. 5, 1941 (Approximation)	Feb. 16, 1942 (Very rough approx.)	Loss by Invaders during this period (very rough approx.)
Leningrad Distr.	Entirely occupied except for city of L. some suburbs	2/3	1/3
Kalinin "	Over 2/3	1/3	1/3
Moscow "	Less than 1/3	None	1/3
Smolensk "	Entirely	3/4	1/4
Orel "	Almost entirely	3/4	1/4
Tula "	About 2/3	Little or none	2/3
Kursk "	Almost entirely	2/3	1/3
Crimean Republic	9/10	Slight decrease	Slight
Stalino Distr.	Over 2/3	About 2/3	Slight

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[1] Concise Statistical Yearbook, pp. 115 and 116, and Pullerits, op. cit., p. 104, respectively.

[2] This figure does not include Bessarabia, where forests are almost non-existent, or Bukovina for which no data are available. The Statesman's Year-Book, 1939, pp. 875, 1120, 1131, and Concise Statistical Year-Book, p. 83.

These considerable reductions in the occupied zone represent a very substantial cut in the peace-time productive capacity of this area--but different resources were affected in markedly different degrees. (Just as in Section 2 above, the statements presented below are in terms of the latest available pre-war data for the districts affected by the westward shift of the front.)

Population. In the course of their retreat, the invaders lost eleven cities with a peace-time population of from 54,000 to 272,000 each, as well as many smaller towns. The total loss, urban and rural, may be very roughly estimated at more than 7,000,000.

Agriculture. The loss in sown area apparently totalled about 5,000,000 hectares. The Russian advance since the beginning of December has taken place chiefly in the central and north-central regions, and the major crops most affected are flax, potatoes, winter rye, spring wheat, and fodder. For these cultures, the reduction of the peace-time acreage included in the occupied zone has reached a significant proportion. Winter wheat, sugar-beets, and sun-flower seeds are more largely southern crops; but at a time when Germany is short of fats, even a small loss of oil-seed acreage may be of consequence.

In the matter of livestock, the types most affected are sheep and goats; the proportionate loss is smaller in the case of horses, and smallest in the case of cattle and hogs, though the reductions in these categories may be of some consequence to the Germans, in view of their need for horse-transport and for meat.

Considerably more than half of the territory lost by the invaders is in the normal grain-deficit region. Yet it may very well be that the Germans (and the Roumanians) plan to exploit the southern grain-surplus region with little or no regard to the needs of the central and northern deficit area. If this is the case, the limited shrinkage of the southern part of the occupied zone involves, for the invaders, a significant loss in grain potential.

Industry. The westward shift of the front has deprived the invaders of industrial resources of very considerable importance. The loss of Tula District cut the peace-time coal capacity of the occupied zone by about 7,000,000 metric tons, while some further capacity has been lost in the Donets Basin. Volkhov (near Leningrad), now re-occupied by the Russians, is the site of a large electric power plant. The loss of Tula District and of Kerch (in Crimea) reduced the productive capacity of the occupied area approximately as follows:

Product	Year of Data	Loss in Productive Capacity
Iron Ore	1938	1,500,000 metric tons
Pig Iron	1937	800,000 " "
Steel Ingots	1937	800,000 " "
Rolled Steel	1935	200,000 " "

In aluminum capacity, the loss was very heavy; the recapture of Volkhov-Tikhvin reduced the annual potential of the occupied zone by 13,000 metric tons (data of 1940). In the machine-building and metal-fabricating industries there have apparently been large losses in the Leningrad, Kalinin, Orel, Moscow, and Tula districts and in the Donets Basin. Finally, the capacity of the forest industries, has been significantly reduced by the loss of central and northern territories.

B. GENERAL REMARKS

In Part I of this report, (except for Sec. 4, just above), the military front as delineated in the M.I.D. situation map of December 5, 1941, is taken as the boundary between the occupied and the unoccupied territories. Below are listed the administrative sub-divisions of the Soviet Union that lie wholly or partly within the occupied territory, as defined by this military line. It should be repeated here that for the purposes of this study, the territories annexed by the Soviet Government in 1939 and 1940 are not included; the western boundary of the occupied territory, as here defined, is therefore the pre-1939 frontier of the Soviet Union.

Russian Federative Republic, partly occupied, as follows:

- Karelian Republic (about one-half occupied)
- Leningrad District (entirely occupied except for the city of Leningrad and some of its suburbs)
- Kalinin District (over two-thirds occupied)
- Moscow District (less than one-third occupied)
- Smolensk District (entirely occupied)
- Orel District (almost entirely occupied)
- Tula District (about two-thirds occupied)
- Kursk District (almost entirely occupied)
- Crimean Republic (nine-tenths occupied)

White Russian Republic (entirely occupied)

Ukrainian Republic almost entirely occupied as follows:

- Zhitomir District (enitrely occupied)

Kamenets-Podolsk District (entirely occupied)

Moldavia (entirely occupied)

Odessa District (entirely occupied)

Chernigov District (entirely occupied)

Kiev District (entirely occupied)

Vinnitsa District (entirely occupied)

Nikolaev District (entirely occupied)

Dnepropetrovsk District (entirely occupied)

Poltava District (entirely occupied)

Kharkhov District (entirely occupied)

Stalino District (over two-thirds occupied)

Voroshilovgrad District (unoccupied)

The local boundaries accepted here are those of March 28, 1938, for the reason that the latest available general statistics with a breakdown by administrative districts date back to March 1938 or before. All subsequent changes in administrative boundaries are disregarded, for the statistical reason just indicated. The principal changes in boundaries which took place after 1933, but previous to March 28, 1938, are listed below:

1. Tula District before September, 1937, was included in Moscow District.
2. Orel District before September, 1937, was included in Kursk, Voronezh and Zapadnaia Districts.
3. Smolensk District before September, 1937, was included in Zapadnaia District.
4. Voroshilovgrad and Stalino Districts were created in September, 1937, out of Donets District.
5. Poltava District before September, 1937, was included in Kiev and Kharkhov Districts.

6. Nikolaev District before September, 1937, was included in Odessa District.

7. Before 1935 Kalinin District was included in Moscow, Zapadnaia, and Leningrad Districts.

8. Before 1935 Zapadnaia District included all of Smolensk and a part of Kalinin and Orel Districts.

9. Before 1934 Kursk District was included in the Central Black Earth District.

Due account is taken of these changes in the boundaries of administrative districts, when it is necessary to employ local statistics of 1937 or before.

The handling of statistics for the administrative districts that lie entirely to the west of the front line of December 5 (that is, entirely within the occupied zone) is a simple matter. The real difficulty arises in the case of the districts that fall partly to the east and partly to the west of the front of December 5. The problem of assigning to the occupied zone a proper proportion of the statistical totals for such divided districts is, of course, essentially insoluble; yet some rough solution had to be found. In most instances, a rough apportionment was made between the occupied and unoccupied zones; but in every case the method followed in handling a given category of statistics is explained below, in the section in which the data are presented.

C. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

This study is based largely on official Russian statistics. In recent years, however, the quantity of statistical material made available by the Soviet Government has decreased sharply; for the years since 1938, for example, no systematic and inclusive regional breakdowns of the statistics on agricultural and industrial production have been published.

An effort has been made to fill this gap with data from periodicals and newspapers; but no great success has been realized in this direction. In only a few instances has it been possible to locate figures more recent than those found in out-of-date annual statistical publications.

In addition to Russian material, information supplied by the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Commerce has been used.

D. POPULATION

According to the official census of 1939, the population of the administrative sub-divisions of the Soviet Union that have since been occupied completely or in part was 68,100,000, distributed as follows:

	Urban	Rural
Ukrainian Republic	11,196,000	19,765,000
White Russian Republic	1,373,000	4,195,000
Russian Federative Republic		
Kalinin District	703,000	2,509,000
Kursk District	286,000	2,911,000
Leningrad District	4,119,000	2,316,000
Moscow District	6,268,000	2,650,000
Orel District	693,000	2,789,000
Smolensk District	448,000	2,243,000
Tula District	711,000	1,339,000
Karelian Republic	150,000	319,000
Crimean Republic	586,000	541,000
Total	26,533,000	41,577,000 1/

1/ Pravda, June 2, 1939.

The published returns of the census of 1939 list separately cities which had a population of 50,000 or more. Three such cities--Moscow, Leningrad and Voroshilovgrad--although unoccupied, are included in the above total. The population of these three cities, reported at 7,541,000, must therefore be deducted from the total figure for urban population. It should be noted that cities and towns with a population of less than 50,000 are not separately listed in the incomplete published returns of the latest census and that no attempt is made here to exclude from the total for the occupied area any places of this kind that may be situated in unoccupied parts of occupied districts. The net urban population in the occupied zone was, therefore, somewhat less than 18,992,000.

The rural population in the unoccupied parts of divided districts and republics of the Russian Federative Republic included in the above total can be estimated at approximately 3,200,000. In estimating this portion of the population, the entire rural population in these administrative sub-divisions has been apportioned approximately according to the amount of land area lying east and west of the front line. To follow this procedure, it was necessary to assume that the rural population is uniformly distributed throughout each administrative district, even though this is highly improbable. The following portions of divided districts and republics are considered as lying east of the front line: one-third of Kalinin and Tula Districts, two-thirds of Moscow District, one-half of the Karelian Republic and one-tenth of the Crimean Republic. Because the census of 1939 does not present analogous regional figures for the administrative units of the Ukrainian Republic, no attempt has been made to estimate the population in unoccupied Voroshilovgrad District and the unoccupied part of Stalino District. The rural population in the occupied zone can thus be estimated at approximately 38,377,000.

The total population of the occupied zone was, therefore, approximately 57,400,000. If an allowance is made, however, for the unoccupied cities and towns of less than 50,000 and for the rural population in the unoccupied parts of the Ukraine, the net total would probably be less than 57,000,000.

The American Embassy at Kuibyshev has estimated the total population of the occupied area at about 59,000,000.1/

E. AGRICULTURE 1/

1. Sown Area

In 1938, the latest year for which detailed statistics are available for the amount of land under cultivation in the Soviet

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1/ Cable 12/1/41 - #2003. Like our own estimate of less than 57,000,000, the Embassy estimate does not cover the territories annexed by the Soviet Government in 1939 and 1940.

2/ Since the statistical series dealing with the agricultural resources of the Soviet Union do not divide districts and republics into smaller territorial units, the estimates for the agricultural resources of those districts and republics that are cut by the front line have been determined by apportioning the total resources of these administrative units according to the approximate amount of land lying east and west of the front line. If, for example, one-half of the land area of a given sub-division lies west of the front line, it is assumed that one-half of the sown area, tractors, combines and other resources of that sub-division is contained in its occupied part. Such an assumption necessarily ignores variations between localities within a given sub-division, in climatic conditions, fertility of soil, proportion of sown area to forest land and meadow, types of crops, density of livestock, and so forth. Hence, this procedure - the apportionment of the agricultural resources of a given sub-division according to the proportion of the land area that lies east and west of the front line - can give only a very rough estimate of the agricultural resources of these divided districts and republics. The unoccupied portions of the divided districts and republics form, however, only a relatively small part of the whole occupied territory.

The statistical totals for agricultural resources in the occupied zone presented in this report cover the following sub-divisions or fractions of sub-divisions: all of Leningrad, Smolensk, Orel and Kursk Districts and of the White Russian Republic; all of the Ukrainian Republic except Voroshilovgrad District and one-third of Stalino District; one-third of Moscow District; two-thirds of Kalinin and Tula Districts: one-half of the Karelian Republic; and nine-tenths of the Crimean Republic.

Union, the sown area in the occupied zone is estimated at 40,508,000 hectares.[1] This figure is very much higher than the estimate of 30,000,000 hectares supplied by the American Embassy in Kuibyshev.[2] This discrepancy is all the more difficult to explain, when it is noted that the Embassy figure includes in the occupied zone the territories annexed in 1939 and 1940, while our estimate of 40,508,000 hectares does not include the annexed area.

The distribution of the sown area among the principal crops is shown in the following table:

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[1] Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khoziaistvo S.S.S.R. (Socialist Agriculture in the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1939, pp. 112-118.

[2] Cable December 1, 1941, No. 2003.

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

SECRET

SOWN AREA OF THE PRINCIPAL CROPS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Data of 1938, in hectares

Administrative Sub-division 1/	Total Sown Area	All Grains	Winter Rye 2/	Principal Bread Grains		Potatoes	Flax	Sugar-beets	Sunflowers	Fodder Crops
				Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat					
Ukrainian Republic	23,513,000	16,343,000	2,945,000	5,966,000	730,000	1,386,000	152,000	804,000	556,000	2,938,000
White Russian Republic	3,337,000	2,073,000	911,000	74,000	149,000	633,000	211,000	---	---	324,000
Russian Federative Republic										
Kalinin District	1,485,000	813,000	297,000	56,000	58,000	144,000	203,000	---	---	309,000
Karelian Republic	30,000	21,000	7,000	1,000	1,000	4,000	---	---	---	5,000
Crimean Republic	898,000	701,000	3,000	432,000	---	7,000	3,000	---	9,000	97,000
Kursk District	3,068,000	2,209,000	734,000	361,000	186,000	195,000	---	155,000	82,000	290,000
Leningrad District	1,522,000	822,000	253,000	76,000	80,000	188,000	143,000	---	---	333,000
Moscow District	386,000	198,000	55,000	30,000	12,000	63,000	11,000	---	---	101,000
Orel District	2,933,000	2,043,000	954,000	131,000	153,000	370,000	34,000	13,000	---	325,000
Smolensk District	2,191,000	1,235,000	503,000	41,000	115,000	267,000	253,000	---	---	406,000
Tula District	1,145,000	759,000	270,000	93,000	59,000	128,000	9,000	3,000	---	222,000
Total	40,508,000	27,217,000	6,932,000	7,234,000	1,543,000	3,385,000	1,019,000	975,000	647,000	5,350,000

1/ Where a district or republic is divided by the military front of 5 December 1941, the acreages are apportioned between the occupied and unoccupied zones in the manner described in the footnote 1/ on page 9 above.

2/ Only a negligible quantity of spring rye is grown in the Soviet Union.

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Sources of data in table: *Posevnye Ploshchadi S.S.S.R. v 1938 (Sown Area in the U.S.S.R.)*, Moscow, 1939, pp. 12-13, 49,51,53, 71, 74, 97, 106-107, 121, 131; *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe* Khoziaistvo S.S.S.R., pp. 112-113.

2. Crop Yields and Estimated Harvest

No figures for harvests in the various administrative sub-divisions that have been occupied completely or in part, have been found for recent years. An estimate of the harvest in a normal recent year can be computed, however, on the basis of the latest data available. It must be stressed that weather in the U.S.S.R., especially the amount of rainfall, causes considerable fluctuations in the yields from year to year and, during any given year, from region to region. However, improved methods of cultivation have tended to offset in recent years the effects of drought, and the general trend of yields per hectare has been upward since 1935, the latest year for which the average yields for some of the sub-divisions are available. Therefore, it is probably that our estimate represents a minimum for the harvest in the most recent pre-war normal year.

The latest available data on average yields per hectare for the various administrative sub-divisions in the White Russian Republic and in the occupied part of the Russian Federative Republic and in the occupied part of the Russian Federative Republic pertain to the year 1935, which was considered a fairly good, but not a bumper year. These data, however, embrace only six categories -- all grains, winter rye, winter wheat, spring wheat, sugar-beets and flax. For the average yields per hectare of potatoes and sunflower seeds in these sub-divisions, the averages for the U.S.S.R. as a whole during the period from 1928 to 1935 were used, as these were the only data available.

Several different types of fodder crops are sown in the U.S.S.R. Since these crops vary greatly in weight, any appreciable change in the type of crop -- and several such changes are known to have taken place -- would radically alter the total yield per hectare of fodder crops. Since the only available data on average yields of fodder crops are those for the U.S.S.R. as a whole during the period from 1928 to 1935, no attempt is made to estimate the harvest of fodder crops.

The following table shows the average yields, per hectare, upon which the estimates of the harvest in the White Russian Republic and in the occupied parts of the Russian Federative Republic are based:

AVERAGE YIELDS OF PRINCIPAL CROPS IN THE WHITE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC AND THE OCCUPIED PARTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC (in quintals per hectare) 1/

	All Grains 2/	Winter Rye 2/	Winter Wheat 2/	Spring Wheat 2/	Sugar-beets 2/	Flax 2/	Potatoes 3/	Sun-flower Seeds 3/
White Russian Republic	7.8	7.0	7.2	7.4	—	2.6	82.1	—
Russian Federative Republic								
Kalinin District	10.5	10.7	9.3	7.9	—	3.1	82.1	—
Karelian Republic	10.5	11.0	8.6	10.2	—	—	82.1	—
Crimean Republic	8.8	10.0	9.8	—	—	2.6 6/	82.1	5.2
Kursk District	9.3	8.9	12.5	8.0	123.3	—	82.1	5.2
Leningrad District	9.1	10.0	7.7	7.2	—	2.5	82.1	—
Moscow District	10.3	9.6	10.0	8.0	—	2.8	82.1	—
Orel District 4/	9.0	8.1	9.2	8.3	92.9	2.8	82.1	—
Smolensk District 4/	9.0	8.1	9.2	8.3	—	2.8	82.1	—
Tula District 5/	10.3	9.6	10.0	8.0	119.0	2.8	82.1	—

Footnotes on following page.

(9634)

NOTES TO TABLE ON PRECEDING PAGE

1/ The figures in this table are taken from Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), (Socialist Construction in the U.S.S.R., 1936), Moscow, 1937, pp. 337, 339, 341.

2/ The figures for all grains, winter rye, winter wheat, spring wheat, sugar-beets and flax apply specifically to the administrative sub-divisions after which they appear.

3/ The figures for potatoes and sunflower-seeds are averages for the U.S.S.R. as a whole for the period from 1928 to 1935.

4/ The yields for Smolensk and Orel Districts, except for potatoes and sunflower-seeds, are those of Zapadnaia District, from which the Smolensk and Orel Districts were formed. The yields for potatoes and sunflower-seeds are averages for the U.S.S.R. as a whole for the period from 1928 to 1935.

5/ The yields for Tula District, except for potatoes and sunflower-seeds, are those of Moscow District, from which Tula District was formed. The yields for potatoes and sunflower-seeds are averages for the U.S.S.R. as a whole for the period from 1928 to 1935.

6/ No yield for flax in the Crimean Republic is available; the figure given is the average for the U.S.S.R. as a whole for the period from 1928 to 1935.

For the Ukraine as a whole, data on the average yields per hectare of several categories of crops -- all grains, potatoes, sugar-beets and sunflower seeds -- are available for the years from 1938 to 1940; the latest average yield for flax that has been found is for 1935. These yields, in quintals per hectare, are as follows:

All Grains	Sugar-Beets	Potatoes	Sunflower Seeds	Flax	
13.1	162.9	85.5	12.1	2.6	1/

Since no average yields for individual grain crops in the Ukraine are available for the period from 1938 to 1940, a hypothetical average yield for these crops may be established by assuming that the increase in the average yield of wheat, and of rye, between 1935 and 1938-40, was proportionate to the increase in the average yield of all grains taken together, during the same years. The average yields of grain crops in the Ukraine in 1935, in quintals per hectare, were as follows:

All Grains	Winter Rye	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat	
9.2	8.8	10.2	7.9	2/

It will be seen that the average yield per hectare of all grains in the Ukraine was 42.3 per cent higher in 1938-40 than in 1935; the hypothetical average yields of the individual grain crops for the period of 1938-40 in quintals per hectare, can therefore be

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1/ The figures for all grains, sugar-beets, potatoes and sunflower seeds are from Khurshohov's Report, Pravda, Feb. 11, 1941. The figure for flax is from Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 339.

2/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 337.

estimated as follows:

Winter Rye	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat
12.5	14.5	11.2

An estimate of the harvest of the principal crops in a normal recent year in the occupied territory can be obtained by multiplying the estimated sown area in 1938 by the above average yields. This estimate is shown in the following table:

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

ESTIMATED HARVEST OF PRINC

(i

Administrative Sub-division 1/	All Grains	Principal Grains	
		Winter Rye	Winter Wheat
Ukrainian Republic	21,409,000	3,681,000	8,651,000
White Russian Republic	1,617,000	638,000	53,000
Russian Federative Republic			
Kalinin District	854,000	318,000	52,000
Karelian Republic	22,000	8,000	1,000
Crimean Republic	617,000	3,000	423,000
Kursk District	2,054,000	653,000	451,000
Leningrad District	748,000	253,000	59,000
Moscow District	204,000	53,000	30,000
Orel District	1,839,000	773,000	121,000
Smolensk District	1,112,000	407,000	38,000
Tula District	782,000	259,000	93,000
Total	31,258,000	7,046,000	9,979,000

1/ Where a district or republic is divided by the military front of 5 December 1941, the harvest is apportioned between the occupied and unoccupied zones in the manner described in footnote 1/ on page 9 above.

SECRET

INCIPAL CROPS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY

(in metric tons)

Spring Wheat	Potatoes	Flax	Sugar-beets	Sunflower Seeds
818,000	11,850,000	40,000	13,097,000	673,000
110,000	5,197,000	55,000	---	---
46,000	1,182,000	63,000	---	---
1,000	33,000	---	---	---
---	57,000	8,000	---	5,000
149,000	1,601,000	---	1,911,000	43,000
58,000	1,543,000	36,000	---	---
10,000	517,000	3,000	---	---
127,000	3,038,000	10,000	121,000	---
95,000	2,192,000	71,000	---	---
47,000	1,051,000	3,000	36,000	---
1,461,000	28,261,000	289,000	15,165,000	721,000

The above production figures are estimates of crops in the field. Therefore, an allowance should be made for losses to the grain crop during harvesting. Mr. Lazar Volin, of the Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture, has suggested an allowance of ten per cent. On this basis, the net grain harvest in the occupied territory can be estimated as follows:

All Grains	28,132,000	metric tons
Winter Rye	6,341,000	" "
Winter Wheat	8,975,000	" "
Spring Wheat	1,315,000	" "

3. Domestic Consumption and Surplus of Bread-Grains

An attempt has been made to estimate domestic consumption of bread-grains (rye and wheat only) in the occupied territory on the basis of our own estimates of population in this territory and an average per capita domestic consumption in the period between 1933 and 1935 of 226 kilograms per year. 1/

1/ According to Vladimir P. Timoshenko, the apparent average per capita domestic "disappearance" of bread-grains (rye and wheat only) in the whole country has been as follows:

Pre-war	
1909-10 to 1913-14	196 kilograms
Post-war	
1925 to 1928	246 "
1930 to 1932	215 "
1933 to 1935	226 "

If this statistical increase corresponds with reality, it must be due to one or more of the following factors: an increase in human per capita consumption, a greater use of bread-grains in the feeding of animals, or an accumulation of stocks in hand. Timoshenko thinks it probable that there was no actual increase in any of these three directions, and that the Soviet statistics, on the basis of which the above estimates were compiled, simply overstate the bread-grains crops. See Vladimir P. Timoshenko, *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem*, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1932, pp. 393-413, and *Soviet Agricultural Reorganization and the Bread-Grain Situation, Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute*, Stanford University, vol. XIII, #7, April 1937, pp. 359-364.

The latest figure given by Timoshenko (226 kg.) is employed here on the ground that it is the one that is probably most nearly consistent with the Soviet data here used in computing the harvest.

In order to determine the interregional bread-grain balance within the occupied territory, as well as the over-all surplus available in normal times, separate consumption estimates have been compiled for deficit and surplus areas within the occupied zone.

Deficit Area
(Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin, and Moscow Districts, Karelian Republic and White Russian Republic)

Population 1/

Urban	5,733,000
Rural	11,032,000
Total	16,765,000

Bread-Grain Harvest 2/ (rye and wheat only)	2,230,000	metric	tons
Domestic Consumption (of the same grains)	3,789,000	"	"
Deficit	1,559,000	"	"

Surplus Area
(Tula, Orel and Kursk Districts, Crimean Republic and Ukrainian Republic)

Population 1/

Urban	13,259,000
Rural	27,345,000
Total	40,604,000

Bread-Grain Harvest 2/ (rye and wheat only)	16,249,000	metric	tons
Domestic Consumption (of the same grains)	9,177,000	"	"
Surplus	7,072,000	"	"

4. Livestock

The distribution of livestock in the occupied zone in 1938, the most recent year for which detailed figures are available, is contained in the following table:

1/ For method of estimating population, see pp. 7-8 above.

2/ For method of estimating harvest, see pp. 12-17 above.

LIVESTOCK IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, 1938 1/

Administrative Sub-division 2/	Horses	Large Horned Cattle	Hogs	Sheep and Goats
Ukrainian Republic	2,759,000	7,163,000	7,180,000	2,871,000
White Russian Republic	633,000	1,905,000	1,950,000	1,077,000
Russian Federative Republic				
Kalinin District	277,000	694,000	327,000	829,000
Karelian Republic	19,000	44,000	13,000	34,000
Crimean Republic	73,000	239,000	1,255,000	739,000
Kursk District	367,000	807,000	572,000	632,000
Leningrad District	325,000	835,000	502,000	893,000
Moscow District	73,000	188,000	134,000	185,000
Orel District	433,000	857,000	855,000	815,000
Smolensk District	394,000	890,000	893,000	1,019,000
Tula District	159,000	261,000	265,000	403,000
Total	5,512,000	13,883,000	13,946,000	9,497,000

1/ These figures on livestock are compiled from data in Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khoziaistvo S.S.S.R., pp. 118-123.

2/ Where a district or republic is divided by the military front of December 5, 1941, the livestock is apportioned between the occupied and unoccupied zones in the manner described in footnote 1/ on page 9 above.

The volume of livestock contained within the limits of the occupied areas in June of 1941 was probably somewhat greater than in 1938. During the collectivization period, especially during the years from 1930 to 1932, the number of livestock declined; but the recovery since those years has been relatively rapid; and between 1932 and 1938 the number of livestock about doubled. _/ The increase of livestock, already aided by scientific breeding and by the policy of not slaughtering young animals for food, has been further stimulated by measures introduced in 1939 requiring every collective farm to maintain livestock. Our estimate is, therefore, probably a minimum of the number of livestock in the occupied territory.

5. Agricultural Machinery

The distribution of agricultural machines in the occupied zone in 1938, the most recent year for which figures are available, is contained in the following table:

1/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 354; Sotsialistichna Ukraina (Socialist Ukraine), (Kiev, 1937, p. 49.

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, 1938,1/

Administrative Sub-Division 2/	Tractors	Combines	Trucks (on Farms)
Ukrainian Republic	78,800	25,940	43,350
White Russian Republic	8,850	1,230	4,240
Russian Federative Republic			
Kalinin District	4,030	430	840
Karelian Republic	250	20	80
Crimean Republic	3,500	1,770	2,470
Kursk District	10,670	3,040	4,650
Leningrad District	5,670	580	1,880
Moscow District	1,650	210	690
Orel District	8,470	2,030	2,480
Smolensk District	5,060	580	1,810
Tula District	2,640	570	740
Total	129,590	36,400	63,230

Because of the expansion in the national output of agricultural machinery between 1938 and 1941, the number of agricultural machines in the field has probably also increased. Our estimate may, therefore, be regarded as somewhat below the actual volume of such machinery in the occupied zone in 1941.

1/ These figures are compiled from data in Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khoziaistvo S.S.S.R., pp. 112-117.

2/ Where a district or republic is divided by the military front of 5 December 1941, the agricultural machinery is apportioned between the occupied and unoccupied zones in the manner described in the footnote 1/ on page 9 above.

F. INDUSTRY

1. Fuel and Power

a. Coal

The German invasion of the Soviet Union affected the Donets Basin and Tula coal mining districts, which in 1938 produced respectively 80.7 and 7.4 million metric tons of coal.1/

The Donets coal basin comprises partly-occupied Stalino District and unoccupied Voroshilovgrad District. There were three main coal producing centers in Stalino District: Makeevka, Gorlovka and Krasnaia Zvezda; of these, only Makeevka lies west of the front line of December 4th. An attempt has been made to divide the total coal output between occupied and unoccupied mining centers of the Donets. Since the statistics of 1938 do not break the Donets coal production into smaller administrative units, an estimate of the output in the occupied part of Stalino District had to be determined by first apportioning the production of 1935 in the Donets District, from which the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad districts were later formed. In 1935, an area roughly corresponding to the occupied part of Stalino District accounted for approximately 15 million metric tons of coal, or 22 percent of the total output of the Donets District (69 million metric tons).2/ If the same ratio is applied to the total output

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1/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38) (*Socialist Construction of the U.S.S.R., 1933-38*), Moscow, 1939, p. 47.

2/ *Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira* (*The Large Soviet Atlas of the World*), Moscow, 1937, vol. 1, plates 133-134; *Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God; Plan Razvitiia Rainov (The Economic Plan for 1936; The Plan of Regional Development)* Moscow 1936, vol. II, p. 215; and *Sotsialistichna Ukraina* (*Socialist Ukraine*), Kiev, 1937, p. 187.

(9634)

of the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad districts for 1938, the computed output of the occupied part of the Donets basin, as of that year, will be 17.8 million metric tons.

It seems best to assign the entire production of the Moscow coal basin -- the Tula District -- to the occupied zone. Without a detailed knowledge of the location of individual shafts in this mining area, it is impossible to divide between the occupied and unoccupied zones the aggregate output. (7.4 million metric tons in 1938). As the military front of December 5th runs across this territory, it is likely that even those mines which are not already in the hands of the enemy have been incapacitated by the Russians.

Thus the total annual coal production of the occupied area is believed to be in the neighborhood of 25 million metric tons.

b. Oil

The oil extraction and refining industry is located in the unoccupied part of the Soviet Union. It should be repeated here, however, that the oil resources of the Western Ukraine -- annexed by the U.S.S.R. in 1939 -- are not included in this report.

c. Peat

The latest available localized statistics pertaining to the production of peat in the Soviet Union relate to 1935. In that year the total output in the administrative sub-divisions that are now occupied in whole or in part amounted to 7.3 million metric tons, and was distributed as follows:1/

(9634)

1/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, Vol. II, p. 217.

Ukrainian Republic	1.2
White Russian Republic	1.8
Russian Federative Republic	
Leningrad District	2.0
Kalinin District	1.2
Zapadnaia District	.8
Kursk District	.3

The output of Moscow District has not been included in the above total because the peat production in 1935 in the occupied part of that district was insignificant.1/

Although it is possible to divide the output of the partly-occupied districts according to the approximate amount of land lying east and west of the military front, this has not been done because the peat production in 1935 appears to have been concentrated in the western parts of the Ukraine and of the divided districts of Russian Federative Republic.2/ It seems best, therefore, to assign the entire output to the occupied zone.

It should be noted that the national output of peat in the Soviet Union rose 43% between 1935 and 1938.3/ If it is assumed that the rate of increase in the occupied territory was the same as in the whole country, the peat production in the occupied territory in 1938 can be estimated at about 10.5 million metric tons.

1/ Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira, vol. I, plates 133-134.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, vol. II, p. 217; and Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38), p. 54.

d. Electric Power

The latest regional statistics pertaining to the capacity of the electric power stations of the Soviet Union relate to 1937; and even for that year the figures are given only for large groups of administrative sub-divisions.

At the beginning of 1937 the capacity of all the electric stations situated anywhere (east or west of the war front) in the three invaded republics was as follows:1/

Russian Federative Republic	5,370	thousand	kilowatts
Ukrainian Republic	1,980	"	"
White Russian Republic	87	"	"

These statistical groupings, except in the case of White Russia which is wholly occupied, are much too general to indicate the capacity of the electric stations in the occupied zone. A more exact picture can be presented by the use of the data of 1935. At the beginning of that year the aggregate capacity of all the electric stations in the entirely or partly occupied districts of the Russian Federative and Ukrainian Republics was as follows:

Russian Federative Republic 2/

Karelian Republic		52.2	thousand	kilowatts
Leningrad	District	682.5	"	"
Moscow	"	936.8	"	"
Kalinin	"	45.5	"	"
Zapadnaia	"	85.3	"	"
Kursk	"	27.1	"	"
Crimean Republic		32.5	"	"
		1,861.9	"	"

1/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38, pp. 157, 161, 165.

2/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, Vol. II, pp. 212-214.

(9634)

Ukrainian Republic 1/

Dnepropetrovsk	District	643	thousand	kilowatts
Donets	"	682	"	"
Kiev	"	95	"	"
Kharkov	"	179	"	"
Odessa	"	88	"	"
Chernigov	"	30	"	"
Vinni~~tsa~~	"	29	"	"
Moldavia		8	"	"
	Total	1,754	"	"

It should be noted that as of 1935 the capacity in the occupied zone was actually smaller than that indicated in the above totals, for the reason that these totals include the capacity of the stations located in the unoccupied as well as the occupied parts of the divided districts. The problem of the apportionment of the total capacity lends itself to a rough solution only. It is known that the unoccupied parts of the Leningrad, Moscow and Donets districts embrace a large proportion of their aggregate capacity, and an attempt has been made to determine the approximate capacity of the occupied stations by superimposing the front line of 5 December 1941 on the economic maps showing the distribution of electric capacity in these three districts in 1935. In this way, the capacity in 1935 of the occupied electric stations has been estimated at between 150 and 300 thousand kilowatts in Leningrad District, at between 250 and 500 thousand kilowatts in Moscow District, and at between 170 and 350 thousand kilowatts in Donets District.2/ It must be stressed, however, that the estimates obtained through this method are subject to a wide margin of error

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1/ Sotsialistichna Ukraina, p. 190.

2/ Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira, vol. II, plates 18-19, 28-29, 106.

and should be treated as rough approximations only. No attempt has been made to divide the capacity of the other partly occupied districts.

The pertinent figures for the Russian Federative and Ukrainian republics as of 1935, are therefore the following:

	Capacity (in thousands of kilowatts)	
1. Partly occupied districts	Minimum	Maximum
a. Occupied parts of Leningrad District, Moscow District, and Donets District (rough estimates)	570	1150
b. All other partly occupied districts as a whole (no attempt to divide between occupied and unoccupied zones)	243	243
2. Wholly occupied districts	1,072	1,072
Alternate grand totals, approx.	1,885	2,465

The capacity in 1937 was probably somewhat larger; it is known that the aggregate capacity in that year of all the stations in Russian Federative Republic and the Ukraine was 7,350 thousand kilowatts against 6,381.2 thousand kilowatts in 1935, or 13% higher.1/

If the figures given in the table just above (1,885-2,465 thousand kilowatts) are increased in like proportion, and the total for White Russia in 1937 (87 thousand kilowatts) is added, the total capacity of the occupied area, as of 1937 will appear to be somewhere between 2,217 and 2,872 thousand kilowatt hours.

1/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, vol. II, pp. 212-214; Sotsialistichna Ukraina, p. 190; Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.S.R. 1933-38), pp. 157, 161.

2. Iron Ore, Manganese Ore and Ferrous Metallurgy

a. Iron Ore

The iron ore reserves of European Russia have been estimated at 6.7 billion metric tons.1/ No data for regional distribution of these reserves have been found in the Soviet material, but according to a German source the Ukrainian deposits (located in the occupied territory) may be estimated at 4.2 billion metric tons.2/

The national output of iron ore in 1940 was estimated at 27.5 million metric tons and subsequently at 31.0 million metric tons.3/ The first estimate is not significantly greater than the national output in 1938 which amounted to 26.6 million metric tons. For 1938 the regional breakdown for the areas now wholly or partly occupied by the enemy is given in the official statistics as follows:4/

Ukrainian Republic	16.1
Central Areas	1.4
Crimean Republic	.9

According to recent information, the output of iron ore in the Ukraine in 1940 was estimated at 18.5 million metric tons and in the Crimea at 1.2 million metric tons.5/

1/ Tretii Piatiletnii Plan Razvitiia Narodnogo Khoziaistva Soiuza SSR (Third Five Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy in the USSR (1938-42), Moscow 1939, p. 173. This estimate does not include low-grade iron ore deposits.

2/ Frankfurter Zeitung, August 16, 1941.

3/ Consular Report, Moscow 6/9/41 - #16,600; cable from American Embassy at Kuibyshev, 1/5/42 - #16.

4/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S·S·R. (1933-38), p. 55.

5/ Cable from American Embassy at Kuibyshev, 1/5/42, #16.

The entire iron ore output of the Ukraine comes from the Krivoi Rog mining region situated in the occupied Dnepropetrovsk District.1/ The Crimean mines, located around Kerch, were also occupied by the Germans. The statistical total for the "Central Areas" represents the aggregate output of two districts -- Voronezh (unoccupied) and Tula (about two-thirds occupied). Although it is not known what proportion of the mines in Tula District lie west of the front line, it seems best to assign the entire production to the occupied territory; in view of close proximity of this mining region to the zone of military operations, it is probable that even those mines which are not already in the hands of the enemy have been incapacitated by the Russians. On the basis of statistics for 1934 which give separate figures for Moscow District (Tula was part of the Moscow District in that year) and Voronezh District, the former accounted for approximately 45% of the aggregate output.2/ Assuming that this ratio prevailed in 1938, the output of iron ore in Tula District in that year can be estimated at 630,000 metric tons.

Thus the total annual output of iron ore in the occupied territory can be estimated, on the basis of 1938 statistics, at 17.6 million metric tons. The American Embassy at Kuibyshev has

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1/ German sources indicate that the iron content of the ore from Krivoi Rog (55-60%) is the highest of all the ore mined throughout the Soviet Union and that the flinty ores coming from this district (averaging 9% SiO_2) have a very low phosphorous and sulphur content. Der Deutsche Volkswirt, Vol. 15, #47, August 22, 1941, p. 1635.

2/ U. S. Department of the Interior, Foreign Mineral Quarterly (supplement to Vol. I, #2 of Aug. 1938) June 1938, Vol. I, #2, p. 17.

estimated it (in the Ukraine and the Crimea only), in terms of 1940 production, at 19.7 million metric tons.

b. Manganese Ore

The total output of semi-concentrated manganese ores in 1940 in the Soviet Union was estimated at 2,800 thousand metric tons.1/ In 1937, the last year for which the regional figures have been found in Russian material, the output of the Nikopol mines, located in occupied Dnepropetrovsk District, accounted for 957 thousand metric tons out of a total national output of 2,752 thousand metric tons.2/ There was no other source of manganese ore in the occupied area. The annual production lost to the Germans is estimated by the American Embassy at 1000 metric tons.3/

The crude ore deposits in this area were estimated in 1931 at 398 million metric tons.4/

c. Pig Iron

The total production of pig iron in the Soviet Union in 1940 amounted to 14.9 million metric tons.5/ The national output in 1937, the last year for which regional distribution of production is available, was 14.5 million metric tons distributed as follows among the areas affected by the invasion:6/

1/ Consular Report, Moscow 5/21/41 -15406.

2/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38), p. 55.

3/ Cable from American Embassy, Kuibyshev, 1/5/42 - #16.

4/ U. S. Department of the Interior, Foreign Minerals Quarterly, June 1938, p. 22.

5/ Consular Report, Moscow 3/29/41 - 11636.

6/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38), p. 56.

Ukrainian Republic	8.8
Central and Volga Areas	1.2
Northern Caucasus and Crimean Republic	.4

The pig iron capacity in the Ukraine is concentrated in Dnepropetrovsk, Stalino and Voroshilovgrad Districts. A rough idea of the relative importance of these production centers can be gained from examination of the latest available localized data for 1935. In that year, Dnepropetrovsk District accounted for 3.0 million metric tons, or 40%, and Donets District (which in 1935 comprised Stalino and Voroshilovgrad Districts), for 4.6 million metric tons, or 60%, of the aggregate Ukrainian output of 7.6 million metric tons.1/ If the 1935 production ratio between these areas prevailed in 1937, the mills located in Dnepropetrovsk District (entirely occupied) produced in 1937 about 3.5 million metric tons of pig iron while the mills located in Stalino and Voroshilovgrad Districts produced 5.3 million metric tons. Other data suggest, however, a faster rate of expansion in the output of pig iron after 1935 in Dnepropetrovsk District than in Donets District (subsequently divided into Stalino and Voroshilovgrad Districts). Under the Second Five Year Plan (1932-1937) a greater number of new blast furnaces was projected for Dneporpetrovsk District than for Donets District. It is possible, therefore, that the production ration between these two districts in 1937 showed a somewhat higher percentage of output in Dnepropetrovsk District

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1/ Sotsialistichna Ukraina, p. 187.

than did the ratio of 1935.1/ An attempt to divide the Donets statistical total between occupied and unoccupied zones met with no success. The 1935 economic map in Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas does not separate the pig iron production from the output of steel ingots and rolled steel, and this map therefore does not make possible a division of pig-iron production between the Russians and the invaders.

The statistical classification "Central and Volga Areas" comprised in 1937 partially occupied Tula and unoccupied Voronezh and Kirov districts. As Tula District is about two-thirds occupied it can perhaps be presumed that the greater part of the industrial resources in this District have been lost to the enemy. An attempt has been made to estimate the 1937 pig iron production in this district on the basis of 1935 localized data. In 1935 Moscow District, which then included Tula District where substantially all the pig iron capacity was concentrated, accounted for about 35% of the aggregate output of the Central and Volga Areas.2/ If we assume the same ratio of production between the Tula, Voronezh and Kirov districts in 1937 as in 1935, the output in Tula District in 1937 can be estimated at 400,000 metric tons. This assumption, however, must be qualified further. The period between 1935 and 1937 witnessed an expansion of ferrous metallurgical industry in the Soviet Union; while plant facilities in Voronezh and Kirov Districts have probably been enlarged, it is unlikely

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1/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, vol. II, p. 486.

2/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, vol. II, p. 218.

that the capacity in the Moscow-Tula District has increased in the same proportion to that of the other two districts. This assertion is supported by the fact that since 1932 there has existed in the Soviet Union a general prohibition on construction of new industrial plants in Moscow, although it did not apply to the enlargement of the old facilities and the improvement of their equipment.1/ The pig iron production in Tula District in 1937 was, therefore, probably somewhat less than 400,000 metric tons, and not all of that capacity fell in the occupied part of the district.

The entire pig iron output in 1937 of the regions reported together as Northern Caucasus and the Crimean Republic can be assigned to the occupied zone. More than 95% of the pig iron output reported in this single classification, according to statistics of 1935, came from the mills located around Taganrog and Kerch in the occupied Crimean territory.2/

According to the latest available data, here cited, the total annual output of pig iron in the occupied part of the Ukraine can be estimated at substantially more then 3.5 million metric tons and in the occupied part of the Russian Federative Republic at somewhat less than .8 million metric tons.

d. Steel

The national output of steel ingots in 1940 has been estimated 18.4 million metric tons, and more recently at 21 million.3/

1/ Tretti Piatiletnii Plan Raxvitia Narodnogo Khoziaistva Soiuza S.S.R., pp. 139-140.

2/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 136.

(9634) 3/ Consular Report, Moscow, 3/29/41 - 11363; cable from American Embassy at Kuibyshev, 1/5/42 - #16.

In 1937, the last year for which regional figures have been found, the total production aggregated 17.7 million metric tons, and was distributed as follows among the affected areas:1/

Ukrainian Republic	8.5
Central Areas	2.0
Crimean Republic and Northern Caucasus	.8

For a more detailed breakdown of these broad statistical groupings, the published figures for 1935 have to be used.

The production of steel ingots in the Ukraine in 1935 amounted to 6,069,000 metric tons and was divided as follows:2/

Dnepropetrovsk District	2,436	thousand metric tons
Donets District	3,483	" " "
Kiev District	17	" " "
Kharkov District	52	" " "
Odessa District	81	" " "

The wholly occupied districts -- Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa -- accounted for 2,586,000 metric tons, or 40% of the total Ukrainian production in that year. To this there should be added the output in the occupied part of Donets District; a number of large steel mills in the Donets were located west of the military front,3/ but unfortunately it is quite impossible to divide the total output of the district between the occupied and unoccupied zones.

1/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38), p. 57.

2/ Sotsialistichna Ukraina, p. 187.

3/ Narodno-Khoziastvennyi Plan na 1936 God, v. II, pp. 486-488.

The steel ingot production in the occupied Ukraine can, therefore, be estimated at 40% of the Ukrainian total plus a large but unknown figure for the Donets. Forty percent of Ukrainian production for 1937 is 3,400 metric tons, but this figure comes far short of representing the actual situation.

The regional distribution of the steel ingot production in 1937 in "Central Areas" is not known. It can be assumed, however, that the output of the partly occupied Leningrad and Moscow districts (presumably the only affected areas) is indluded in this very general statistical grouping. But since it is believed that the steel mills in these two districts are located in and around the cities of Leningrad and Moscow, and are unoccupied, even this portion of the output can not properly be assigned to the occupied zone.

On the other hand, the total amount of production in "Crimean Republic and North Caucasus" can be assigned to the occupied zone, since the steel mills in this area are concentrated around the occupied cities of Kerch and Taganrog.1/

The total annual output of steel ingots in the occupied territory can therefore be estimated, on the basis of 1937 statistics, at very substantially more than 4.2 million metric tons. The American Embassy at Kuibyshev has estimated it, in terms of the production of 1940, at between 5.5 and 10.0 million metric tons.2/

1/ Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira, vol. I, plates 133-134.

2/ Cable from American Embassy at Kuibyshev, 1/5/42 - #16.

Statistics for rolled steel production are even more out of date than those for steel ingot production. The latest estimate of the national output is for 1937; the total production of rolled steel in that year was 12.9 million metric tons.1/ The last year for which the regional figures are available is 1935. In that year the national output, estimated on the basis of preliminary data, at 9 million metric tons, was distributed as follows among the affected areas.2/

Ukrainian Republic	4.5
Central Areas	.6
Crimean Republic	.2

The production of rolled steel in the Ukraine in 1935 was divided as follows:3/

Dnepropetrovsk	District	1,827	thousand	metric	tons
Donets	"	2,572	"	"	"
Odessa	"	70	"	"	"

The production of rolled steel in the Ukraine in 1935 which can be assigned to the occupied zone can be therefore estimated at 1,897,000 metric tons--the output in Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa districts--plus the large but undefinable output in the occupied part of Donets District. To this must be added the Crimean production of 200,000 metric tons. The total production of rolled steel in the occupied territory in 1935 can be therefore estimated at substantially more than 2,097,000 metric tons.

1/ U. S. Department of the Interior, Foreign Minerals Quarterly, June 1938, p. 16.

2/ Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 God, vol. II, p. 219. These figures do not include piping and forgings from bars.

(9634)

3/ Sotsialistichna Ukraina, p. 187.

3. Non-Ferrous Metallurgy

a. Nickel

The chief Russian nickel deposits and the only known Soviet plants are located in Norilsk (Siberia), Ufalei (Urals) and Monchegorsk (Kola Peninsula). None of these is in the occupied territory, although Monchegorsk is in close proximity to the front line.

b. Aluminum

Of the three areas which furnish all the aluminum in the Soviet Union, two -- Zaporozhe (Ukraine) and Volkhov-Tikhvin (Leningrad District), are in the occupied territory.[1]

The national output of aluminum in 1940 was estimated at 73,000 metric tons, of which 55,000 metric tons were produced from primary metal and 18,000 metric tons from scrap.[2]

Production from primary metal in the occupied territory was distributed as follows:

Zaporozhe	32,000 metric tons
Volkhov-Tikhvin	13,000 " "

The allocation of scrap production is not known.

c. Lead and Zinc

No known lead smelters are located in the occupied territory, and no detailed information about zinc production is available. The Konstantinovka zinc distillation plant, located in the occupied part of the Ukraine, had in 1938 an annual capacity of 12,000 metric tons.1/

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[1] While the front line, as defined in this report, runs through Volkhov, it is not known whether the city has been taken by the invading army; inasmuch as the Tikhvin region, from which the raw material comes, is occupied by the German Army, it may be assumed that all the aluminum production originating in this area has been lost to the Germans.

[2] Consular Report, Moscow 1/25/41 - 7379.

d. Copper

The latest localized data that have been found for copper ore and blister and electrolytic copper relate to 1933; those for primary copper to 1935.2/ According to these data, there was no copper mining, smelting or manufacturing in the areas that are now occupied by the German army.3/ Production of copper in the Soviet Union has increased rapidly since 1933. But, so far as we know, all the new plants are situated in the areas far from the zone of German occupation.4/

1/ U. S. Department of the Interior, Foreign Mineral Quarterly, June 1938, p. 36.

2/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1935), p. 91; U. S. Department of the Interior, Foreign Minerals Quarterly, June 1938, pp. 33-34.

3/ In 1933 the production of blister copper in the partially occupied Leningrad District amounted to 4400 metric tons and of electrolytic copper to 4800 metric tons; it is believed, however, that the plants were located in the city of Leningrad, and therefore this output has not been assigned to the occupied zone.

4/ U. S. Department of the Interior, Foreign Minerals Quarterly, June 1938, p. 33.

4. The Machine-Building and Metal-Fabricating Industry

Machine-building and metal-fabricating is an important industry in the Soviet Union. In 1938, for example, the value of the output of the industry measured in 1926-1927 prices accounted for 31.6% of the total value of the industrial production of the country.[1] This is a very broad category in the Russian statistical series. The Soviet figures bracket together semi-finished metal articles of all sorts with such finished products as machine tools, all kinds of armament, automobiles, railroad equipment and ships.

As is shown by the following table, which gives the value, in 1926-27 prices, of actual metal-fabricating and machine-building production in the Soviet Union between 1933 and 1938, and planned production for 1942, the total output of this industry has expanded sharply during these years.

1933 a)		11.3	billion	roubles
1934 b)		13.6	"	"
1935 e)		17.8	"	"
1936 e)		24.7	"	"
1937 c)		27.4	"	"
1938 a)		33.6	"	"
1942 d)	(plan)	62.0	"	"

a) Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38), p. 36.
b) Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 61.
c) Narodnoe Khoziaistvo S.S.S.R. v Tsifrakh, (1860-1938), (The Economy of the U.S.S.R. in Figures), Moscow, 1940, p. 117.
d) Tretii Piatiletnii Plan, p. 197.
e) Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan Soiuza S.S.R. na 1937 God, (Economic Plan of the Soviet Union for 1937), Moscow, 1937, p. 58.

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[1] Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-38) p. 36.

Obviously, the regional distribution of such a rapidly expanding industry can change drastically in a short time. It is therefore regrettable that Russian material on the geographical distribution of the output of this industry as a whole, and of its various subcategories, is scanty. No regional distribution of the entire industry has been published after 1934. In that year the areas under complete or partial occupation had the following aggregate output, expressed in terms of 1926-27 prices:[1]

Russian Federative Republic			
Karelian Republic	13	million	roubles
Leningrad District (Leningrad city not included)	194	"	"
Kursk District	36	"	"
Moscow District (Moscow city not included)	841	"	"
Zapadnaia District	229	"	"
Crimean Republic	59	"	"
White Russian Republic	94	"	"
Ukrainian Republic			
Dnepropetrovsk District	434	"	"
Donets District	418	"	"
Kharkov District	945	"	"
Kiev District	276	"	"
Odessa District	398	"	"
Vinnitsa District	36	"	"

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[1] Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R., (1936), pp. 60-63.

Chernigov District	27	million	roubles
Moldavia	5	"	"
	4,005	"	"

Tula District and a part of Kalinin District (both about two-thirds occupied) were included in Moscow District before 1935; for this reason the 1934 output of Moscow District is included in the above total despite the fact that less than one-third of Moscow District, as it was known after 1937, is occupied by the Germans. It should be noted also that no attempt has been made to divide the production of the Donets District between the occupied and unoccupied parts; according to a 1935 economic map, however, machine-building and metal-fabricating plants located west of the front line accounted for the greater proportion of the industry's output in this district.1/

The following table presents an estimate of the value (in 1926-27 prices) of the output in 1937 in the occupied zone:2/

Russian Federative Republic			
Karelian Republic	25	million	roubles
Leningrad District (excluding the city of Leningrad)	392	"	"
Kalinin District	193	"	"
Zapadnaia District	463	"	"
Tula District	140	"	"
Kursk District	37	"	"
Crimean Republic	119	"	"
White Russian Republic	233	"	"
Ukrainian Republic	4,721	"	"
Total	6,323		

1/ Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira, vol. I, plates 135-136.

2/ Sources: For the Ukraine and White Russia from Itogi Vypolneniia Vtorogo Piatiletnogo Plana Razvitiia Narodnogo Khozlaistv a Soiuza S.S.R. (Totals of Fulfillment of the Second Five Year Plan of Development of the Economy of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1939, p.129; For Kursk and Tula Districts from Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira, Vol. II, plates 18-19; For other areas, the estimates were calculated on the basis of actual production for 1934, from Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R., (1936), pp.60-63, adjusted by the known rate of growth of the whole industry in the Soviet Union between 1934 and 1937.

Attention is called to the fact that the above figures are rough approximations of the total production; it has not been possible to divide the output of the partially occupied districts, excepting that the city of Leningrad is excluded from the Leningrad District.

It is also possible to give the output of some of the individual products of the machine-building and metal-fabricating industry in the Ukraine as a whole during 1935:[1]

Electrotechnical machinery	(in million of roubles - 1926-27 prices)	281
Coal Cutters (type DTK-2	(units)	423
Tractors	" 4	40,200
Combines	"	9,538
Threshers (type MK1100)	"	10,300
Threshers (type BDO)	"	2,500
Tractor-drawn seeders	"	12,600
Horse-drawn seeders	"	37,000
Locomotives (type F.D.)	"	521
Locomotives (type E)	"	445
Hopper Freight Cars (60-ton)	"	4,565
Gondola Freight Cars (60-ton)	"	1,800
Bicycles	"	84,400

It should be noted that all the type F.D. locomotives and 110 out of 445 type E. locomotives were produced at a plant situated in the unoccupied part of the Ukraine. The above figures represent the aggregate production of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry; what proportion it bore in that year to the total production of the machine-building and metal-fabricating industry of the Ukraine is not known.

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[1] Sotsialistichna Ukraina, p. 187.

Thus, according to regional data of 1934, the aggregate value of the output of the machine-building and metal-fabricating industry in the occupied zone was 4,005 million roubles (based on prices of 1926-27) and it is estimated that the output in 1937 had a value of 6,323 million roubles.

5. Lumber

The occupied part of the Soviet Union has large areas covered with timber. According to 1935 statistics, at the beginning of that year the total of timber lands in the areas affected by the invasion was somewhat less than 29,353 thousand hectares, distributed as follows:1/

Russian Federative Republic	
Karelian Republic	8,260
Leningrad District	9,810
Zapadnaia District	2,679
Kalinin District	1,551
Kursk and Voronezh Districts	1,243
Crimean Republic	186
White Russian Republic	2,908
Ukrainian Republic	2,715

It was necessary to include in the above total the timber land in Voronezh District (unoccupied) because it is combined in the Soviet

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1/ Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 68.

statistics with Kursk District (occupied). Moscow District -- less than one-third occupied -- is not included above.

Available regional data on the output of lumber products for 1934 are classified under "firewood" and "other than firewood"; the latest published statistics for sawed lumber are for 1935. These figures are contained in the following table:

	Firewood a) 1934 (in mill. cu. meters)	Wood b) (other than firewood) 1934 (in mill. cu. meters)	Sawed Lumber c) (in thous. 1935 cu. meters)
Russian Federative Republic			
Karelian Republic	1.7	5.7	903
Leningrad District	8.2	5.7	2,033
Zapadnaia District	2.8	3.6	819
Kalinin District	2.9	3.9	787
Kursk District	.2	.3	12
Crimean Republic	.1	---	30
White Russian Republic	3.8	5.0	1,271
Ukrainian Republic	2.6	4.9	1,675
Total	22.3	29.1	7,530

a) Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. (1936), p. 188.

b) Ibid., p. 188.

c) Narodno-Khoziaistvennyi Plan na 1936 god, II, pp. 228-229.

No information for later years, either for the whole country or for individual regions, has been found in the Russian material.

According to statistics presented above, as of 1935 the occupied territory had somewhat less than 29,353 thousand hectares covered with timber. These figures also reveal an output in 1934 of 22.3 million cubic meters of firewood and 29.1 million cubic meters of other wood, and in 1935 7.5 million cubic meters of sawed lumber.

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(9634)

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

PART II

TRANSPORT IN THE OCCUPIED REGIONS OF RUSSIA BEFORE THE INVASION

March 14, 1942

(9634)

PART II

TRANSPORT IN THE OCCUPIED REGIONS OF RUSSIA BEFORE THE INVASION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
A.	Summary	71
B.	Railways	71
C.	Roads	78
D.	Inland Waterways	79

(9634)

PART II

TRANSPORT IN THE OCCUPIED REGIONS OF RUSSIA BEFORE THE INVASION

A. SUMMARY

The part of Russia occupied by the Germans by December 5 is the part which, previous to the German attack on June 22nd, was best provided with transportation. Comparison of a railway map of the Soviet Union with a map showing the area occupied by the Germans shows strikingly that they were in control of the best developed portion of the Russian rail net. They were also in possession of Russia's only modern automobile highway, for most of its length, and of a large proportion of Russia's mileage of other all-weather roads. Finally, through their occupation of the entire basin of the Dnieper River, the Germans controlled an inland waterway system second in importance only to that of the Volga.

B. RAILWAYS

At the beginning of December, 1941, the Germans were in control of approximately 37,500 kilometers of Soviet railways. Of this total, approximately 25,000 kilometers were within the boundaries of the country as they stood before September, 1939, and the remainder were in the areas taken over by the Soviet Union between that date and June, 1941.[1] Precise data are lacking as to the degree to which the railways of the countries occupied by Russia in 1939 and 1940 had been integrated into the Soviet railway system by June 22, 1941. Where the gauge was the same as that of the Russian railways, as on the main lines in Estonia or where there was mixed Russian and standard gauge operation as on the main lines in Latvia, no special problems were involved. But in Lithuania, in the Soviet-occupied parts of Poland and the Bukovina, and in Bessarabia, all the main lines were on the European standard-gauge, necessitating conversion to the wider Russian-gauge before they could be fully integrated into the Soviet system. Immediately after the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September, 1939, conversion of the main east-west lines to Russian-gauge was undertaken, except for the Polish section of the Cernauti-Lwow-Przemsyl-Krakow line, which, by special arrangement between the Russian and German governments, was left on the European standard-gauge to facilitate through traffic from Rumania to Germany. Subsequently, conversion of the other railways in the Soviet-occupied part of Poland was undertaken, so that by the date of the German attack on Russia the railways of eastern Poland, comprising some 7,000 kilometers out of the 12,500 kilometers of standard-gauge lines acquired by the Russians in the various countries they had occupied in 1939 and 1940, were largely integrated into the Soviet rail system. It is believed that the 3,000 kilometers of standard-gauge line in Lithuania, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia were in the main also converted to the Russian-gauge. It might be noted in passing that the railways in all the territories occupied by the Soviet government in 1939 and 1940 with the

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[1] Length of railways as of September, 1939 Russia from Skhema Zhelezhnodorozhnykh i Vodnykh Putei Soobshcheniia S.S.S.R. (Scheme of Railway and Water Ways of Communication of the U.S.S.R.), N.K.P.S., Transkartografiia, 1937, 1:2,500,000; for part of Poland annexed to Russia, Urzedowy Rozklad Jazdy, as of 15 May, 1931, Ministerstwa Komunikacji; for the Baltic states, Bukovina and Bessarabia, Universal Directory of Railway Officials and Railway Year Book 1936-1937, London, 1936.

(9634)

(9634)

exception of the Bukovina were all originally built on the Russian-gauge by the old imperial Russian government.

In no other region of like extent in the world have railways been built so largely with strategical aims in view as in the Russo-German border lands, that is to say, in that broad zone including the Baltic states, Poland, and western European Russia. Before 1914 both the German and the Russian government (the latter with loans from France) constructed thousands of kilometers of railways in this general area to facilitate the rapid concentration of their armies and their supply during military operations. In the period between the two world wars, the Soviet government on its territory, and Poland to a lesser extent, continued this process. As a result, this area is far better provided with railway transportation than the economic needs of the area would justify. In particular, this accounts for a large proportion of east-west lines in a region where the peace-time economic traffic in recent years has been largely north and south. It explains also the extensive mileage of double-track on lines which in peace-time carry a relatively light traffic.1/ These east-west lines could be of great value to the colonial type of economic relationship envisaged by the Germans for this part of Europe, in which the flow of traffic would be largely east-west. This would be especially true of the east-west lines in the western

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1/ Of the 25,000 kilometers of line in the pre-1939 part of the U.S.S.R. occupied by the Germans up to December 5, 1941, some 8,500 kilometers were double-track. In the part of Poland taken over by the Soviet government in 1939 approximately 2,300 of the 7,000 kilometers of standard-gauge line were double-tracked.

Ukraine, an area which the Germans have counted on to supply them with large quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials.

Obviously, effective utilization by the Germans of the railways in the occupied parts of Eastern Europe depends on the degree in which they are successful in integrating the railways of these areas into the German Reichsbahn and the degree in which they can provide rolling stock and motive power.

It is equally obvious that such integration is not complete until rail freight shipments can move without transfer from the occupied regions to Germany proper. When confronted with a break in railway gauge, as were the Germans when they advanced into Soviet-occupied Poland, there are four methods of moving freight without transferring from one vehicle to another at the change in gauge:

1) By the use of container cars. This system (used to some extent in the U. S. for package goods in combined rail and motor truck traffic) involves the use of containers which can be lifted from one flat car to another -- a sort of modified freight transfer. In addition to the objections that this method involves loss of time and the need for extensive hoisting equipment, it has the fundamental objection that only flat cars -- a small part of the rolling stock of most railways -- can be used.

2) By the use of cars with interchangeable or adjustable axles, which can operate on both standard and wide-gauge track. The Germans are reported to have equipped some of their new freight cars with trucks of this type. If interchangeable-axle cars are

used, it is necessary to maintain facilities for changing axles at each change of gauge, together with stocks of axles. Time is required for making the change. These objections are not encountered when adjustable axles are used, but these are by their nature complicated and expensive. But the chief objection to this method is that only the few cars so equipped can be operated on both gauges.

3) Mixed gauge operation. Under this system, used in Latvia and on the Denver and Rio Grande R. R. in this country, and perhaps on other lines as well, a third rail, or both rails of the narrow-gauge line, are laid inside the broad-gauge track, or one or both rails of the wider gauge are laid outside the rails of the narrow-gauge track. This system has the advantage that cars or locomotives of either gauge can be used on the mixed-gauge line. However, for complete interchange of rolling stock, it would be necessary to lay additional rails on all lines -- manifestly an enormous undertaking, especially if an additional rail or rails of the Russian-gauge were laid outside the narrower European-gauge line, since in such a case it would generally be necessary to lay longer ties also and perhaps to widen bridges, tunnels and the like to accommodate the wider clearances required by the Russian-gauge rolling stock. But since the Russians either withdrew or destroyed much, if not most, of their rolling stock, it would be pointless to lay additional rails on the standard-gauge tracks to accommodate the Russian-gauge cars, and easier and less of a drain on rail production to accommodate the standard-gauge cars on the Russian railways by converting the latter to standard-gauge.

4) Conversion of one of the two gauges to the other. In view of a) the lesser mileage involved, b) the shortage of Russian wide-gauge rolling-stock, and c) the greater ease of converting a wider gauge line to a narrower-gauge (due to length of ties), it is obvious that the conversion of the occupied Russian-gauge lines to standard-gauge would be the only practical method for integrating the railways of the occupied area with those of Germany proper. That this is the method adopted by the Germans is indicated by their announcement toward the end of September that they had converted 10,000 of the 15,000 km. of Russian-gauge lines acquired by that time.1/ Although this may sound like a very considerable achievement, it should be borne in mind that the operation involved is a very simple one. To remove one rail and relay it is a task which can be easily and rapidly performed by unskilled labor.

Providing rolling stock and locomotives to operate on these converted lines is, however, a far more serious problem. The rolling stock and motive power necessary to maintain traffic on the railways taken over and converted by the Germans must be provided from the park of standard-gauge material controlled by Germany. In view of the fact that this material was not sufficient to meet all the railway transport requirements - civil and military - of Germany in the territory west of Russia before the opening of the Russian campaign, it will be surprising if the Germans are able

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1/ For the railways of eastern Poland this represents the third conversion in less than 25 years.

to maintain, on the additional trackage acquired by them as a result of the Russian campaign, as heavy a traffic as these lines carried under Russian operation.

For the exploitation of Russian resources by Germany the most important single railway is probably the line from the Donets Basin via Dnepropetrovsk, Shepetovka (former Soviet-Polish frontier station), Kowel, and Brest Litovsk to Warsaw. This line, double-tracked throughout with the exception of the 40 kilometers between Shepetovka and the former Soviet-Polish frontier, connects the chief industrial centers and best agricultural areas of the Ukraine with Germany. Over it, if the Germans succeeded in organizing the economy of the Ukraine for their purposes, would move the products of the heavy industry of the Donets Basin and Dnepropetrovsk, and the foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials from the rich black-earth belt of the Ukraine. The single-track railway from the Donets Basin via Poltava and Kiev to Kowel would supplement this line.

The railway that extends from Odessa northwestward by double track to Podvolochisk on the old Soviet-Polish frontier and thence by single-track via Tarnopol to Lwow (from which there is a double-track via Krakow to the Silesian industrial area) would be of especial importance if the Germans had access to the oil of Trans-Caucasia.1/ Since Odessa is the Black Sea port nearest to Germany,

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1/ The importance of this railway for oil transport will be less if the pipe line from North Caucasia to Nikitovka in the Donets Basin which the Russians are reported to have extended to the Dnieper, has been extended further to the west by the Germans.

it is the natural port for Black Sea tankers operating from Batum and Tuapse.

The east-west lines north of the Ukraine, some of which are double-tracked, would not be of as much importance for Germany's economic development of the occupied area as those further south, although obviously they are of very great importance for military purposes. The regions through which they pass are not normally regions of surplus production, except of flax and possibly lumber. If Moscow were taken -- an event which appears to be highly unlikely, for the present -- the main double-track line from the Soviet capital to Germany via Vyazma, Smolensk, Minsk and Warsaw would of course become a main traffic artery.

C. ROADS

Russian roads are proverbially bad. The total mileage of hard-surfaced roads for the entire country is approximately the same as that for the State of Connecticut.

Unfortunately, the best roads are found near the former western frontier such as the Kiev-Gomel-Orsha-Vitebsk-Pskov-Leningrad road, the Kharkov-Kursk-Orel-Briansk-Smolensk road, and the Moscow-Minsk "magistral" (the only modern high-speed auto highway in the country). As in the case of the railways, the explanation for this concentration of better transport arteries in this section of the country is strategic. This concentration of "good" roads in the western part of Russia is a definite advantage for the Germans.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

On December 1, 1941 the Germans were in occupation of the entire basin of the Dnieper-Russia's principal inland waterway, after the Volga. While the Dnieper is primarily important for north-and-south transportation, some of its tributaries and connecting canals provide for east and west traffic also. The canal connecting the Pripet and the (Northern) Bug in eastern Poland, reconstructed and enlarged after the Soviet occupation, should be of especial value to the Germans, since it provides for cheap water transport, by way of the Dnieper and the Vistula, from the Ukraine to Germany.

The partial destruction of the Dnieper dam at Zaporozhe may have greatly reduced the value of the Dnieper as a transport artery. If the rapids above the dam have been uncovered by the release of the reservoir, this has divided the river again into two navigable sections separated by rapids. If the reservoir still covers the rapids, or the Germans are able to restore the dam, they will have a waterway from the Black Sea to the Baltic which, during the ice-free season, will greatly relieve the strain on the railways. Not only could barges loaded with the iron ore of Krivoi Rog, iron and steel from the heavy industries of Dnepropetrovsk, wheat and sugar from the black-earth belt, and other products of the Ukraine, move directly to Germany, but small tankers from Batum and Tuapse could reach centers of German consumption over a protected waterway.

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(9634)

PART III

RUSSIAN EVACUATION, DESTRUCTION, AND GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF THE OCCUPIED AREA

A. CONCLUSIONS

The German advance into Soviet territory reached its maximum depth early in December, and it is convenient to examine, as of approximately that date, the extent of Germany's economic gains and losses incident to the occupation. The main purpose of this section of the report is to consider (1) the effectiveness of the Soviet "scorched earth" policy of removal or destruction of everything that might be of value to the enemy, (2) the destructive results of actual combat and (3) the effects of the change of regime as applied primarily to agriculture, industry, transportation, and man-power.

From the available information it is evident:

1. that the Germans have derived some economic gains from their invasion of Russian territory;

2. that these gains are by no means equal to the wealth and productive capacity which were in existence on June 22, 1941, in the area subsequently occupied by the invaders;

3. that the potential gain is greater than the immediate.

The available evidence, however, does not permit drawing exact quantitative conclusions.

The outstanding fact with regard to agricultural wealth is the acquisition by the Germans of much fertile land, which, with proper exploitation, can be made to produce at least as much as in the past. But this task will take time and is dependent on the availability of sufficient equipment and man-power; also it involves acutely difficult questions of organization and administration.

A large part of the grain, potato and beet harvests in the Baltic lands, Belorussiia (White Russia), Bessarabia and the Ukraine west of the Dnieper has fallen into German hands. Elsewhere the Russians have had ample time to complete the harvesting and to remove or destroy the crops. Livestock in almost all the areas apparently has been greatly reduced by evacuation or destruction and will be reduced still further this winter by the lack of fodder.

Owing to the removal or destruction of a considerable proportion of the agricultural machinery, work animals and man-power (including technical and managerial personnel), as well as to the general disorganization and demoralization of the remaining peasants, the chances for full utilization of this year's product, and the prospects for next year's crops, are poor; but they may be improved by the importation of a large number of foreign agricultural administrators and experts and by the ruthless use of the forced labor of peasants and of prisoners of war. In any case, considerable time will be needed to restore production to its former level.

For industry the Germans have gained valuable sources of raw materials, including iron, manganese, timber and some coal, but little oil. As in the case of agriculture, these resources, insofar as they are still in the soil, may be exploited in the future. The immediate gains are less certain. While some stocks of raw materials and finished goods (including loot from stores and homes) have been acquired and utilized, this booty must be considerably less than might have been expected if there had been no deliberate destruction by the Russians. The most important acquisition for immediate use is perhaps scrap metal resulting from military operations and deliberate Soviet destruction, but difficulties of transportation and labor will limit its conversion.

The productive capacity of the occupied area has been greatly reduced by the evacuation of labor and the removal or destruction of machinery. At least several years will be probably required to restore production to pre-war levels, even with the most efficient organization and without further hostile interference. As yet, only light industries, primarily of local significance, appear to have been restored to operation, and this mainly in areas such as the Baltic and Galicia, where the Soviets had less time than elsewhere for evacuation and destruction. Heavy industries may be restored sooner than machine-building and metal-products plants, as it was harder for the retreating Russians to remove or cripple heavy industrial equipment.

Transportation has been widely damaged or disrupted by the destruction of bridges and the evacuation of railway equipment and other vehicles. On the other hand, the Germans are apparently making rapid progress in adapting and repairing transportation facilities, inasmuch as this is an immediate military necessity as well as a general economic need.

(9634)

Much reduction and dislocation of population has taken place from various causes, resulting in a shortage of agricultural and industrial labor. Observers are agreed, and the Germans have admitted, that the most serious problem is technical, skilled and managerial personnel, which can be replaced only in part by importation. Extensive use of the forced labor of civilians and war prisoners may alleviate to some extent the local shortage of unskilled labor, and may even replenish the labor supply within the Reich itself, especially since the southwestern portion of the occupied territory was the most densely populated part of the Soviet Union. But bad housing, under-nourishment and other effects of the war may still further reduce the labor supply, though this in turn will cut down the food consumption. Urban areas, except on the border, have suffered more than rural areas from depopulation.

Far-reaching plans for the exploitation of Eastern Europe, both in the immediate and in the more distant future, have been prepared by the Nazis; and a complex system of civil administration and economic organization has already been placed in partial operation. In the long run, the success of the German plans for exploitation will depend to some extent on the attitude of the people. Aside from the attitude of scattered German colonists, and nationalists in the Baltic states and some sections of the Ukraine, there is little to support the claim that the Germans were "welcomed with flowers." Also their subsequent actions have scarcely won them additional favor.

B. THE SCORCHED-EARTH POLICY

Stalin's appeal for "scorched-earth"--for the thorough devastation and destruction of the areas about to be occupied by the enemy--made in his radio address of July 3, 1941, was the opening gun in an officially sponsored campaign to impress upon the Soviet people the necessity of leaving nothing of value to the invaders.[1]

The appeal for scorched earth was reiterated in many editorials, proclamations of party and army leaders, and resolutions adopted at meetings of peasants and workers, and even in poetry. Even before Stalin's address, some German reports spoke of devastation in the areas abandoned by the Red Army; but, in general, the policy of scorched earth appears to have been more consistently applied after the Premier's broadcast.[2]

The deliberate removal or destruction of everything of value before the withdrawal of the regular forces of the Red Army was to be supplemented by continued activity of guerrilla detachments in the rear of the enemy,[3] and by the sabotage and passive resistance of the remaining population. The presence of guerrillas in the rear of the German army has been admitted in German reports; it is not clear, however, how far behind the front lines the guerrillas have been able to continue their activities. Most of the Russian and German reports speak of guerrilla activity in areas adjacent to the zones of military operations, rather than in the distant rear. The coming of the cold season must have resulted in a diminution of guerrilla activities, which are carried on mostly from secret bases and meeting places in forests and swamps.1/ There is little definite information available on sabotage carried out by civilians (other than guerrillas) in the occupied regions, but some scattered Soviet reports of instances of such sabotage are mentioned below. In Bessarabia, according to the German official agency D.N.B., sixteen Soviet agents were convicted of successful sabotage after the Russian retreat.2/

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[1] For official text of Stalin's address, see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta (Gazette of the Supreme Council), July 6; for English text, see Moscow News, July 3, or N.Y. Times, July 3.

[2] AP dispatch from Berlin, citing D.N.B; N.Y. Times, July 1.

[3] The term "guerrillas" is used in this report to include "partisans".

Another method by which devastation was wrought in areas abandoned by the Red Army was the planting of delayed-action mines and bombs, exploded by a time device, by remote control, or by attachments to doors, water taps, bed springs and similar objects. There is much testimony on all sides as to the effectiveness of this technique of destruction.

The extent to which the scorched-earth policy has been successfully carried out in practice is impossible to determine or define with any exactness. There is a mass of general statements from Soviet, German, Finnish, Italian, French and American eyewitnesses and from other sources, to the effect that the scorched-earth policy has been put in operation with surprising ruthlessness and

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1/ Stockholm, Völkisher Beobachter, Oct. 21.

2/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 6.

thoroughness, and that little or nothing has been left to the invader. Such statements, however, are probably too sweeping, and may lead to an inaccurate estimate of the situation.

Detailed examination of such more specific factual statements as are available--sometimes found in the same sources as the aforementioned generalizations--indicates that the scorched-earth policy has been applied in earnest and has resulted in a diminution of the booty that would otherwise have fallen into German hands; but it also indicates that the Russians certainly have *not* succeeded in removing or destroying *everything* of value. The success of the application of the policy has depended upon a number of factors, such as the nature of the wealth involved, the speed of the German advance, and the attitude of the officials and the population entrusted with carrying out the policy. Peasants and others who gain their livelihood from the materials to be destroyed are likely to be less willing to carry out demolition orders than are soldiers temporarily stationed in the neighborhood. Therefore, special destruction squads have been employed, and it may be taken for granted that some plans for both sabotage and evacuation were made well in advance of the German occupation.1/

C. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

1. Planned Removal by the Russians

a. Food, Fodder and Other Agricultural Products; Livestock.

1/ Paul Wohl (formerly scientific adviser to the Soviet Commissariat of Land Transportation), *P.M.* Oct. 21.

(9634)

SECRET

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

PART III

RUSSIAN EVACUATION, DESTRUCTION, AND GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF THE OCCUPIED AREA

March 14, 1942

(9634)

PART III

RUSSIAN EVACUATION, DESTRUCTION, AND GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF THE OCCUPIED AREA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Conclusions 80
B. The Scorched-Earth Policy 84
C. Food and Agriculture. 86
  1. Planned Removal by the Russians
    a. Food, Fodder and Other Agricultural Products; Livestock
    b. Productive Equipment: Agricultural Machinery, etc,
    c. Man-Power
  2. Deliberate Damage or Destruction by the Russians
    a. Stocks of Food and Other Agricultural Products; Crops in the Fields
    b. Productive Capacity-Agricultural Machinery, etc.
    c. Man-Power and Housing
  3. Unorganized Looting and Destruction by the Russians
  4. Combat Destruction or Damage
  5. Destruction and Casual Looting by Germans
  6. Guerrilla Activity and Sabotage
  7. What has Remained for the Germans
  8. Organization of Agricultural Production
D. Industry. 101
  1. Planned Removal by the Russians
    a. Goods and Raw Materials
    b. Productive Equipment
    c. Man-Power
  2. Deliberate Damage or Destruction by the Russians
    a. Goods and Materials
    b. Productive Capacity
    c. Man-Power
  3. Unorganized Looting and Destruction by the Civilian Population
  4. Combat Destruction or Damage
  5. Destruction and Casual Looting by Germans
  6. Destruction by Guerrillas and by the Civilian Population after German Occupation

(9634)

Page
7. What has Remained for the Germans
8. Organization of Industrial Production
E. Transportation and Communication. 120
1. Planned Evacuation by the Russians
2. Planned Destruction by the Russians
3. Combat Damage and Destruction
4. Guerrilla Activity
5. Reconstruction
F. Population. 131
1. Planned Evacuation and Deportation by the Russians
2. Deliberate Destruction by the Russians
3. Reduction in Population Resulting from Military Operations or Unspecified Causes
4. Guerrilla Activity
5. Relations Between the Germans and the Civilian Population
6. Housing
G. Administration and Exploitation of Occupied Soviet Territory. 139
1. Administration
2. Reconstruction
3. Exploitation; Regional Problems
4. Finance
5. Plans for the Future
Appendix - Condition of Cities in the Occupied Area. 147

Note

In the citations of newspapers, all are for the year 1941 unless another year is given in the citation.

There are many general statements to the effect that stocks of food and livestock were evacuated or destroyed by the retreating Russians, leaving little or nothing to the Germans.1/

After the invasion began, great efforts were made to get in the harvest by every available means in order to prevent its falling into German hands.2/

Peasants, it was claimed, hid stocks of food and drove cattle into the woods or other secret hide-aways.3/

b. Productive Equipment; Agricultural Machinery, etc.

Many types of machinery, particularly tractors and work animals, are said to have been requisitioned by the Russians for military use, or evacuated in advance of the occupation. Columns of abandoned tractors which the Russians had been driving eastward were overtaken by the Germans near Taganrog.4/

c. Man Power

Russian, German and Finnish reports abound in references to peasants fleeing into the woods, or to neighboring cities, or to

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All dates 1941, unless otherwise specified.

1/ Pravda, Sept. 3; Pravda Vostoka, July 19; Bakinskii Rabochii, July 28; Cyrus L. Sulzberger, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, Nov. 9; Joachim Fischer, soldier-reporter, "Die Wolgaquelle," Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 13; Erskine Caldwell, P M, Aug. 6, citing Red Star; (Krasnaia Zvezda, the official Red Army newspaper); Berlin, N.Y. Times, July 17; letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1, (released by J. Kaiv, Estonian Acting Consul General).

2/ Moscow News, July 3.

3/ Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 13.

4/ Berlin, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, Oct. 31; Sulzberger, Ibid., Aug. 29; Report of S. E. Woods, Commercial Attache, Berlin, Aug. 18; Volkischer Beobachter, Oct. 28.

(9634)

the east. Evacuation into forests or into neighboring cities is likely to be temporary in effect; nevertheless, such dislocation results in waste of man-power. German and Finnish sources allege that many men were deported by the Soviet authorities, especially from the Baltic States, Karelia and Bessarabia, where many households were found deserted. Peasants from villages near Odessa were found by the Germans in the city itself.[1] The indications are that the managers of the peasant-collective farms (the Kolkhozes) and of the larger "Soviet farms" or "state farms" (the Sovkhozes), together with their staffs, as well as tractor operators and mechanics, were largely mobilized or evacuated, leaving only the less skilled peasants to work with primitive tools under German supervision.[2] In August, Das Reich (Berlin) predicted a shortage of both agricultural workers and specialists, as a result of Russian evacuations.[3]

2. Deliberate Damage or Destruction by the Russians.

a. Stocks of Food and other Agricultural Products; Crops in the Fields.

The burning of warehouses with food and fodder is frequently mentioned in general terms by various sources. The German radio broadcasted an appeal to the Russian peasants not to destroy crops, and Lord Haw Haw mentioned blazing fields and slaughtered livestock, as well as destroyed tractors, as among the traces left behind by the retreating Bolsheviks.1/ In general Nazi propagandists have made much of the "senselessness" of destruction by the Russians.

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[1] Das Reich, Sept. 21; Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Sept. 16; Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 10, Oct. 21.

[2] Report of S. E. Woods, Commercial Attache, Berlin, Aug. 18; Berlin correspondent of Stockholm Tidningen, July 5.

[3] 17 August

From Estonia come reports that much livestock was shot or burned in barns, where evacuation was impracticable. Destruction of livestock was said to have been caused also by the floods resulting from the breaking of the Dnieper dam.2/

Wells, it is claimed, were destroyed or polluted by the Russians. On the other hand, water works in cities were spared supposedly, for humanitarian reasons.3/

b. Productive Capacity - Agricultural Machinery, etc.

Although certain Italian and German correspondents report in general terms that the Russian smashed all agricultural implements, there is relatively little specific evidence regarding the destruction of agricultural machinery. In some cases German sources claim that peasants prevented such destruction.4/ In the region annexed by Rumania, special provision was made for the restoration of flour mills and other food processing industries, indicating their previous destruction or evacuation.5/

1/ Bern, N.Y. Times, July 5, PM, Aug.20.

2/ Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 22.

3/ N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, citing Moscow radio; Berlin, ibid., Sept. 3, citing DNB; letter from France, ibid., Nov. 23; letters from German soldiers at the front; a confidential source.

4/ Rome, N.Y. Times, July 11; Das Reich, July 27.

5/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 4, 19.

(9634)

The lack of machinery and work-animals for harvesting and plowing is frequently cited by neutral and Axis observers as one of the chief difficulties facing the Germans and Rumanians, even though the cause of the shortage is not indicated. Some of the German proclamations to the peasants stressed that harvesting must be completed by hand, without waiting for new machinery. In the territory taken over by Rumania, the lack of machinery for planting new crops is considered especially grave, and agricultural machinery, including tractors, is being imported from Germany. In the Baltic region, cab horses have been requisitioned for agricultural work, as few draught animals have survived.1/

c. Man-Power and Housing

There are many reports, of German or Finnish origin, of the deliberate burning of villages by the retreating Russians.2/

3. Unorganized Looting and Destruction

German sources would like to create the impression that, given a chance, the peasants in the occupied territory immediately divided up the animals and implements on the collective farms.

Two reports indicate that, on the evacuation of the cities of Nikolaev and Taganrog by the Red army, the local civilians attempted to plunder stores or warehouses, presumably containing food.3/

1/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 19; Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25.

2/ N.Y. Times, June 30, July 12, 24, Aug. 27, Oct. 14.

3/ Radio to Chicago Tribune, n.d.; Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 28.

(9634)

4. Combat Destruction or Damage

Much destruction to villages, stocks, crops and agricultural equipment must have been caused by military operations. Labor power must also have been much reduced by mobilization for military service and by some casualties among civilians in the battle zone. German papers printed some accounts and photographs of villages burned as a result of local fighting.1/

Many German, Finnish and Russian reports describe villages razed to the ground, without indicating the cause of destruction. Damaged grain fields are also mentioned in passing. In the Novgorod area, a German soldier-reporter wrote, many villages were only rubbish heaps, after German air bombing.2/

5. Destruction and Casual Looting by the Germans

In some places, so the Russians claim, the Germans destroyed agricultural machinery and livestock, as well as peasant houses.3/ Alleged official German documents, captured by the Red Army, were cited in support of the general charge that much senseless destruction is committed by German soldiers.

More serious and more probable would appear to be losses of agricultural man-power inflicted by the Germans. The Russian press contains numberless reports which say that the Germans, as part of their deliberate policy, uniformly "liquidate" all local

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1/ See, for instance, Völkischer Beobachter, July 20; here, a photo shows a large village completely destroyed; the caption says there was house-to-house fighting.

2/ Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Aug. 28.

3/ Pravda, July 25, Aug. 3; PM, Aug. 21; Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 10.

Soviet leadership, including all Communists, members of village Soviets, chairmen and managers of Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes, and other officials, together with their families, and even village teachers and physicians. According to the Soviet reports, such people are killed (in most cases), or are sent away to concentration camps. Failure of the village inhabitants to reveal the identity or whereabouts of such persons is usually punished by the execution of a number of the inhabitants, according to these reports. On the other hand, the Russian guerrilla detachments seem to be led by, and largely composed of, similar elements.

The Germans are also accused of numerous atrocities and of mass executions of peasants, either in reprisal for guerrilla activity or for other reasons.

6. Guerrilla Activity and Sabotage

Numerous reports in the Soviet press stress the activities of Russian guerrilla bands, chiefly behind the German lines--activities including the destruction, by fire or otherwise, of stores of food, fodder and other products.[1] It is reported that these bands also take pains to destroy local traitors--former kulaks, or "Petlurists"--who are used by the Germans as their tools.[2] Cases of deliberate setting or fire of food stocks by individual civilians are also reported by the Soviet press.[3]

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[1] Pravda, Aug. 20, Sept. 2; Moscow News, Aug. 1; Bakinskii Rabochii, July 29, Aug. 17.

[2] P. Grinev, Pravda, Aug. 7; Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 15.

[3] Official communique, Bakinskii Rabochii, July 5; Moscow News, Aug. 20.

The Germans admit widespread guerrilla activity behind their lines, but fail to specify the resulting damage. Owing to this activity, German control was at first confined to the fringes of the main roads.1/

7. What Has Remained for the Germans

In spite of general statements describing the Soviet scorched-earth policy as ruthless and thorough, it is evident that the occupied area is by no means a desert. Much fertile land is now under German control. If the German control continues, production will be organized sooner or later. Moreover, the Soviet reports of German and Rumanian requisitions and atrocities against the peasants, and of guerrilla activities, indicate that large stocks of food and a considerable population have remained behind in the enemy-occupied area. Some German reports speak of fire and destruction; but others mention peaceful scenes of rustic life, and some German photographs show blooming villages, apparently untouched by the ravages of war. Foreign correspondents travelling in the occupied regions saw burned villages; but they also report seeing a large number of undestroyed ones, and golden fields of grain, particularly west of Smolensk, in Galicia and in Bessarabia.2/

In the cities, shortages of food are usually noted, although in Odessa and in Estonia large food reserves were reported to have been found by the invaders. Food conditions in the rural

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1/ Report of S. E. Woods, Commercial Attache, Berlin, Aug. 18.

2/ Jack Fleischer, with the German army, N.Y. Times, July 7; Alvin J. Steinkopf, with the German army, Ibid., Aug. 12, Oct. 31.

areas are usually compared favorably with those in the cities; in some cases, the scarcity of food in the cities is due to lack of transportation facilities.1/ War booty has included foodstuffs and horses. For instance, the Finns claimed the capture of hundreds of railway cars loaded with cereals and other food, and of 1,500 horses.2/

The Russian papers abound in stories of food parcels being sent home by the German and Rumanian soldiers, sometimes by the carload;3/ and they also contain indications that unharvested crops were found by the Germans in some of the occupied areas. Sometimes the crops were used as fodder for horses. In a letter to his mother, a German officer is said to complain that German troops find nothing in the Ukraine, except unharvested grain.4/ All available food is reported being shipped from the Baltic lands to Germany.5/

In general, the quantity of grain and other agricultural products, such as vegetables (including potatoes and beets, much harder to destroy than grain) that has fallen into German hands,

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1/ N.Y. Times, Oct. 31; Oechsner, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 29; letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1; radio to Chicago Tribune, n.d.

2/ N.Y. Times, Aug. 4.

3/ Pravda, July 10, Aug. 9, 20; Moscow News, Aug. 27; Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 15, etc.

4/ Pravda, July 25; Moscow News, Aug. 1; Izvestiia, July 13.

5/ Edmund Stevens, Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25.

must have depended very largely upon two factors:

(1) The condition of the crop;

(2) The speed of the German advance.

At the beginning of September, Stalin stated to an American observer that 2,000,000 tons of Ukrainian grain had fallen into the hands of the Germans.1/ According to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, a large part of this season's harvest went to the Germans, but in Rome it was conceded that the Ukraine would not supply this year any grain to the Axis (presumably this refers to internal consumption in the Axis countries).2/ The Germans probably got much less food than they counted on, but more than the Russians hoped the Germans would get. In any case, much, if not all, will be consumed on the spot by the occupying forces and the natives, some of whom must be kept alive for the sake of their labor in spite of the fact that the Nazis admit no moral obligation to feed them.

Along the border and in Lithuania and Latvia, relatively little could be destroyed by the Russians; in Belorussiia, where the production is relatively small, conditions were comparable to those in the Ukraine; in Galicia and Western Ukraine most of the grain was green when the Germans came, since the harvest was later than usual; further east, the grain had been harvested and much was removed or burned by the Russians. In the Ukraine, the

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1/ Tel. from Steinhardt, Moscow, Sept. 4.

2/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 12; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 27.

Nazis claim to have captured much food and grain (salvaging some that was partially damaged) up to the time when their forces reached Kiev. Soviet destruction then became very thorough.1/

Problems of harvesting loom large in German and Rumanian reports. Soon after the beginning of the fighting it was reported that German harvesters were following on the heels of the army in an effort to salvage as much of the crop as possible. Farmers were collected and trained for such work at Kassel.2/ In occupied Ukraine, harvested grain was to be seen stacked in the fields, with no way of threshing it.3/ According to the Swedish press, more serious than the destruction of grain (much of which was green) was the lack of labor, tractors, spare parts, and repair facilities for the harvesting of the grain that the Russians left behind in the fields. On the basis of all these scraps of evidence, it is at least possible to say that there remained in the occupied area, for the use of the invaders and of the diminished local population, far less than a normal year's harvest.

Also the shortage of personnel and equipment, and the general disorganization, make the prospects for next year's crops dubious. It is a question whether much plowing for winter grain

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1/ S. E. Woods, Commercial Attache, Berlin, "Weekly Economic Report," Aug. 18; Berlin correspondent, Stockholm Tidningen, July 5; tel. Harrison, Bern, Oct. 27; private letter from Kaunas (via Germany, Aug. 11). The Germans claim to have recovered 80% of the standing crop in the Ukraine (tel. Schoenfeld, Helsinki, Oct. 9).

2/ Letter from Germany, dated July 13.

3/ Tel. from Gunther, Bucharest, Oct. 25, reporting a conversation with Oechsner.

could have taken place this year before the ground was frozen. Livestock prospects are even less favorable than those for field crops.1/

The Germans claim to be enjoying the cooperation of the local peasantry. According to the Soviet press, they are attempting to create new local leadership, by appointing minor village and Kolkhoz officials from among former kulaks and other anti-Soviet elements. Old men, or young ones who have been in Soviet jails, are often chosen. The basic purpose of the new organization is to maintain or restore agricultural production by the peasants. In the Odessa region, some peasants of German stock were reported as planning to purchase horses and start field work at once. Finally, prisoners of war may provide some agricultural man-power, both in the occupied area and in Finland and Germany, where they are reported to be working as farm hands.2/

The scorched-earth policy has thus resulted in a reduction rather than complete destruction of the agricultural and food resources in the area occupied by the Germans and their allies. The native population has also been reduced, however. While this means less man-power, it also means less local consumption of foodstuffs.

1/ A.P., with the German Army in Odessa, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 30; Ch. Sc. Monitor, Nov. 28, (estimating that 200,000 tractors and 30,000 to 40,000 harvesters would be needed in the occupied area. Tractors, in turn, need fuel. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, citing Das Reich; and Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 19.

2/ N.Y. Times, Oct. 25; testimony of a reliable American witness.

8. Organization of Agricultural Production

At first the impression existed that land would be returned to private ownership. However, the Nazis are avoiding, temporarily at least, the issue of a general restoration of private property, by maintaining that inasmuch as Soviet land and industry are state-owned they are "war booty".1/ Thus, in a military order of July 9, peasants were told to surrender within forty eight hours all former collective farm property.2/

There are strong arguments for retaining the Soviet system of collective ownership. All sources agree that the Kolkhozes (collective farms) which have been denounced for ideological reasons will be retained at least for the present because of the practical difficulty of dividing the land and equipment and because of the shortage of agricultural livestock, machinery and labor. Intensive cultivation with such machinery as can be made available, and with an economy of management and policing seems to call for large-scale operation.3/

At first, for propaganda reasons, the Nazis encouraged the peasants to divide up the Kolkhozes and the Sovkhozes, or at least created the impression abroad that such divisions were

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1/ Berlin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24; also the testimony of a reliable American witness. Compare Tel. from Morris, Berlin, 31 Oct., regarding German confiscation of Soviet state property (nationalized farms, etc.) in the Baltic States.

2/ Quoted by Foreign Commissar Molotov in his note of Jan. 6, Washington Times-Herald, Jan. 9, 1942.

3/ Das Reich, Berlin, Aug. 17; N.Y. Times, July 12, 25, Aug. 21, Oct. 31

taking place. However, the present German policy is to maintain the Soviet system for the time being. Any change would react adversely on production.1/ To encourage production the peasants are to be permitted to keep as private property the plots they formerly worked individually. These plots may be doubled as a reward for increased production. In addition, according to German sources, fixed prices, higher than those formerly received, are to be paid for agricultural products.2/ Similar plans have been announced by the Rumanians for their newly acquired territory (in contrast to recaptured Bessarabia and Bukovina).3/

Where landholdings were excessively small or are cultivated by primitive methods, and where collectivization had not been completed, as in parts of Eastern Galicia, the Germans are probably attempting to raise productive efficiency by consolidating farms and introducing intensive cultivation, as they have done in those parts of former Poland which they occupied in 1939. In the Baltic states, where likewise collectivization had not been thorough, the general program calls for gradual restoration of private ownership of land, but the immediate objective of efficient production takes precedence.

1/ Das Reich, Berlin, Aug. 17; N.Y. Times, Aug. 21; British Min. of Econ. Warfare, "Weekly Summary", No. 101 (Aug. 20); Dagens Nyheter, Aug. 5.

2/ N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 30; N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, quoting Novoe Slovo (Berlin), Aug. 31; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Sept. 2.

3/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 4, 19, Nov. 6.

Even before the German attack began, managers of large German estates were drafted and trained to take over Soviet farms, according to a reliable American observer. Some were taken from Magdeburg, noted for its large-scale farming, and other agricultural experts were released from the army. Each expert, or Sonderführer, is given a special uniform and rank, and is placed over a number of collectives.1/ The appointment of German managers serves the double purpose of safeguarding collective farm property and of maintaining or restoring production.

At a conference in Italy of German and Italian economic leaders, the feasability of sending Italian farmers to the Ukraine was said to have been discussed.2/ To supplement imported managers and experts efforts are being made as already stated, to recruit anti-Soviet or "kulak" subordinates to take the place of the former kolkhoz and village soviet leaders who have disappeared for one reason or another. These new Russian subordinates act as immediate supervisors of the peasants. It is evident that the success of the Nazi plans for organizing agricultural exploitation depends to a considerable extent on the cooperation of the native population, and it is by no means certain that that cooperation will be readily or fully obtained.

1/ Berlin correspondent of Svenska Dagbladet, Aug. 22, says each Sonderführer has charge of about 10,000 acres. Another source gives 2 Sonderführers for 54 collectives, with about 180,000 acres, (N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 30).

2/ N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 30.

D. INDUSTRY

1. Planned Removal

a. Goods and Raw Materials

There is comparatively little information concerning the evacuation of stocks of industrial goods and raw materials by the Russians. Pig iron, piping, rails, car wheels, etc., according to Ralph Ingersoll, were to be seen among the materials (mostly machinery) being moved to the East.1/ The Russians have claimed the removal of huge stocks of raw materials from Kharkov, and the Germans have admitted that in Nikolaev the stores were empty when they arrived, most of the stocks having been carried away by the Russians.2/ A French observer reported that in Odessa all homes had been stripped of furniture, bedding and kitchen ware, and Hugo Speck found in a Kiev hotel that the bed sheets had been taken away by the Russians. In reoccupied Finland even doors and windows had been removed, a German paper reported from Helsinki.3/ Many German reports mention empty stores in occupied cities, without assigning any particular cause for this fact. There can be little doubt that the evacuation of machinery and of a part of the civilian population was accompanied by large scale removals of

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1/ Washington Star, Nov. 4.

2/ AP dispatch based on official Soviet sources, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30. Frederick C. Oechsner, reporting a German conducted tour, ibid., Oct. 26; radio to Chicago Tribune, n.d. For the German claim of capture of 1,000 tons of steel plates at Nikolaev see below.

3/ UP dispatch from Vichy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11; Hugo Speck, "The Scorched Red Earth", Collier's, Dec. 6, p. 76; Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 1.

stocks of manufactured goods, raw materials and household articles. A recent report from Kuibyshev enumerates--in addition to machinery--tools, office furniture, trucks, cars, carts and horses.1/

b. Productive Equipment

The first definite information concerning the removal of industrial equipment from the cities abandoned to the enemy appeared late in August, when Soviet sources claimed that much plant equipment and machinery had been evacuated from Gomel and Dniepropetrovsk.2/

Since then the Soviet claims of such evacuations, and the volume of supporting evidence, have grown steadily. The Commissariat of War Industry announced in September that the most valuable and the least easily replaceable machinery and equipment had been moved from the Ukraine to the Urals through the efforts of thousands of workers under the supervision of hundreds of engineers.3/ There have been reiterations of this general claim by Soviet officials from time to time. More specifically, the removal of industrial equipment from Odessa, Kharkov and Mariupol, as well as from areas as yet unoccupied by the Germans (Leningrad, Moscow and Tula), has been mentioned.4/ There appeared in the Soviet press a report of the workers' committee of a small plant

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1/ Ch. Sc. Monitor, Jan. 3, 1942.

2/ N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 31.

3/ Exchange telegram from Moscow, Der Bund, Sept. 22.

4/ N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 30; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 17; Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Nov. 6 (quoting Pravda).

moved from somewhere near the front line to Sverdlovsk, describing in detail the work of dismantling, packing, loading, and reassembling the plant, which, despite this interruption, fulfilled its monthly production quota. Apparently, this case must be considered as model, rather than a typical instance.[1] In November, S. A. Lozovsky, deputy Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau, announced that the Soviet government had evacuated "all important enterprises" from the areas occupied by the German army. From 5,000 to 8,000 railroad cars were required for the evacuation of the equipment and the workers of a part of these enterprises. Great success had been achieved in shifting the aircraft industry.[2] Finally in December came the disclosure that several huge Dniepropetrovsk metallurgical enterprises, including the Petrovsky, Cherzinsky (Dzerzhinsky?) and Voroshilov works, had been evacuated and were operating elsewhere.[3]

The Soviet claims are supported by personal observations of foreign - mostly American - correspondents in Russia. An American observer, who left Moscow on October 2, is reported to have seen hundreds of carloads of lathes, turbines, etc., going East.[4] Ralph Ingersoll, traveling for nine days from Tashkent to Moscow in the middle of August, met a steady stream of trainloads of machinery smeared with grease and covered with canvas, including a complete hydro-electric power plant, lathes, etc. A month later on his way from Moscow to the Caucasus, he witnessed a similar procession of machinery moving South and East.1/ Cyrus L. Sulzberger, in addition to reporting in general terms the movement of machinery to the East, described his impressions during an inspection tour of reassembled factories. One Leningrad factory had been moved in three weeks, during August. The general policy was to preserve specialized factories, machine-building equipment, and unusually complicated dies and labor-saving devices. He also reported the evacuation of much machinery from Rostov, and during his journey from Moscow to Kuibyshev he witnessed the passage of "dozens of trains loaded with important machines and dies moving eastward from evacuated plants to new factories."2/ A. T. Steele, in addition to repeatedly mentioning trainloads of machinery moving East, as a familiar sight in Russia, reported a personal visit to a munitions factory evacuated from the Don Basin to an industrial center on the Volga. Machinery was being evacuated from all sections of the front: the North, the Center, the Ukraine and the Donets Basin. Many of the trainloads, however, apparently came from Moscow, Leningrad and other areas not yet today occupied by the Germans. Priority was given to machine tools, aircraft manufacturing equipment, automobile works and munition plants.

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[1] A. T. Steele, Chicago Daily News, Nov. 18.

[2] N.Y. Times, Nov. 27; Washington Star, Dec. 8.

[3] A. T. Steele, Kuibyshev, Washington Star, Dec. 8.

[4] Quoted by Carrol Binder, Chicago Daily News, Oct. 25; also witnessed by Douglas Brown (interview, Nov. 29).

(9634)

1/ *Washington Star*, Nov. 4; *PM*, Nov. 5.

2/ *N.Y. Times*, Oct. 25, 31; Nov. 16, 25.

(9634)

The total transferred, according to Steele, is very large, and consists of the most essential items.1/

Wallace Carroll, Walter Kerr and Ralph Parker made similar observations, the latter two on their trip from Archangel to Kuibyshev. This evacuation caused considerable traffic congestion, according to Parker.2/

Instances of evacuation of machinery by the Soviets have also been reported from the German side. A former German director of the cellulose plant in Kexholm visited the plant and reported the removal or destruction of all the machinery. In particular, the steam turbines, pumps and armatures of the power plant had been removed. In his opinion, production could hardly be restored before 1943. At the same time, it was reported that the machinery of the East-Finnish suger refinery had been taken away.3/ In Kharkov much machinery had been destroyed or removed, according to German admissions, and Frederick C. Oechsner, an American correspondent who made a tour of the German-occupied areas, reported that at Nikolaev vast quantities of factory machinery had been removed by the Russians.4/ German sources disclosed that a large aluminum plant on the bank of the Dnieper, near Dniepropetrovsk, and the neighboring iron works, had been

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1/ Washington Star, Oct. 27; Chicago Daily News, Oct. 30; Nov. 13, 18, 24, 26, 27; Radio to Chicago Daily News, Dec. 1.

2/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 24; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 23; N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1942.

3/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 13, 14.

(9634) 4/ N.Y. Times, Oct. 26.

completely evacuated to the East.1/ A German propaganda-company reporter described the towing of a huge floating dock (loaded with tanks and guns) from Kerch to Novorossiisk by the Russians.2/ The conclusion that a large-scale evacuation of industries (including at least one tank-manufacturing plant) took place, is reported to have been reached by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, and by Mr. Harriman.3/ That the evacuation of industrial equipment would be "more or less successful" was the opinion of the Materials and Equipment Committee of the American Mission to Moscow. An American official observer in Russia goes so far as to estimate that about one half of the machinery for medium and light industry was evacuated from the occupied area.4/ Two other very competent witnesses who recently returned from Moscow do not consider this an unreasonable estimate.5/

There have been almost no reports, however, of the removal of plants with very heavy equipment, such as steel mills (with one exception, type unspecified), and the Soviets admit that such removals are not feasible.6/ Also, there are no reports of any planned evacuation of industrial equipment during the first

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1/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 9.

2/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 16.

3/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 12. W. M. M., "Soviet Industry Prepares for a Long War", Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Nov. 6.

4/ Tel. from Michela, Kuibyshev, Nov. 13, No. 106.

5/ Statements made in O.C.I.

6/ W. M. M. "The Soviets Regain the Donbass," Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Dec. 4.

few weeks of the German-Soviet war, and it is unlikely that much equipment was removed from the cities occupied in that period. As a matter of fact, there are a number of references in the Russian papers to continued or increased industrial production in a number of large cities, including Riga, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov and Mariupol, not long before their occupation by the Germans.1/ In general the evidence indicates that industrial evacuation could not have been complete and that some industrial equipment fell into German hands. On the other hand, a considerable evacuation took place from Moscow, Leningrad, and other areas threatened by the Germans but not actually occupied.

c. Man Power

The aforementioned claims and testimony concerning the evacuation of industrial equipment frequently state that the trainloads of machinery are accompanied, or immediately preceded or followed, by the personnel of the evacuated establishments, especially the engineers and the skilled workers. Recently the Soviets announced that the larger part of the population and most of the factories had been evacuated from the occupied area.2/ Lack of manpower, and particularly of skilled industrial labor, in the occupied areas, has been reported also from the German

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1/ Moscow News, June 27; Pravda, Sept. 3; Izvestiia, Sept. 4, 5; Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Nov. 6, (quoting Pravda).

2/ Cable from Kuibyshev, Dec. 1. One correspondent (in Moscow to Sept. 25) estimates that at least 2,000,000 skilled workers were evacuated from western cities (M.I.D. interview, no. 1935).

side.1/

There can be little doubt that, as in the case of equipment, the evacuation of workers has not been complete, especially in the regions occupied by the Germans in the first few weeks of the war; this is indicated, for example, by the Russian accounts of mass executions by the Germans of active trade union men and Stakhanovites in Lvov, Brest and Minsk, and by a reference to engineers and technical experts remaining in the Baltic countries.2/ Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of the industrial workers must have been mobilized or evacuated from the occupied area as a whole. In some cases it is impossible to determine the causes of the reported lack of industrial labor in the occupied cities. In Nikolaev, after two months of German occupation, only 2,000 of the 25,000 shipyard workers were reported to have returned to work--but many of the rest may have found it simply impossible to obtain work, owing to the destruction of their places of employment.3/

Although there are no specific mentions of the evacuation of the managing personnel, the proportion of managers evacuated from the abandoned areas was probably higher than that of skilled labor;

1/ Berlin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24; report of correspondents after a tour with the German army, ibid., Oct. 31; Hermann Brüning, soldier-correspondent, Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Aug. 20; Sonia Tomara, citing information supplied by the Lithuanian consul (in New York), based on reports from Lithuania, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 2; Oechsner, on tour with the Rumanian army at Tiraspol, Chicago Daily News, Oct. 30. An Italian correspondent reported that all the workers had been mobilized or evacuated from the Don basin (Corriere della Sera, Sept. 27).

2/ Moscow News, Aug. 8, 11. Radio to Chicago Tribune, n. d.

(9634) 3/ Oechsner, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26; Hugo Speck, Washington Post, Oct. 26.

and the proportion of skilled labor was almost certainly higher than that of unskilled labor.

2. Deliberate Damage or Destruction

a. Goods and Materials

There are numerous reports of the deliberate destruction on a large scale, of stocks of materials by the retreating Russians. In many cases, the destruction of stocks may be assumed to have occured when large parts of certain cities were burned by the Russians, or were demolished as a result of delayed mine explosions.1/

Even in such cities, as have apparently remained largely intact, for example in Mariupol, individual warehouses were set on fire or otherwise demolished.2/

Of the particular commodities destroyed, aside from food, oil (or its derivatives) is the one most frequently mentioned. German soldier-correspondents and foreign correspondents traveling through German-occupied territory described blazing oil tanks in Odessa and burning gasoline stocks in Taganrog.3/ On the other hand, an official of the German petroleum industry claimed that much aviation gasoline (American) had been captured because the Russians were unable to destroy the underground storage tanks.4/

1/ For the available information on the condition of some cities in the occupied territory, see Appendix.

2/ F. Horstmann, soldier-reporter, "Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 17.

3/ Heinz Schubert, "Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 18; H. U. V. Wangenheim, ibid., Oct. 28; Oechsner, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 29.

(9634) 4/ Report of a conversation, cited by Col J. P. McDonnell in Memorandum dated 17 Nov.

In many places, especially in the Finnish theatre of war and in the northwest generally, the Red Army is reported to have set large areas of forest on fire.1/ Presumably this action was taken primarily for tactical purposes; nevertheless, it doubtless resulted in the destruction of much valuable timber that might otherwise have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

b. Productive Capacity

There are numberless reports from all sides of the destruction of industrial and power plants by the retreating Russians, who paid special attention to the demolition of public utilities. Destruction of industrial and power plants is reported by Russian sources to have taken place in Kharkov, Nikolaev, Mariupol, the Rostov area, the Dnieper dam region, Kiev and Poltava; German reporters and foreign correspondents travelling in the occupied territories have described the ruin of factories and other industrial establishments at Odessa, Nikolaev, Kiev and other places; Finnish, Estonian and Scandinavian sources have reported destruction in the industrial areas of Finnish Karelia and Estonia.

A German correspondent declared that a few weeks' trip through the occupied territory had convinced him that if the Soviets could do anything thoroughly, it was the work of destruction.2/ Even in some small towns, German soldiers found local industrial

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1/ N.Y. Times, June 30; July 21, 22, 24; Aug. 4; Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Aug. 28.

2/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 28.

(9634)

plants wrecked.1/

The destruction of the Dnieper dam system was officially claimed by the Soviet Government, and seems to have been in a large part confirmed by German admissions and photographs, despite earlier denials. Since the system was apparently composed of several dams and power plants, it is impossible to tell how completely it has been ruined. Reports from Russia mention also the destruction of dams in Finnish Karelia and the Rostov area.2/

A correspondent in Russia wrote that in the Donets Basin, mines, factories and power stations were being blown up or set afire on retreat, and a German soldier described blasted coal shafts and twisted steel buildings. The Krivoi Rog mines and the Black Sea shipyards were reported in bad shape.3/ Although it may not be practicable to evacuate them, the Soviets have effectively sabotaged ovens, blast furnaces, and rolling mills, according to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

c. Man Power

The Germans allegedly found evidence of mass executions by the retreating Russians of politically objectionable people in Lvov, Kiev, and other cities. If the facts correspond to these

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1/ Felix Lutzkendorf, "Die Brücke am Bug," Das Reich, Sept. 7.

2/ N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 25, 29, Sept. 5, Nov. 9; Völkischer Baobachter, Oct. 11; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Sept. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 2. According to Pierre Huss, I.N.S. correspondent who left Germany in Nov., the Dnieprostroi Dam was said to be yielding some power (Interview, Dec. 23).

3/ A. T. Steele, Chicago Daily News, Nov. 18; Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Sept. 23; interview with Pierre Huss.

(9634)

allegations, there must have been some loss of industrial man power.1/

3. Unorganized Looting and Destruction by Civilian Population

There must have been a certain amount of destruction or dispersal of consumers' goods and other commodities through looting by the population in cities abandoned by the Soviet authorities, but not yet under effective German control. A German soldier-reporter wrote that in Taganrog the population attempted to plunder what remained of stocks, stores and other Soviet property, but that order was quickly restored by the German army.2/ In Nikolaev, according to another report, the Soviet authorities, before leaving, threw open to the population all warehouses which had not been evacuated or destroyed.3/

4. Combat Destruction or Damage

Much destruction of cities, stocks, industrial plants, and some man-power has undoubtedly been caused by combat operations, including air raids, but such destruction is often not reported separately. German sources claim in particular that much damage to industrial plants, railroad stations and other objectives had resulted from German attacks and fighting in Smolensk, Tallinn

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1/ In Lvov, the number executed was reported at 2,000-3,000; private letters from Germany repeat the accusation that thousands of Ukrainians were massacred by the Russians. N.Y. Times, July 6.

2/ Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 28.

3/ Radio from Berlin to Chicago Tribune, n. d.

and Kiev.1/ German newsreels are said to reveal much destruction on the Moscow front, and to show smouldering ruins and skeletons of what had been huge war industry plants employing 30,000 to 40,000 workers.2/

5. Destruction and Casual Looting by Germans

Soviet sources claim that in a number of German army orders and reports, intercepted by the Red Army, and identified by names, dates and numbers, complaints were found of senseless destruction, as well as wholesale plunder, committed by German soldiers.3/ There is no confirmation of these reports from other sources. German troops are also said to have burned and destroyed buildings in cities (Rogachev, Rostov), from which they were retreating.4/

Many Soviet sources have also reported massacres of city workers by Germans (for instance, at Lvov, Brest Litovsk, Minsk and Kiev), as well as numerous unorganized atrocities among all classes of the population. Prisoners of war are often shot, the Soviet newspapers say.5/ While deliberate killings of prisoners of war or of miscellaneous civilians are naturally not admitted by German sources, many dispatches of soldier-reporters and other

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1/ N.Y. Times, July 15, Aug. 30, Nov. 19.

2/ George Axelsson, Berlin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14.

3/ Moscow News, Aug. 15; Pravda, July 21.

4/ Bakinskii Rabochii, July 22, PM. Dec. 1.

5/ Moscow News, Aug. 8, 11, 15; Izvestiia, July 12, 13; Pravda, July 21, Aug. 9; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 30.

items in the German press darkly hint at the dire fate of Jews, commissars, "politruks" (political instructors), Communists and other active adherents of the Soviet regime, who fall into German hands. There can be little doubt that the establishment and maintenance of "order" by the German army involves the execution of many civilians, including some city workers and industrial managers or experts.

6. Destruction by Guerrillas and by the Civilian Population after German Occupation

Soviet sources contain many reports of small scale guerrilla activities, including the destruction or capture of stocks and plants behind the German lines, and the liberation of civilians compelled to work for the Germans. At Timkovichi munition stores and a fuel base, as well as two food warehouses were blown up, and in the Glusk region, an alcohol plant, and fuel and alcohol tanks were destroyed.1/ Some 200 villagers compelled by the Germans to rebuild a bridge across the Siniukha, 18 kilometers south of Novoarkhangelsk, were freed by guerrillas, according to an official communiqué.2/

There are only a few reports of sabotage by individual Soviet civilians. At the Zhmerinka station, after a group of inhabitants had been forced to load flat cars with aviation gasoline and munitions, Spirkov, formerly a food store clerk, hid among the

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1/ Official communiqué, Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 17. Iazykovich, "Narodnoie Mshchenie" ("People's Vengeance"), Pravda, Aug. 20; for other instances in unnamed places, see Bakinskii Rabochii, July 25.

2/ Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 23.

barrels, and at night set the gasoline on fire. Four trains with gasoline and munitions were destroyed. But it stands to reason that reports of cases of this kind could not readily reach the Soviet press.[1]

German sources admit no instances of sabotage by Soviet civilians, claiming instead that the latter are glad to stop the work of destruction. Guerrilla activity is, however, acknowledged by the Germans in general terms.

7. What Has Remained for the Germans

Numerous Soviet reports of looting of consumers' goods by German soldiers from stores (e.g. at Novograd-Volynsk) and private residences, are admissions that such goods had not all been evacuated or destroyed.[2] Clothing and food are reported to be the favorite objects of looting; much of the loot is sent back to Germany in parcels. The systematic collection of footwear from dead bodies on battlefields, and from Russian prisoners, is reported to have been ordered by the German command.[3] Requisitioning of winter clothing by the Germans in the Baltic area (as in Norway) has also taken place; this clothing appears to be destined for use in the winter campaign in the east.[4] The Finns have reported the capture of stocks of consumers' goods and materials, including wool, cotton, hardware, blankets, furniture, kerosene lamps, gramophone records, and cosmetics.[1] Finally, looting of metal coin and the requisition of metal fixtures is also reported.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Alleged diary of private Karl Neusser, Moscow News, Aug. 27. Pravda, Aug. 12; Bakinskii Rabochii, July 19; Moscow News, Aug. 4, 27.

[3] Moscow News, July 21, Aug. 15, 22, 27; Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25.

[4] Washington Star, Nov. 18, quoting the Latvian Minister in Washington.

The British Ministry of Economic Warfare reported that large supplies of iron ore fell into German hands.[3] Minerals in the ground, such as iron, manganese, coal, oil and bauxite, have obviously remained.[4] Partial restoration of oil production in Galicia has been reported and the Germans were said to be counting heavily on the recently discovered Romny oil fields, which, however, were not yet in operation. Much of the war material destroyed in combat, and sabotaged and wrecked industrial plants, will undoubtedly yield large quantities of badly needed scrap-iron and other metals, enough perhaps to supply Germany's needs for some times, but man-power and smelting facilities may prove inadequate.[5] Finished steel, spare parts and some machinery fell into German hands at Nikolaev. The half-built battleship also captured at

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[1] Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 21, (estimating value at over 50,000,000 Reichsmarks); radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, Nov. 15.

[2] Pravda, Aug. 12; Edmund Stevens, Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25.

[3] N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, (presumably referring to ore already mined).

[4] After the conquest of the Donets basin the Germans claimed to have captured about 69% of the iron ore, 34% of the manganese and 60% of the coal production of the Soviet Union, as of 1938 (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 5).

[5] Report of economic and industrial conditions in Germany, by M. W. Altaffer, Zurich, Sept. 24. A reliable American observer reported carloads of Russian military scrap waiting to be smelted near Wittenberg.

Nikolaev may be of little use without blueprints.

Industrial productive capacity certainly has not been entirely eliminated. Restoration of production in certain plants in Karelia, Riga, Vilna, Kiev and even Nikolaev (termed the best example of the scorched-earth policy) has been reported. Efforts to put Soviet heavy industry back into operation in the region of Kursk were reported in Berlin. Obviously man-power has not been completely evacuated or destroyed, as is indicated by reports of German atrocities against the workers in certain cities, by the return of 2,000 workers to the Nikolaev shipyards, and by other similar facts.

Nevertheless, because of the very considerable evacuation, destruction, disorganization and depopulation, admitted by the Germans, general resumption of production is very difficult, and there is little concrete evidence of success to date. Some factories are said to be operating with machinery sent from Germany. In regions where resumption of operations in Russia was impossible, skilled workers and technical experts were recruited (for instance, in the Baltic lands) for work in Germany. On the other hand, there is a report of a plan to send thousands of Austrian workmen to help restore Soviet industry.[1]

Prisoners of war provide an additional source of man-power. According to a Soviet report, one German commander ordered the selection, from among the prisoners of war, of small groups of highly skilled workers, not over 30 years old and in good health, for work in German factories. The remaining prisoners were ordered shot.[1]

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[1] Moscow News, Aug. 8, 11; N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, Nov. 5; radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4. Tel. Harrison, Bern, Oct. 27.

(9634)

8. Organization of Industrial Production

The measures for industrial exploitation are comparable to those for agriculture. After the immediate work of physical reconstruction has taken place, semi-military economic staffs (Wirtschaftskommandos), including technical battalions, take stock of all industrial property and lay plans for the resumption of work by public utilities, mines and factories, and especially by oil wells and refineries. Included in their duties is the detective work of ferreting out hidden raw materials and other supplies and of identifying evacuated equipment which has been overtaken and captured by the German advance.[2] The unofficial suggestion in the German financial press that the sabotaged factories in occupied Russia be offered for sale to Western European private interests, thus helping to pay the costs of the war, and the reports that the Axis was not necessarily planning to rebuild Russian factories as they had been, but might transfer or liquidate them or adapt them to Europe's needs, indicate not only the extent of damage but also the fact that Germany is looking to the East primarily for raw materials (and foodstuffs), not for manufactured goods.1/

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[1] Official communiqué, citing a document found in a German regimental headquarters, Pravda, July 30.

[2] Telephone from Berlin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, Dec. 6; report of Military Attaché, Berlin, Sept. 25, cited by Col. P. J. McDonnell in Memorandum dated 17 Nov. Oil production in the sabotaged Galician oil-fields was quickly raised to 75% of prewar output by German oil experts (Well-informed source with German contacts.)

In industry as in agriculture, there is some difference of opinion as to the best form of control. All ultimate economic decisions respecting the conquered areas are under the control of Göring. In each administrative area the so-called "Wirtschaftskommandos" have complete power, subject to the commands of Göring and to the higher necessities of the military.2/ In addition there is the "Haupttreuhandstelle Ost," a system of government trusteeship for individual industrial enterprises and former state properties active mainly in Polish areas and entrusted with incorporating the economic life of annexed territories into that of the Reich. In some cases this system represents a transition to private ownership.3/

For the highly important coal and ore mining, smelting, and related industries in occupied Soviet areas, special corporations for monopoly exploitation have been set up, with complete jurisdiction and with representation of the corresponding Reich interests.4/

The German plans for the reorganization of industries in the occupied regions are related to measures of financial control and organization which are treated below.

1/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 9; N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 24; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 27.

2/ Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25.

3/ Deutsche Volkswirt, July 11, Aug. 29, Oct. 17.

4/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 9, Oct. 8; Der Neue Tag, Sept. 9; Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 7.

E. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

This discussion of transportation and communication deals with the evacuation or destruction, according to the Russian plan or as the result of military operations and of guerrilla and saboteur activities, of locomotives, railway rolling stock, roadbeds and bridges, yards and depots, motor trucks and other vehicles, roads, bridges, ferries, canals, harbors, radio and postal facilities, and telephone and telegraph lines. For many of these categories there is no information of value. The problem is complicated by the fact that it is impossible in many cases to distinguish between military equipment (such as army trucks) and equipment used primarily for industrial and agricultural purposes. Another difficulty is that much destruction is stated by the military commands to have been caused by air raids. Such damage may occur far behind the Russian lines. In some cases the precise number of railway cars damaged may be given, but not the extent of the damage; or the number of "destroyed" trains may be given, but not the number of cars. In many cases the exact location of wrecked bridges, etc., is not indicated. Often the cause of damage is not stated.

The Germans appear to have shown unusual skill and energy in restoring bridges and railways and in transforming the lines from the Russian gauge to the European standard gauge. Hence much of the damage is of only temporary significance in impeding the progress of the military advance and dislocating transportation facilities without permanently interrupting them. Of course, additional labor and materials have had to be used in the work of reconstruction.

1. Planned Evacuation

That many if not most of the railway locomotives and cars have been evacuated seems extremely likely, but from the available sources it is impossible to tell the precise numbers. The enormous evacuation of industrial equipment and personnel must necessarily have involved the removal to safety of much rolling stock. Day after day, the correspondent Kerr saw evacuation trains of 30-40 cars and great quantities of additional rolling stock moving east, and the official Soviet spokesman, Lozovsky, stated that the removal of certain industrial plants involved the use of 8,000 cars.1/ One commentator believes that the efficiency of the remaining Soviet transport system has been greatly increased by the addition of evacuated locomotives and rolling stock.2/ Another says that the Germans had to re-lay tracks because the broad-gauge locomotives and cars had been removed, the removal of the former being particularly serious since there was no way of utilizing the remaining Russian cars.3/

Somewhat more precise, although doubtless exaggerated, is the information for the Baltic area: 80 per cent of all railway equipment was said to have been evacuated, passenger traffic had ceased, there was no rolling stock to transport food, only 50

All dates 1941 unless otherwise specified.

1/ N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 23; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27.

2/ W.M.M., "Soviet Transportation and Water Supplies," Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Nov. 21.

3/ Caldwell reporting from Moscow, PM, Aug. 6.

(9634)

locomotives were to be found in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In Estonia it was believed that the railway equipment removed from the Baltic states had been sent to the Murmansk line.1/ According to a reliable observer, the Russians took special pains to evacuate railway personnel, particularly those having anything to do with repair operations and signal equipment.

Information on the evacuation of other means of transportation from the Baltic area is scarce. All ships in Estonia are said to have been removed or sunk. The Germans say that the Russians removed many busses, ambulances, fire trucks, and the like, from Lithuania and Latvia.2/

Occasionally claims are made of the capture of means of transportation, such as 4,000 horses and 100 trucks on the Leningrad front by the Germans, ten locomotives and 100 supply trucks by the Finns at Pitkaeranta, and later 15 locomotives, 100 cars and 1,500 horses.3/

No other type of industrial equipment is as easily evacuated as locomotives, railway cars, and motor trucks, and the fact that the enemy does not claim the capture of large quantities of such equipment tends to confirm the conclusion that the Russian

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1/ Radio dispatches from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, n.d., and Nov. 14; tel. from Schoenfeld, Helsinki, Nov. 24. Herman Habicht saw large amounts of Baltic rolling stock in Vladivostok at the beginning of August.

2/ Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 7. Some may have been removed before June 22.

3/ N.Y. Times, July 19, 22. The American observer referred to above says that Russian planes are used on internal runs in Germany.

(9634)

evacuation was effected with a considerable measure of success.[1]

The British Ministry of Economic Warfare believes that the shortage of labor and of other personnel has been the chief obstacle to the full restoration and use of the Russian transportation system by the Germans.[2] This labor shortage is undoubtedly due in part to deliberate evacuation by the Russians.

2. Planned Destruction

Deliberate destruction of railway facilities usually took the form of blowing up bridges, but there are some reports of the destruction of trains, roadbeds, stations and yards. Some destroyed bridges not specifically labeled "railway bridges" may have been of that character. In any case the information is too scattered to be of great value. In blowing up a Narva bridge the Russians destroyed two fully loaded trains and dammed up the river at the same time.[3] Railway stations were razed or damaged in Tallinn, Topa, Viipuri and other cities and rail bridges over the Pripet (at Ianov), the Niemen (at Kaunas), and others, were blown up.[4] In Nikolaev, the Germans claim to be using twenty-three captured locomotives that the Russians had tried to sink in the harbor.[5] There are indications that deliberate damage to railway facilities in Bessarabia was especially effective. Here saboteurs removed rails and ties and dynamited bridges on important sections.1/

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[1] Some transportation facilities, including trucks, cars, carts and horses, were evacuated eastward along with industrial equipment, by rail, according to a report from Kuibyshev, Ch. Sc. Monitor, Jan 3, 1942.

[2] Tel. from Winant, London, Jan. 16, 1942, No. A226, Sec. I.

[3] Photo and Caption. Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 17.

[4] N.Y. Times, Sept. 6; Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 10; Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 13; N.Y. Times, July 2.

(9634)

[5] Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 24.

Specific information on the destruction of other types of vehicles is lacking, but such destruction has undoubtedly taken place. On the other hand, there are a number of general references to the deliberate destruction of roads and bridges, which impeded the German advance. Mined roads and blown up bridges added much to the military damage.2/ Among the bridges definitely reported to have been destroyed are those at Smolensk, Dorpat, Narva, Aleksotas, Viipuri, Dorogobuzh, Gomel and Kiev; but any such partial list is merely an indication of what has been done.3/

It should be noted that in the deliberate damage to larger cities, known to have taken place, considerable damage and dislocation of railway stations and yards, port facilities and communication systems must have occurred. Some dislocation would result from the interruption and shortage of power, affecting street railway systems, for example. It is known that the Russians paid special attention to public utilities in their demolition work. The ferries between Nikolaev and Babarovka were destroyed, necessitating the building of a pontoon bridge; and the deliberate destruction in Tallinn, Odessa, Nikolaev and other ports included

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1/ From Ankara, based on reports of travelers from Rumania, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10.

2/ Berlin, N.Y. Times, July 13, etc.

3/ Völkischer Beobachter, July 30, Aug. 22; N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 28, 31.

(9634)

harbor facilities and shipping.1/ In the demolition of the Dnieper Dam a series of locks beyond it were destroyed, according to local German residents.2/

3. Combat Damage and Destruction

The majority of the available reports of damage to transport systems ascribe this damage to German air attack or to land combat, or else do not indicate the cause of damage. Unfortunately this information is very unsatisfactory because much of it comes from unsubstantiated communiqués of the respective high commands, chiefly the German, and because it is usually too general in character to be of much value. German air raid damage to railway rolling stock behind Soviet lines does not necessarily represent a loss to the Germans if and when they eventually occupy the territory affected, because the rolling stock might otherwise have been evacuated or subjected to deliberate destruction by the Soviets before it could fall into German hands. The German air force has made a special target of transportation facilities and railways. The main lines and junctions near Leningrad, Moscow and other major centers have naturally received most attention, but German claims of damage or destruction of tracks, bridges, junctions, stations, locomotives, and other rolling stock, including tank cars, cover the whole front from Murmansk to the Black Sea. Communiqués of this kind from the German High Command and reports

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1/ Speck, from Nikolaev, Washington Post, Oct. 26.

2/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 9.

(9634)

from Berlin, often without indication of the location or extent of the damage, may be found almost daily in the New York Times. In the first two month of the war the German air force claims to have destroyed 689 "trains" and 66 important bridges.1/ Between July 27 and August 1 the Soviets lost, according to the Germans, 1,200 railway cars, apparently destroyed in military operations.2/

Official or semi-official German announcements often include references to the destruction by their armed forces of Soviet trucks, other vehicles, and horses, presumably used for military purposes. Here again the evidence is fragmentary. From the other side of the lines comes an incomplete report for October stating that 2,500 trucks in the hands of the Germans were destroyed by the Russians -- but these trucks may well have been brought into the occupied area by the Germans. On one occasion, 300 German trucks were submerged by the blowing up of a dam in the Rostov area.3/

Evidence of damage to roads and highway bridges is extremely vague and inconclusive, both as to degree of damage, and as to locations. Water transportation and port facilities have suffered from military action. The Germans claim to have sunk many freighters and transports in the Black Sea, thwarting Soviet

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1/ Special communiqué of the High Command, Aug. 22, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23.

2/ Ibid., Aug. 3.

3/ Moscow (U.P.), N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, Nov. 2. Although not in occupied territory, Soviet damage to the important Crnavoda railway bridge may be mentioned (British Min. of Econ. Warfare, "Weekly Summary" No. 102, Aug. 27).

evacuation and salvage efforts; the port of Odessa was filled with sunken ships, according to Hugo Speck.1/ The Germans also claim to have sunk 16 river boats southeast of Smolensk and to have damaged a lock in the Stalin Baltic-White-Sea Canal.2/ In addition to damage resulting from deliberate intent, the heavy military operations must have seriously dislocated transport and communication systems in large cities, as can be gathered from the eye-witness accounts of American correspondents after the German occupation of Minsk, Kiev, Odessa, Nikolaev, and other important centers.3/

4. Guerrilla Activity

One of the favorite occupations of the Soviet guerrillas is the destruction of railway transportation lines and equipment. This includes attacks on trains, burning of oil tank cars, destruction of bridges and stations, derailing of trains, removal of rails which are sometimes sunk in swamps, and burning of cross ties. Naturally, reports of these activities behind the German lines come mostly from the Russian side.4/ At Zhmerinka one civilian set fire to four gasoline and munitions trains, according to an official Soviet communiqué.5/ Caldwell reported from Moscow

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1/ From Odessa, Washington Post, Oct. 29; Black Sea sinkings reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 8, 9.

2/ N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 17.

3/ Washington Post, Oct. 23, 29; N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, etc.

4/ Sulzberger from Moscow, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, Caldwell from Moscow, PM, Aug. 7; Pravda, July 12.

5/ Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 23.

that guerrillas were removing rails and ties as fast as the Germans could lay them -- a quite incredible statement, of course.1/ On one occasion the guerrillas seized a small railway station and in a half hour took down several kilometers of wire, destroyed telephone and telegraph apparatus, blew up the water pump and burned the station. There are also other reports of the destruction of telegraph lines.2/ This type of sabotage was effective in Bessarabia and is said to be increasing in the Ukraine.3/

5. Reconstruction

The Germans have displayed great energy in the repair of railway lines, bridges and roads and in the conversion of the broad gauge to the normal European gauge in the occupied areas. Their success has been achieved in spite of the tremendous strain on the German transportation system as a whole, the great distances involved in the eastern campaign, the bad state of the Russian roads, the necessity of adapting the Soviet gauge to their own (partly because of the evacuation of many locomotives which rendered much of the remaining rolling stock useless), and the very considerable extent of damage from various causes.

All available horses and horse-drawn vehicles from occupied countries are reported to have been sent east. Railroad transportation in Finland was said to be very difficult for the Finns because the Germans were using most of the rolling stock.

1/ PM, Aug. 6.

2/ Pravda, July 10, Aug. 16, Aug. 26.

3/ Kuibyshev, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1.

Tank cars were brought from Estonia to Eastern Karelia where they were tied up for months because of the lack of storage tanks.1/

The Todt organization is supposed to be using 30,000 men in assisting the regular railway troops. On undamaged lines the rate of conversion to the European gauge is 50 kilometres per day, according to the German radio.2/ In his October 3 speech Hitler claimed that over 25,000 kilometres of Soviet tracks had been repaired and that more than 15,000 kilometres had been converted. All together, the Germans are said to have restored to operation the railway net for a distance of 600 miles from the Soviet border.3/

Specific examples of "miracles of reconstruction" are the repair of the Grodno railway bridge in 12 days, the construction of a 150-meter bridge over the Niemen at Szabany in 5 days, a 120-meter bridge over the Berezina in 2 days, and one 1,000 meters long over the Dnieper. Such work is frequently subjected to attack by Soviet troops in the rear. In 3 days, 150 kilometres of railway between Vilna and Kovno were changed to European gauge and in three months all Baltic railways were converted to that gauge.4/

1/ Tel. from Harrison, Bern, Nov. 12; from Schoenfeld, Helsinki, Nov. 27.

2/ British Min. of Econ. Warfare, "Weekly Summary" No. 99 (Aug. 6), No. 102 (Aug. 27).

3/ N.Y. Times, Oct. 4; Paul Wohl, "Russia can fight on," PM, Oct. 19; interview with Pierre Huss, I.N.S. correspondent who left Germany in November.

4/ Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Aug. 28; Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 24; radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, Nov. 14; photo of rail conversion in the Kaunas area, N.Y. Times, July 4.

According to an American correspondent in Vichy, the Soviet authorities had ordered the removal of the third rail which on the main lines in Latvia made it possible to operate standard as well as Russian-gauge rolling stock.1/

On the other hand, before the outbreak of the Russo-German war the Nazis were building freight cars with convertible axles for the same purpose, which could be used on both European gauge and Russian.2/ A reliable American witness claims that large German motor trucks, after adjustment, are run on Soviet railways. To expedite the work of gauge conversion (easier than the conversion of equipment), the Germans are said to be using a machine for picking up the widely-spaced rails and replacing them in the desired position in one operation.3/ In spite of men and machinery for repair and conversion, it appears that on certain crucial lines considerable delay occurred in the resumption of service.4/

In addition to the "Heeresbautruppen," or military construction troops, the Germans make use of prisoners and peasant forced labor for the repair and construction of roads and bridges.5/

1/ N.Y. Times, June 28.

2/ British Ministry of Economic Warfare, "Weekly Summary," No. 95 (July 14).

3/ Machine stated to have been shown in newsreels in New York. (Information supplied by O. J. Lissitzyn.)

4/ German Transocean Radio, July 31; British Min. of Econ. Warfare "Weekly Summary," No. 99 (Aug. 6). On Nov. 12, Harrison reported from Bern that standard gauge was now available as far east as Smolensk.

5/ Pravda, July 21; Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 16.

Roads in Galicia were said by the Germans to be in a "catastrophic" state, and their reconstruction a big job. Bundles of straw have been used to make roads passable. In order to make them satisfactory, millions of tons of cement would be needed for the whole occupied area.1/

There are indications that civilian communication systems are being restored. Radio stations as well as normal postal facilities are mentioned as functioning in a number of "Ostland" cities, and telegraph services from "Ostland" and Galicia have resumed functioning. According to Soviet sources, local peasants have been charged with the protection of telegraph lines from guerrillas, under threat of execution if damage occurs.2/

In estimating the state of transportation and communication facilities in occupied Russia it may be said that, in addition to military exigencies and normal demands, an extra strain will be placed on them by the necessity for salvaging and repairing machinery and industrial equipment. In many cases shortages of food in cities are caused by lack of means of transportation, and city residents are themselves going to the country for food.

F. POPULATION

In connection with the preceding discussion of agriculture and of industry, something has been said of the population groups that are directly connected with these economic activities. However

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1/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 12; Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 17; British Min. of Econ. Warfare, "Weekly Summary," No. 101 (Aug. 20).

2/ Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 26, 28; Pravda, Aug. 26.

in many cases the reports of mass changes of population do not state just what groups are affected.

Among the difficulties in arriving at conclusions with regard to the reduction of population in the occupied areas, is the fact that many statements on this subject seem to be exaggerated, or else sound like manufactured atrocity stories.

1. Planned Evacuation and Deportation

It is not possible to determine how much evacuation or deportation was effected by the Russians before and after June 22, 1941, from the areas acquired by the Soviets after September, 1939. The population of the territory recently regained by Finland was first depleted by the thousands who elected to migrate to Finland during or after the Russo-Finnish War, and then by Soviet deportation, mobilization, and voluntary or forced evacuation before and during the present war. The impression created by Finnish sources (perhaps purposely) is that urban and rural areas are generally deserted and denuded, except where the Finns advanced very rapidly.1/ Finnish exiles are beginning to return to their old homes. Indications are that the population of adjacent threatened areas (Murmansk, Leningrad district, etc.) has also been evacuated in part.

For the Baltic states, information comes largely from anti-Soviet or pro-German sources, and has some of the earmarks of atrocity stories. Thus an Estonian, evidently in exile during the Soviet occupation, reported on returning that probably 100,000

1/ Radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, Nov. 15; A.P., Helsinki N.Y. Times, Aug. 25; Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 1.

Estonians, including three-fourths of the intellectual and professional classes, were deported by the Russians to Siberia and elsewhere. Later other Estonians were mobilized by the Russians.[1] An Estonian deserter reported to the Finns that in July, 1941, 20,000 men from Tallinn had been drafted into the Red Army. Apparently about the same time the Soviet authorities were rounding up Estonians in general for evacuation eastward.[2] A comparable situation evidently exists in Latvia and Lithuania, with 50,000 and 100,000 respectively deported by the Soviets, according to a German statement. A Lithuanian official claims a 10 percent reduction in population, and says that the Soviets made a special point of deporting technical experts.[3]

For other areas the information does not lay claim to such precision, except in the case of certain cities, such as the large industrial centers of the Ukraine, where the Russians had time to evacuate some of the population, including skilled workers, along with industrial equipment. German peasant-colonists in the Odessa area had to hide to avoid being deported, a German witness reported.[4] One may say also that where heavy fighting occurred, or where the scorched-earth policy was carried out, considerable numbers of refugees accompanied the retreating Red Army in what has been described as an organized mass movement.1/ The evacuation of women and children from the large Western cities and from Leningrad and Moscow began soon after the outbreak of hostilities.2/ Mobilization, and the subsequent retreat of the Russian armies also effected, indirectly, a considerable evacuation of population, and particularly of able-bodied men. In the Kuibyshev region, there were said to be 250,000 refugees, evacuated according to plan, from all the war theatres, but mainly from Moscow, Belorussiia, and the Ukraine.3/

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[1] Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1; 150,000 were deported or killed by the Soviets, according to Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 12.

[2] Radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, n.d.; from Stockholm, N.Y. Times, July 25; Das Reich, July 20. Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Aug. 20, mentions the evacuation of a large part of the male population of an Estonian city.

[3] Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 7; Sonia Tomara, in N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 2, based on information supplied by the Lithuanian consul.

[4] Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 22.

2. Deliberate Destruction

Little can be said under this heading except to mention again the unverified references to the possible killing of population in the Baltic States by the Soviets, and the similar charges of atrocities committed by them in certain Polish and Ukrainian places. These charges emanate from German sources, and appear to be designed to create anti-Soviet feeling among the remaining local population, as well as in Germany and abroad.4/

1/ Izvestiia, July 24.

2/ Radiogram from Yeaton, Moscow, July 12; eye-witness report of Herman Habicht.

3/ A. T. Steele, Kuibyshev, Chicago Daily News, Nov. 24.

4/ However, Fleischer, U.P. Correspondent with the German Army, claims to have seen evidences of Soviet mass executions in Lvov jails. N.Y. Times, July 7.

(9634)

3. Reduction in Population Resulting from Military Operations or Unspecified Causes

The severe attacks on and protracted sieges of certain large cities must have resulted in many civilian casualties. The line between civilians and uniformed combatants was not clearly drawn, and this would contribute to the civilian casualty list. One Soviet source notes the large number of civilian wounded resulting from a German air raid attack on refugees.1/

4. Guerrilla Activity

Soviet guerrillas direct their attention in part to exterminating kulaks, "Petlurists," and other anti-Soviet elements that are cooperating with the Germans. Frequently the activities of guerrillas, whether with or without the cooperation of the local inhabitants, lead to reprisals, executions and the burning of villages by the Germans. The guerrillas are also said to assist the escape of civilians through the German lines to Soviet-controlled territory.

As a result of the blowing up of the Dnieper Dam, 10,000 persons were said to have been killed -- this according to a German soldier-reporter.2/

5. Relations Between the Germans and the Civilian Population

In their relations with the conquered population, the

1/ Izvestiia, July 24. cf. also official communiqué, Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 20.

2/ N.Y. Times, Nov. 9.

Germans are faced with a contradiction between their economic and their political aims, and between their immediate and their future plans. Realizing that the shortage of labor, particularly skilled and managerial, is one of the most pressing problems, the Germans have made some effort to temper their customary attitude and to gain the cooperation of local elements. The Nazis claim to have been welcomed by the population remaining in the Baltic states and even in the Ukraine (though they admit the presence of guerrillas) and they have given a certain encouragement to nationalist movements in an effort to create separatism and anti-Soviet feeling. However, they apparently have found little of the hoped-for Quisling support.1/

Many nationalists in both the Baltic area and the Ukraine have been disillusioned, the former because there seems to be little likelihood of local autonomy, and the latter because, in addition, their country has been dismembered. The Nazis have made attempts to enlist the Ukrainians in their anti-Bolshevik crusade by giving Ukrainian prisoners special treatment, using "Petlurists" in subordinate capacities, creating a Ukrainian "militia" and accusing the Soviets of anti-Ukrainian atrocities.2/

On the other hand, there are numerous reports of atrocities committed by the Germans. The pattern of German violence

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1/ Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Aug. 20; radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, Nov. 14, etc.

2/ Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Aug. 20; Pravda, Aug. 3, 7; N.Y. Times, July 6; Hugo Speck, "The Scorched Red Earth," Collier's, Dec. 6, p. 77; Fischer, with the German army at Kiev, Washington Post, Oct. 23.

includes the systematic liquidation of Jews and of key representatives and adherents of the former political and economic regime. An American correspondent with the Russian army at Odessa writes guardedly of the "treatment" of the Jews in Kiev, Zhitomir, Kherson, and other places -- the Germans claiming that the Ukrainians themselves often "took care" of matters.[1] Reports come of wholesale executions of Jews in Lithuania and Galicia, and of mass executions of Russian civilians as reprisals; 52,000 civilians are said to have been killed in Kiev, and many in Rostov and elsewhere.[2]

On the basis of intercepted German documents, the Soviets claim that war prisoners are either shot because of food shortage, or are ordered not to be shot because of labor shortage.[3] Some prisoners are released to work in the fields, others work on roads and bridges. Many have been sent to Germany, for agricultural and unskilled labor, or for training.[4] In parts of Belorusiia (White Russia), large numbers of the population have been transferred to the rear by the Germans, to do military construction work. The Germans look upon the Baltic area, Galicia and the

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[1] Oechsner, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 29; Pravda, Aug. 24, (based on intercepted German documents).

[2] Letter from Kaunas (via Germany, Aug. 11); N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 30, (based on the Red Star); PM, Dec. 1.

[3] Moscow News, Aug. 15; Pravda, July 21, etc.

[4] Pravda, July 21, 30, etc.; testimony of a reliable American witness. According to Pierre Huss, half a million Ukrainian prisoners have been returned to farms and factories (Interview, Dec. 23).

Ukraine as new sources of civilian labor for Germany; and labor conscription is reported to have been introduced.1/

The most detailed catalogue of Nazi atrocities and the most violent indictment of the German regime in occupied Soviet territory is Foreign Commissar Molotov's lengthy note of January 6.2/ According to this document the Germans are ruthlessly stripping both the urban and the rural population of their property, their food, and their clothing. Apparently they are pursuing a systematic policy of mistreatment. Forced labor, at the point of a gun, is exacted of young and old, men and women, peasants and city inhabitants, on roads, on military works, and far in the rear of the army. If these allegations of bruitality and of the destruction of lives and peoperty are even approximately true the Germans apparently are sacrificing the prospect of ultimate advantages for immediate material gain and military necessity.

In conclusion, it may be said at least that the usual Nazi arrogance and contempt for conquered peoples is even greater in Eastern Europe than elsewhere, but that, except insofar as the Jews are concerned, it is temporarily and partially checked by the exigencies of the problem of labor supply.

6. Housing

Some deductions with respect to population and labor supply may be drawn from the degree of damage to villages and towns in the occupied areas. Apparently urban areas have suffered more

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1/ Pravda, Aug. 11; editorial in Deutsche Volkswirt, Sept. 26; Stevens, Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25.

2/ Washington Times-Herald, Jan. 9, 10, 1942.

(9634)

than villages. With the exception of those along the border, most of the towns have been damaged. The destruction of housing, from whatever causes, together with the effects of malnutrition, will contribute to disease and will still further reduce the labor supply.

Foreign Commissar Molotov, in his note of January 6, accuses the Germans of systematic, wholesale destruction of villages and towns. However, a considerable amount of such damage must be attributed to accidental or military causes. On the other hand there is no reason to doubt his claim that the Germans have ordered the creation of a "desert" zone in the occupied territory which they are evacuating.[1]

G. ADMINISTRATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORY

The degree of, and the method used in, the removal or damage of the economic resources and facilities of occupied Russia have been discussed in preceding sections. This section will consider in general the German procedure and plans for the immediate and future exploitation of this territory. The Nazis have one simple objective -- to make the territory already conquered and any that may be conquered entirely subservient to the interests of Germany. This means, first, requisitioning and salvaging goods and food which can be used at home or in carrying on the war; second, acquiring raw materials and maintaining or increasing production for military purposes; and third, long-term plans for the thorough exploitation of former Russian territory for the benefit of Germany. The Germans may well be appalled at the magnitude of the task of organization, administration and policing.

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[1] Text of Molotov's note, Washington Times-Herald, Jan. 9, 1942. For other details on population and housing see Sections C and D and the Appendix.

1. Administration

Although only recently officially confirmed as "Reich Minister for the East," Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi ideologist on the East, was from the beginning earmarked for the post of administrator of the territory conquered from Russia. Alfred Meyer serves as his deputy.[1] So far the two main subdivisions are Ostland and the Ukraine. Ostland, under Heinrich Lohse as Reich Commissar, includes former Lithuania (under A. von Renteln), Latvia, and Soviet Belorussiia (White Russia) under Wilhelm Kube as deputy. Estonia, until recently under military administration, is now in the hands of K. S. Litzmann. Eastern Karelia presumably will be attached to the puppet state of Finland. The Ukraine is administered by Erich Koch, with the exception of eastern Galicia (governed by Dr. Lasch), which has been incorporated in the General Gouvernement of Warsaw, and Odessa with its hinterland ("Transnistria") which along with Bessarabia and Bukovina has been placed under Rumanian administration. This system of territorial organization is not regarded as a final one.[2]

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[1] A. Visson, "Rosenberg Goes to Russia," *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, Dec. 3.

[2] *N.Y. Times*, Oct. 9; Nov. 17; A.P., Berlin. *Ch. Sc. Monitor*, Nov. 17; report of S. E. Woods, Commercial Attaché, Berlin, Aug. 25.

Subordinate administrative posts go chiefly to native Nazi Germans who have been especially prepared for work in the East. Qualified Nazi experts with Russian background have been prepared to take over the administration of every kind of agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprise, as well as the more strictly political functions.1/ However, owing to the shortage of labor and the great need for experts, it may be that anti-Bolshevik emigré nationals who formerly lived in the territories now occupied by the Germans are also being recruited for service in the East. Swedes, Frenchmen, Rumanians and Germans from Switzerland have also been mentioned in this connection. Some emigrés who registered to have their land returned are said to have received important posts.2/

In this connection it should be noted that Germans brought back from the Baltic states after the Soviet advances of 1939 are not now allowed to return to their Baltic homes, but must help to Germanize the portions of former Poland that are now incorporated in the Reich. There is even some question whether the German Baltic barons will be permitted to return to the Baltic lands, either as administrators or as landlords.3/ Similarly it seems probable that the Germans expatriated from Bessarabia in 1940 will

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1/ A.P., Berlin, N.Y. Times, July 26.

2/ Letter from Adam Nowicki to the Polish Daily News (Detroit), referring to a statement in the Journal de Genève; British Min. of Econ. Warfare, "Weekly Summary," No. 100 (Aug. 13); No. 102 (Aug. 24).

3/ Ch. Sc. Monitor, Oct. 25; "Nazi Policies in Eastern Europe," Div. of European Affairs, Dept. of State, Sept. 15; Andre Visson, "Rosenberg Goes to Russia," N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 3.

be used for Germanization elsewhere, instead of being returned to their old homes. It has been announced that the Rumanians between the Dniester and the Bug would be repatriated to Rumania proper.1/ As has already been pointed out, the Germans have had scant success in playing up local nationalist sentiment.

2. Reconstruction

The task of cleaning up the wreckage and making the most necessary repairs after the military have done their work was carried out by the famed Todt organization in the East, as elsewhere, although here their duties were especially heavy owing to the effectiveness of the scorched-earth policy and the bitterness of the fighting. Attention was first given to restoring transportation and communication facilities, after which technicians did what they could to prevent further loss and sabotage to surviving equipment and plants.2/ Subsequent reconstruction work is entrusted to supplementary labor battalions made up of recruits, volunteers and labor conscripts. Finally the job of economic exploitation is taken over by special experts.3/

3. Exploitation; Regional Problems

Although the administration of the East is in the hands

1/ Edmund Stevens, "Bessarabia, Nazi Football," Ch. Sc. Monitor Weekly Magazine, Aug. 30; A.P., with the Rumanian army at Ochakov, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30. It may be noted, however, that a large part of the territory between the two rivers has been annexed to Rumania.

2/ Ch. Sc. Monitor, Nov. 27.

3/ A radio dispatch from Helsinki to the Chicago Tribune, Nov. 14, reports that recruits from the Baltic states are used to assist the Todt Battalions.

of Rosenberg, economic exploitation is under Göring, to whom Minister of Economics Funk is now subordinated. The Nazis' aim for the whole eastern territory from Finland to the Black Sea is to make it subservient to the needs of Germany in war and peace. But as one of Germany's avowed objects is fighting Bolshevism, there are certain contradictions between political and economic aims.

The problems of exploitation differ somewhat in the several politico - geographic areas. First of all a distinction must be made between areas belonging to the Soviet Union before 1939, and those subsequently annexed by the Soviets. In the former, private ownership of the means of production and distribution had been very largely eliminated. In the new territories, this process of socialization was under way but had not been completed.

In the reconquered Finnish territories, rather heavily depopulated and devastated, the great problem is the shortage of labor for agricultural resettlement and industrial revival. A beginning has already been made here in reopening a number of damaged factories. There is, in addition, an extreme shortage of food and fodder and a deficiency of important minerals in Finland as a whole. Only indirectly is this Germany's problem, but Germany can gain little from Karelia's resources. Furthermore, little fresh assistance for Germany may be expected from Finland's basic industries, even under German operation.1/

In the Baltic part of Ostland the Soviets had not had

1/ Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Aug. 20; Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 1, Sept. 14; British Min. of Econ. Warfare, "Weekly Summary," No. 101 (Aug. 20).

time to collectivize industry and agriculture to the same extent as in Belorussiia. In the Baltic area the problem is to exploit the agricultural resources and to increase production; the question of restoring property to the former owners is not so urgent. Where property is returning to private hands, the new owners are likely to be Germans.1/ In Eastern Galicia the task is to coordinate the territory economically with the General Gouvernement of Warsaw. Private property is being gradually reintroduced, although not necessarily with the return of property to the original owners.2/

The status of Rumania and her new and regained lands is comparable to that of Finland: all Rumanian territory, old and new, is subject to indirect exploitation by Germany. Even some war booty on the way to Rumania has been diverted to Germany. Rumania's effort in the war has further strained her resources, therefore Germany's. In addition there is direct damage such as the bombing of the Ploesti oil refineries, the Crnavoda bridge, and Constanza.

The Ukraine and adjoining areas of the R.S.F.S.R. represent a rich source of raw materials, and agricultural areas already adapted to large-scale production; but also unusual war damage, and labor and transportation problems that must be solved before considerable gains can be realized by Germany. Much less important, economically, is the acquisition of Belorussiia.

1/ Deutsche Volkswirt, Oct. 17.

2/ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 22, Oct. 8.

4. Finance

The Germans intend to profit from the financial and business transactions in conquered Soviet territory as in other parts of Europe, through currency regulation, banks, insurance and other measures favoring German interests, as well as through the acquisition of metal coinage. Reichskreditkassen (occupation) marks are used to loot the inhabitants. The principal German banks are establishing branches throughout the area. Thus the Dresdner Bank, for example, has a subsidiary, "Handels-und-Kredit Bank," for Ostland in Riga, with branches in Tallinn, Kaunas, Narva, Minsk, Libau, Siauliai and Vilna. Other German credit institutions have branches in Brest-Litovsk, Krivoi Rog and Narva, and the German bank of emission in Poland has opened branches in Galicia. A new bank, Landeswirtschaftsbank A. G., Lemberg, has also been opened in Lvov.[1]

The establishment of German banks is designed not only to further the interests of German enterprises already at work, but to assist in the process of restoring private property, rendered difficult by the destruction of records. The German insurance system for industries has already replaced that of the Soviets, and plans have been made for a postal savings system to attract the savings of the native population into active economic development. Workers in Germany from various parts of occupied territory are not subject to currency-law limitations in the transfer of their savings.1/

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[1] Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 9, Oct. 1, 5, 14, 18, 20; Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 21.

5. Plans for the Future

The guiding principle for the future of Eastern Europe is to reorganize it in such ways as to make it of the greatest use and profit to Germans. It must complement the "Master Plan" for the reorganization of Europe. There will be gradations in the Germanization of its population and its resources. Some areas will be incorporated in the Reich and thoroughly Germanized; others, such as the General Gouvernement of Warsaw, will be coordinated with the Reich and may retain a substratum of non-German forced labor. In Ostland, an effort may be made to balance industry and agriculture by stimulating the migration of the former from other occupied territories. The areas further to the East will remain the great but passive source of raw materials. Here demobilized soldiers and German colonists are to be planted; and when the supply of these is exhausted, Danes, Dutch or other Germanic peoples will be brought in. Non-Germanic elements from both Central Europe and Western Russia will gradually be shifted to the lands east of the Urals.2/

J. F. Clarke
O. J. Lissitzyn

1/ Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Oct. 14; Deutsche Volkswirt, Oct. 17; Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 25.

2/ See Funk's address at the Koenigsberg Eastern Fair, Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 13; Ribbentrop's speech to anti-Comintern delegates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27; plan in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung quoted in Ch. Sc. Monitor, Nov. 24; radio dispatch from D. M. Nichol, Bern, Nov. 28, to Chicago Daily News, referring to articles in Das Reich and Die Weltwoche; report of S. E. Woods, Commercial Attaché, Berlin, Aug. 25.

APPENDIX

CONDITION OF CITIES IN THE OCCUPIED AREA

ALEKSOTAS (Lithuania) - Bridge destroyed, replaced by foot bridge. (Letter from Kaunas, via Germany, Aug. 11.)

BALTIC PORT (Estonia) - Heavy air raids reported. (N.Y. Times, July 2.)

BIALOSTOK (Western Belorussiia) - Many marks of war, but not completely destroyed. Some main streets look undamaged. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 15; Hugo Speck, "The Scorched Red Earth," Collier's, Dec. 6, p. 13.)

BELAIA TSERKOV (Ukraine) - Practically wiped out. (Oechsner, touring occupied area, PM, Oct. 29.)

BOBRUISK (Belorussiia) - Repeatedly bombed by German air force before capture. (Official Soviet communiqué, N.Y. Times, June 28.)

BORISOV (Belorussiia) - Repeatedly bombed by German air force before capture (official Soviet communique, N.Y. Times, June 28) and set ablaze (Berlin, N.Y. Times, July 2). Not over 3,000 inhabitants remained under German occupation, according to alleged official report seized by Red Army. Difficulty in chieving cooperation with natives in local administration, compulsory labor service. (Official Soviet communiqué Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 16.)

BREST LITOVSK (Western Ukraine) - At least 1,000 persons allegedly shot by Germans. (Moscow News, Aug. 11.) Prior to capture, city was heavily bombarded by artillery. (Official German communiqué, N.Y. Times, June 30.)

CERNAUTI (CZERNOWITZ) (Bukovina) - Relatively little damage. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 19.)

CHERVEN (Belorussiia) - Many people reported shot by Germans. (Pravda, July 12.)

DNIEPROPETROVSK (Ukraine) - Considerable steel plant equipment announced by Soviets to have been evacuated. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 31.) German photo and caption indicate artillery fire and street fighting caused much destruction. (Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 12.) This confirmed by soldier-correspondent. (Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 7.)

DOROGOBUZH (R.S.F.S.R.) - Visited by A. T. Steele while in Russian hands after battles, found to be a "ghost town," with one-quarter of houses and people remaining. Steel bridge blown up. (Washington Star). Later taken by Germans.

DROHOBYCZ (Western Ukraine) - Only active oil wells destroyed; others untouched. (Well informed source.)

DVINSK (Dünaburg, Daugavpils) (Latvia) - Photos showing demolitions. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 9, Völkischer Beobachter, July 10.)

ELISENVAARA (Finnish Karelia) - Complete destruction reported by Finns.

ELNIA (R.S.F.S.R.) - A fire-gutted mess after Russian recapture; only an old church left. (A. T. Steele, Washington Star, Sept. 28; Ch. Sc. Monitor, Sept. 23.) Later retaken by Germans.

ENSO (Finnish Karelia) - Industrial works, particularly the chemical factories, destroyed. (Helsinki, N.Y. Times, June 30.) Sulphate and celluloid factories damaged by fire. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 14), Much damage in general. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 24).

GLUSK (Belorussiia) - KIM factory, power plant, shops, warehouses, offices, restaurant, club, destroyed. (Pravda, Aug. 20).

GOMEL (Belorussiia) - According to article in Red Star, by Major General Berezovsky, city pretty well devastated by Russians, large quantities of machinery removed from factories; two nearby bridges destroyed. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 28.) German source reports complete destruction by retreating Russians. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 29).

GORKI (Belorussiia) - Photo shows two completely razed city blocks, (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 1).

GRODNO (Western Belorussiia) - Photo shows some destruction. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 3.)

HANKO (Finland) - In Hanko and surrounding area evacuating Soviet troops were blowing up, burning and destroying buildings and property, in spite of German-Finnish radio warning to desist. (Radio from Helsinki to Chicago Tribune, quoting Uusi Suomi.)

HOROSHOV (Western Ukraine) - Photo showing considerable destruction. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 10.)

JONOVA (Lithuania) - Completely in ruins, except church. (Letter from Kaunas via Germany, Aug. 11.)

KALININ (R.S.F.S.R.) - Apparently completely demolished, according to Soviet reports. (N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, Nov. 3, Nov. 4.)

KAUNAS (Lithuania) - Photo shows city apparently intact. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 5.) "Green" railway bridge demolished; replaced by good emergency bridge; 10,000 Jews shot, many have fled. (Letter from Kaunas, via Germany, Aug. 11.)

KEXHOLM (Finnish Karelia) - Scorched earth policy carried out. (Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Sept. 3.) Only a few suburban houses, one or two factory buildings, and a high school remain. Rest in ruins. (A.P., Helsinki, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24.) At cellulose factory of Waldorf-Konzern buildings remain, machinery destroyed or taken away. Lodgings of workers and employees destroyed. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 13.)

KHARKOV (Ukraine) - Red army claimed important factories and huge stocks of raw materials evacuated; some plants of military importance blown up. (N.Y. Times, Oct. 30.) Difficulties with mines admitted by Germans (N.Y. Times, Nov. 26) who also reported city "a sea of flames," with much machinery and tools destroyed or removed. (N.Y. Times, Oct. 26.) German photos show some buildings intact, a bridge damaged but not destroyed. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 29; PM Oct. 29.)

KIEV (Ukraine) - Not destroyed to extent of Warsaw (eyewitness). Systematic destruction of industrial plants by Russians. (Der Bund, Sept. 22.) Prior to German occupation, many warehouses, waterworks, railroad lines, locomotives and rolling stock claimed destroyed by German air raids. (N.Y. Times, July 15; Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 17.) Russian sources claimed evacuation of all non-essential civilians in July (N.Y. Times, July 18); number of civilian evacués reported as 300,000 by correspondent with German army. (Fisher, A.P., Washington Post, Oct. 23.) At first city as whole appeared relatively undamaged on the arrival of German troops, but delayed explosions created much havoc, and a fire, which burned for five days, destroyed large part of center of city. Russians had removed fire-fighting equipment. Transportation in city thoroughly disrupted, power cut off for several weeks for fear of explosions, bridges destroyed. Food stores destroyed, but after several weeks, a small proportion of food plants were operating. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 3, 5, 17, Fisher, with the German army, Washington Post, Oct. 23; radio dispatches to Chicago Tribune, n.d.; Hugo Speck, "The Scorched Red Earth," Collier's, Dec. 6, p. 13.) Russian sources claim Germans killed 52,000 people within a few days. (N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 30.)

KINGISEPP (R.S.F.S.R.) - Photo of burning city. (Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 11.)

KISHINEV (Bessarabia) - Badly damaged, turned into "a heap of ruins" by explosions and fire. (Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Sept. 16, Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 19, Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 3.)

KREMENCHUG (Ukraine) - Set on fire by retreating Russians. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 2).

KYBARTAI (Lithuania) - Practically untouched; male Jews shot. (Letter from Kaunas, via Germany, Aug. 11.)

LAHDENPOJA (Finnish Karelia) - Big plywood mill burned down. Otherwise little damage. (Helsinki, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17.)

LIBAU (Latvia) - Germans claim docks and naval yards undamaged (N.Y. Times, July 19), but say old city was completely destroyed. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 24.) Photo and caption indicate considerable destruction. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 19.) Southern part completely gutted. (Newsreel shown in Berlin.)

(Ø634)

LIDA (Western Belorussiia) - Photo shows demolition. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 9.)

LUCK (Western Ukraine) - Photos show flames sweeping city (N.Y. Times, July 9), and other destruction. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 10.)

LVOV (Western Ukraine) - Many atrocities claimed by both sides. German sources allege execution of 2,000-3,000 by Soviets. (N.Y. Times, July 6), Soviet sources allege at least 6,000 shot by Germans. (Moscow News, Aug. 8.) Allegations of looting of residences and stores by German soldiers indicate little prior destruction. (Pravda, Aug. 9.) Few signs of damage found by Germans after entrance. (Das Reich, July 13.)

MARIJAMPOLE (Lithuania) - More than half the houses burned. (Letter from Kaunas, via Germany, Aug. 11.)

MARIUPOL (Ukraine) - Evacuation of principal factories, destruction of most of remainder after last-moment production, including Azovstal blast furnaces and mills, and Iliich factory power plant, waterworks and part of remaining equipment. (Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Nov. 6, citing Pravda.) German soldier-reporter claimed little destruction in city, some factories still emitting smoke when Germans arrived, as if production had been uninterrupted. Most of industrial establishments seemed intact. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 17.)

MÄRJIAMAA (Estonia) - Almost completely destroyed. (Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1.)

MELITOPOL (Ukraine) - According to German newsreel review, taken after bitterly contested battle. Russians made a pile of ruins of the city. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 25.)

MINSK (Belorussiia) - Photo shows great destruction, but parts of town untouched. Eventually one street car line will resume operation. Only 14 street cars available. (*N.Y. Times*, Oct. 9.) Not as deserted as Smolensk (Steinkopf, *N.Y. Times*, Aug. 12) but photos show demoliton. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Aug. 9, *N.Y. Times*, July 20, Sept. 3.) Other photos show large buildings undamaged. (*Völkischer Beobachter*, July 10, *N.Y. Times*, July 17.) Newsreel shown in Berlin shows it a shambles. (*N.Y. Times*, July 18.)

MOGILEV (Belorussiia) - Repeatedly bombed by German air force. (Official Soviet communiqué, *N.Y. Times*, June 28.) One of the last points of Soviet resistance in this area, taken after bitter fighting.

NARVA (Estonia) - Photos show no destruction except of a bridge (*Völkischer Beobachter*, Aug. 26, Sept. 17.) Textile plants and bridges destroyed (textile *buildings* standing) by scorched earth and battle. (Information from American correspondents.) Railway and wooden road bridges blown up. (Secret source.)

NEVEL (R.S.F.S.R.) - In ruins; little life remains. (*Völkischer Beobachter*, Aug. 24.)

NIKOLAEV (Ukraine) - Official Soviet claim of destruction of shipyards and warships under construction. (*N.Y. Times*, Aug. 18.) Statement of Lozovsky (*Bakinskii Rabochii*, Aug. 23), disputed by German communiqué and photos (*N.Y. Times*, Aug. 20, *Völkischer Beobachter*, Sept. 5, 6), indicating that at least a part of the yards and ships escaped destruction. City visited by several foreign correspondents, whose accounts may be summarized as follows: A 35,000-ton battleship under construction has remained

(9634)

undestroyed; rest of the warships under construction and perhaps 90% of the shipyards were reduced to scrap iron by fire, or at least seriously damaged. Large sections of city in ruins, including a large power station, textile plant, airplane parts factory and fish cannery, as well as all food storage facilities and warehouses with their contents, except two grain elevators. Establishments not destroyed included the old power plant, a small soap factory, and a nearly completed large brewery. Two small electric power plants and one small plate-cutting shop remained undestroyed in the shipyards. Germans also claim to have seized two new 158-millimeter naval guns, 1,000 tons of finished steel plates, a dozen motors and some thousands of spare parts at the speed boat plant, 23 locomotives, and one motorcycle and some plane parts, recovered by divers from the river, where the Russians had been rumored to have sunk immense quantities of war materials. A few street cars remained, but the river ferry boats had dissappeared. Water and some power were available. Remaining population estimated at 100,000; of the 25,000 shipyard workers, 2,000 returned to work. City one of the best examples of "scorched earth." After two months, it was still dead. (Hugo Speck, Washington Post, Oct. 26, Oechsner, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26; a dispatch from Ochakov, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, radio dispatch to Chicago Tribune, n.d. See also C. Brooks Peters, Berlin, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20.)

NOVGOROD (R.S.F.S.R.) - "Smoking ruins." (Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Aug. 28.) Only 50-60 houses intact. City devastated by Nazi bombings. (Sulzberger, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, citing Red

Star.) There was desperate street fighting. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 29.)

NOVOGRAD-VOLYNSKII (Ukraine) - Looting of stores by German soldiers, alleged by Soviet sources on basis of German soldiers' letters, indicates little destruction had taken place. (Moscow News, Aug. 27.)

OCHAKOV (Ukraine) - Almost all buildings reduced to skeletons. (A.P. correspondent with the Rumanian army, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30.)

ODESSA (Ukraine) - Taken after siege, city is by all sides reported to have been considerably damaged. German air raids resulted in sunken ships cluttering up harbor. In addition to combat destruction, city suffered from delayed explosions after German occupation. Much of population, stocks and industrial equipment, evacuated or destroyed before the Red army abandoned the city. The harbor (including old quarantine pier, new pier, Androvsky pier, old harbor pier and dry docks) said to be damaged. Many oil tanks set on fire. The inner city found less damaged. Skilled workers mostly evacuated. A German soldier-reporter, who visited the city immediately after the entrance of Rumanian troops, counted at least six distinct "seas of fire," with factories and oil tanks ablaze. Northern part flooded by broken dams, but not badly. Rumanians claimed to have found large reserves of food, but there is a food shortage. No estimate of the number of population remaining. Some peasants from the surrounding areas were in the city. Odessa was annexed by Rumania and made capital of "Transnistria." (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 18, Oct. 22; Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 22; N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, Oct. 17, Oct. 24, Nov. 11;

(9634)

Oechsner, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Oct. 29, Chicago Daily News, Oct. 30, Hugo Speck, Washington Post, Oct. 29, radio dispatch to Chicago Tribune, n.d.) Fired and ruined on large scale during 8 days before Soviet evacuation. Most men and materials removed by sea. (Oechsner to Gunther, Bucharest, Oct. 25.)

OLONETS (Aunus) (Eastern Karelia) - Little destruction, only a few houses burned. Many of the people who fled to the woods are returning. (Sp. Corr. Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 5.)

OREL (R.S.F.S.R.) - Photo shows some houses burning. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 28.)

OSTROV (R.S.F.S.R.) - A field of ruins; little life remains. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 24.)

PETROZAVODSK (Petroskoi, Anislinna) (Eastern Karelia) - Finnish sources: relatively little destruction, half of important buildings unharmed, but civilians mostly evacuated. (N.Y. Times, Oct. 3.) Soviet intention to blow up university failed. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 14.) Confirmed by photos, showing railroad station and a number of houses undestroyed. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 9, 24.) Population evacuated. (Swedish source, Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 3.)

PITKAERANTA (Finnish Karelia) - "Still burning" and completely devastated. Of Finland's largest cellulose factory only walls and smashed skeletons of machinery remain. (Svend Carstensen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25.)

POLTAVA (Ukraine) - Systematic destruction of industrial plants claimed by Russians. (Der Bund, Sept. 22.)

PORKHOV (R.S.F.S.R.) - A field of ruins; little life remains. (*Völkischer Beobachter*, Aug. 24.)

PSKOV (R.S.F.S.R.) - Half ruined. (Newsreel shown in Berlin.)

RIGA (Latvia) - Subjected to artillery bombardment. (London, citing Stockholm, *N.Y. Times*, June 29.) Old German quarter, containing historical landmarks, burned down by Russians. The Moscow suburb on the other side of Dvina also badly damaged; rest of city in relatively good shape. Street cars and water supply working, stores well provided, except some bakeries and fish markets. (*Völkischer Beobachter*, Aug. 3, 5.) Sawmills, furniture factories, carpentry and cabinet making shops reported in operation. (Edmund Stevens, *Ch. Sc. Monitor*, Oct. 25.) Many public buildings and whole streets of houses destroyed. Stores destroyed or removed by Russians. (Secret Source.) Surprisingly small amount of industrial destruction. (Testimony of a reliable American witness, from information supplied by Americans at embassy at Berlin and at Riga.)

ROGACHEV (Belorussiia) - Many buildings destroyed. (*Bakinskii Rabochii*, July 22, citing *Izvestiia*.)

ROSTOV (R.S.F.S.R.) - Many buildings razed by retreating Germans. (*PM*, Dec. 1.) Germans deny completely destroying Rostov. (*N.Y. Times*, Dec. 4.)

ROUHIALA (Finnish Karelia) - Waterpower plant badly damaged. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, Sept. 14.)

ROVNO (Western Ukraine) - Few undamaged buildings. (E. G. Fisher, with the German army, *Washington Post*, Oct. 23.)

SIAULIAI (Shavli) (Lithuania) - A lot of destruction because of a battle. 20,000 - 30,000 population. (From German press and Lithuanian sources.)

SKVIRA (Ukraine) - Photo shows city apparently undamaged. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 10.)

SMOLENSK (R.S.F.S.R.) - Set afire (by retiring Russians), now in ruins, about 90% of city destroyed. Apparently all bridges down. 20,000 population (of 160,000) remain. Local anti-communist lawyer appointed burgomaster. (Alvin J. Steinkopf, on tour under Germam auspices, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12.) Prior to German occupation reported ceaselessly bombed from air, with factories among objectives, and in flames. (Berlin, N.Y. Times, July 2, 6.) In general, tremendous destruction reported. (N.Y. Times, July 20, 25; Völkischer Beobachter, July 30, Aug. 5.) Dnieper bridge blown up. City badly destroyed, except main hotel, cathedral, government buildings (according to American correspondents).

SORTAVALA (Finnish Karelia) - Swedish newspaper men, eye-witnesses, reported some factories and houses set afire by Russian artillery. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 4.) Whole blocks in ruins. Practically no civilians. (Svend Carstensen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25.) German photo and caption indicate little destruction, although a few fires set by Soviet artillery bombardment. A destroyed bridge. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 29; see also Louis Barcata, sp. corr., Das Reich, Sept. 7.)

TAGANROG (R.S.F.S.R.) - Hard fighting, destruction by Russians, burning gasoline and munition stocks; population stayed behind. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 28.)

TALLINN (Estonia) - Much damage caused by German air raids, especially to railroad station. Much of city, including the station burned, harbor in a desolate condition. (Berlin, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30; Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 20.) The historic center of the city, however, has remained undestroyed (N.Y. Times, Aug. 30; Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 2) and the town was less damaged than expected; Krull metal works, cellulose factory, power and gas works, both railroad stations, harbor works and shipyards, the port, and Puhk flour mill, reduced to ruins, but the Luther plywood and furniture factory undamaged. Goods removed to Russia or loaded on ships which were sunk. (Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1.) Main harbor - buildings, warehouses, cranes destroyed; railway yard and main station badly damaged, electric power station and gas works partly destroyed. Ellana power station functioning, water works not damaged (Secret source). By September life was becoming "normal," greater part of the enterprises had reopened. (Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 12.)

TAPA (Estonia) - Almost completely destroyed. (Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1.) Harbor railway station and junction partially destroyed (Secret source).

TARTU (Dorpat) (Estonia) - Oil refineries reported destroyed. (Third-hand report, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10.) A photo and caption show some destruction in city; bridge over Embach blown up. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 24, Aug. 22.) City generally ruined, bridges demolished. (Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1.) Library reported burned. (Letter from Berlin, Aug. 7.)

(9634)

TIMKOVICHI (Belorussiia) - Guerrilla activities, including blowing up of munition stores, fuel base and two food warehouses. Population hid in the woods to escape reprisals. (Official Soviet communiqué, Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 17.)

TIRASPOL (Moldavian S.S.R.) - According to an official French reporter in Russia, population almost entirely evacuated. (Vichy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11.)

TÜRI (Estonia) - Almost completely destroyed. (Letter from Tallinn, Oct. 1.)

UMAN (Ukraine) - Blasted by Russians. Stores closed, because nothing to sell (i.e., not destroyed ?). (Oechsner, on tour in occupied area, PM, Oct. 29.)

UNGHENI (Bessarabia) - All houses destroyed by artillery, fire, arson and bombs. (Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, Sept. 16.)

VÄRTSILÄ (Finnish Karelia) - Iron works reported burned with rest of town. (Helsinki, N.Y. Times, July 19.) Rebuilding of iron works begun. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 14.)

VELIKIE LUKI (R.S.F.S.R.) - Although in photo some buildings look intact, caption says that here, as in almost all cities given up by Soviets, everything that could burn was destroyed. (Völkischer Beobachter, Sept. 7.)

VIAZMA (R.S.F.S.R.) - Photo and caption indicate city badly damaged in battles. (Völkischer Beobachter, Oct. 26.)

VIIPURI (Finnish Karelia) - Much damage reported, especially to eastern and southern parts, railroad station, harbor facilities, bridges and factories. 40% of buildings escaped serious damage.

Center of city uninhabited. (Svend Carstensen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, Sept. 6, see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, Sept. 1.) Great destruction, mostly deliberate, but some dating back to 1940, some houses intact, but the station razed to ground. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 10.) Practically no population left. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 1.) Finnish proposal to interest other Scandinavian countries in rebuilding Viipuri as an outpost against the East. Subscriptions collected in Denmark and Sweden. (Das Reich, Sept. 14.)

VILNA (Lithuania) - Undamaged. (Letter from Kaunas.) Industrial enterprises, especially woodprocessing plants, sawmills and furniture, paper and cardboard factories have resumed operations. Industries producing building materials, for which there is much demand, are also active. There is an abundance of raw materials for all these industries. (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 30.)

VILKAVISKIS (Lithuania) - Scene of desolation; male Jews shot. (Letter from Kaunas.)

VIRBALIS (Lithuania) - Practically untouched. (Ibid.)

VITEBSK (Belorussiia) - Not as desolate as Smolensk (Steinkopf, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12), but photo and caption indicate great destruction, many blocks in ruins, fire set by Russians. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 25.) Little life remains in these ruins of a city. (Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 24.) One of the photos shows what is apparently an industrial area, completely destroyed. (Völkischer Beobachter, July 22.)

VOLODARSK-VOLYNSK (Ukraine) - Much population possibly remained behind. (Official Soviet communiqué, describing German atrocities, (Bakinskii Rabochii, Aug. 20.)

ZABLUDOV - Photos show demolition. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 9; N.Y. Times, July 13.)

ZHITOMIR (Ukraine) - Few undamaged buildings. Refugees returning. (E. G. Fisher, with the German army, Washington Post, Oct. 23.)

ZHLOBIN (Belorussiia) - Recaptured by Russians, much destruction found; majority of houses burned, wine cellars looted. (Bakinskii Rabochii, July 19.) Later city was retaken by Germans.